Erechin

Erechin 16b: Staying at the Same Inn

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Erechin 16b: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: From where in the Torah do we learn that a person should not change his place of lodging? From the verse (Bereishis 13:3), “[Avraham traveled] until the place where his tent was earlier.” Rabbi Yossi bar Chanina said: From the words, “He traveled on his [earlier] journeys.” What is the practical difference between these two opinions? For a traveler who happens to sleep there. (Rashi: He stopped there just because it happened to get dark in that place.) 

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: מנין שלא ישנה אדם באכסניא שלו מן התורה? שנאמר: (בראשית י״ג) עד המקום אשר היה שם אהלו בתחלה. רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר, מהכא: (בראשית י״ג) וילך למסעיו. מאי בינייהו? איכא בינייהו אכסנאי דאקראי.

Once, Rabbi Yisroel Salanter came to Dvinsk, and no one in town knew of his visit. He rented a run-down room in a basement. A short time later, he came to Dvinsk again, this time with public fanfare. The gedolim and important people of the town gave him tremendous honor. But incredibly, he lodged in the same basement again, and all his great visitors had to come to speak to him there. All their pleas to him to let them find him a more appropriate accommodation were in vain; he would not violate Chazal’s dictum that a person should not change his place of lodging.

[It could be argued that the rule of not changing one’s place of lodging applies only when the old host and the new host are both inviting you to their houses; in that case you should not offend your old host by staying with a different host. But in a case when a person pays money for his room, it may happen that the first time he was only able to afford a low-quality room, and now he can afford something better, or perhaps now he needs something better and is willing to pay for it. In this case the laws of the free market take over: if the old hotel owner is not providing the product he needs, he can search elsewhere.

From this story, however, we see that Reb Yisroel held that even when one is paying money, the rule applies because there is still some personal honor involved: the first inn owner would feel slighted if he saw Reb Yisroel coming to town and staying somewhere else.

The Gemara brings a dispute as to whether this law applies when a person just happened to lodge somewhere. The question is which opinion the halacha follows, and, if it follows the lenient opinion, whether this leniency applies to our case, where Reb Yisroel just happened to lodge in the basement the first time because he couldn’t afford more. From the story, in which Reb Yisroel was strict, we can conclude that either he paskened like the stricter opinion, or else he held that even the lenient opinion only said it in a case when he didn’t mean to stay in the town at all, just stopped there because it got dark, but in this case, where he meant to stay in Dvinsk, everyone would agree that he must stay at the same place of lodging.]

Kiddushin

Kiddushin 40b: Courtesy and Manners

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Kiddushin 40b: Learning is great, for it leads to keeping mitzvos.

Ri Hazakein: Even good midos must come from the Torah, and if someone has not learned Torah but has naturally good midos, even his midos are incorrect. Rabbi Ovadia of Bartenura on Avos 1:1: The midos in Masechta Avos were not made up by Chazal, as the non-Jewish sages did in their books about how a person should behave with others, but rather all of it is Torah from Sinai, and that is why Avos begins with the words, “Moshe received the Torah from Sinai.”

קידושין מ ע”ב: תלמוד גדול, שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה.

ובתוס’ ר”י הזקן: בא לרמוז שהחכם מצד חכמתו יגיע אל המעשה השלם והטוב והוא קנין המדות הטובות והממוצעות, ומי שהוא בעל תכונות טובות לבד לא יגיע אל החכמה מצד התכונות הטובות, וגם מעשיו שהוא עושה אינם על דרך נכונה ולא על דרך אמת כמו שאז”ל אין בור ירא חטא ולא ע”ה חסיד, שאין לו מדע שידע המעשים שיהיו טובים מצד עצמם.

רע”ב אבות א,א: משה קבל תורה מסיני – אומר אני לפי שמסכת זו אינה מיוסדת על פירוש מצוה ממצות התורה כשאר מסכתות שבמשנה, אלא כולה מוסרים ומדות, וחכמי אומות העולם ג”כ חברו ספרים כמו שבדו מלבם בדרכי המוסר כיצד יתנהג האדם עם חבירו, לפיכך התחיל התנא במסכת זו משה קבל תורה מסיני, לומר לך שהמדות והמוסרים שבזו המסכתא לא בדו אותם חכמי המשנה מלבם אלא אף אלו נאמרו בסיני.

Two bochurim from Yeshivas Eitz Chaim came to speak in learning with the Alter of Slobodka in Hebron. One of them was an amazing iluy. The Alter spoke with him for half an hour, and for the whole time he spoke about the statement of Chazal (Midrash Rabbah Vayikra 1:15) that if a talmid chochom has no deiah (courtesy, common sense), a dead cat is better than him. The Alter described the disgusting appearance of a dead cat in great detail, and commented that as bad as it was, a talmid chochom with no manners was worse. The bochur went out puzzled. Only later did he realize that as he had been speaking with the Alter, he had had a glass of tea, and after the glass was empty, he had stuck his finger into the sugar left at the bottom of the glass and then licked his finger.

Rabbi Meir Chodosh related that Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer disputed the Alter’s assessment of this bochur, saying that he was very bright, not a “talmid chochom who has no deiah” and was destined for greatness. But the Alter remained firm in his opinion. Reb Meir followed the bochur’s progress over the years and in the end, nothing became of him.

[The above Ri Hazakein and Bartenura, who hold that good midos come from the Torah, seem to disagree with Rav Nissim Gaon in his introduction to Shas:

כל המצות שהן תלויין בסברא ובאובנתא דליבא, כבר הכל מתחייבים בהן מן היום אשר ברא אלקים אדם על הארץ, עליו ועל זרעו לדור דורים.

All those mitzvos that can be derived from logic and understanding, all of mankind was obligated to keep from the day of man’s creation, for all generations.

Accordingly, there are two ways to understand this story: 1) According to the Ri Hazakein, the Alter held that this bochur could not have been such a talmid chochom because he was not deriving manners and midos from the Torah. 2) According to Rav Nissim Gaon, the Alter held that although the bochur indeed had Torah, he was missing something more basic that is supposed to precede Torah, which is deiah – awareness and midos that can be derived from one’s own mind.]

Yevamos

Yevamos 63a: Babe Ruth and the Jewish Question

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Yevamos 63a: What is the meaning of the verse, “All the families of the earth will be blessed in you”? Even the families that live in the earth are only blessed for the sake of Israel. “All the nations of the earth [will be blessed for his sake]” – even the ships traveling from Gaul to Spain are only blessed for the sake of Israel.

ואמר ר׳ אלעזר, מאי דכתיב: (בראשית י״ב) ונברכו בך כל משפחות האדמה וכו’ אפילו משפחות הדרות באדמה, אין מתברכות אלא בשביל ישראלֹ (בראשית י״ח) כל גויי הארץ ־ אפילו ספינות הבאות מגליא לאספמיא, אינן מתברכות אלא בשביל ישראל.

A little Jewish boy on the East Side of New York came home from school and with great excitement told his grandfather, “Grandpa! Imagine! Babe Ruth hit three homers today!”

“Tell me,” asked the old man, “what this Babe Ruth did – is it good for the Jews?”

The above joke appeared in “A Treasury of Jewish Folklore,” published in 1948 by Nathan Ausubel, p. 426. Little did whoever cracked the joke know how much truth lay in it.

On March 16, 2013, speaking at a melaveh malka for K’hal Shaarei Shalom of Nostrand and Avenue P, Rabbi Avrohom Daniel Ginsberg, rosh kollel of Bais Medrash of Flatbush, told the following story. R’ Chatzkel Levenstein and the Mirrer Yeshiva arrived in Brooklyn shortly after WWII. In the summer of 1948, the great baseball star Babe Ruth died, and approximately 80,000 people participated in his funeral. R’ Chatzkel came into the beis medrash then, gave a klop, and remarked about the sadness, the atzvus, that had descended upon the populace with the death of the baseball hero, which puzzled him. He was bewildered by the veneration for a mere ball player. Rav Ginsburg humorously described how people tried to explain to the great European baal mussar, R’ Chatzkel, in Yiddish, the American national pastime of baseball, and the greatness of Babe Ruth. Their efforts were in vain, however, as R’ Chatzkel remained baffled as to how Ruth’s athletic feats, great as they were, had earned him such veneration. According to R’ Shlomo Brevda, who was one of the Americans present then along with R’ Refoel Green, that experience, along with its accompanying feeling of dissonance, was an impetus for R’ Chatzkel ultimately deciding to leave America and move to Eretz Yisroel, where he subsequently served as mashgiach of the Mirrer Yeshiva and Ponevezh in Bnei Brak until his passing, approximately 25 years later.

Perhaps, then, the home runs hit by Babe Ruth helped build two of the greatest yeshivas in the world!

Eiruvin

Eiruvin 44b: Chillul Shabbos after the life has been saved

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Eiruvin 44b: All those who go out to save lives may return to their places.

עירובין מד ע”ב: כל היוצאים להציל חוזרין למקומן.

וכתבו התוס’ שם הא דלא חשיב ליה בפ״ק דביצה (דף יא:) גבי הנך ג׳ דהתירו סופן משום תחילתן דזה אינו חידוש וכל הנהו צריכי כדאמרינן התם. ומזה למד הגר”מ פיינשטיין (או”ח ח”ד סימן פ’) דכל היוצאין להציל לא מיירי דוקא במלחמה שיש סכנה גם לאחר שנצחו, אלא אפילו בחכמה הבאה לילד וכדומה שלא יהיה עוד סכנה ובכל זאת התירו סופן משום תחילתן.

There is a doctor in Beilinson Hospital in Petach Tikvah who became observant 30 years ago. This is his story. A religious Jew called him on Shabbos to come and take care of his sick wife. When the doctor arrived at his door and saw that the man was religious, he said, “I’m afraid if treat her, you won’t pay me after Shabbos. Either pay me on Shabbos, or find another doctor.” The man said, “Yes, I’ll pay you on Shabbos.” So he treated the man’s wife, and then said, “You own me 250 shekel.” The man took out his checkbook and wrote a check for 1000 shekel. The doctor was puzzled, so the man explained: “The word אלף (1000) is only 3 letters while מאתים וחמשים (250) is 11 letters. I wanted to minimize my chillul Shabbos.” The doctor took the check and left.

On Thursday he called the man back and said, “I must tell you that I couldn’t sleep for the last few nights, I was in awe of your dedication for Shabbos. My wife and I have decided that we want to learn more about Shabbos. Can you teach us?” [This is based on the Tosafos in Eiruvin quoted above, which says that chillul Shabbos after the life has been saved is permitted because of the rule that “they permitted the end to facilitate the beginning”: if the people going out to save lives knew that they would not be allowed to return home, they might not go to save lives in the first place. This is the basis of R’ Moshe’s heter for Hatzolah members to drive home after a call – Igros Moshe O.C. 4:80. Here too, if this man had not paid the doctor, he would not go to help the next religious Jew who called him on Shabbos. Here the heter is more clear, since the doctor made that condition explicitly.]

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 73a: Speaking lashon hara to warn someone about a shidduch

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Sanhedrin 73a: If someone sees his friend drowning in the river, or being dragged by an animal, or attacked by robbers, he must save him, as the Torah says, “Do not stand idle while your neighbor bleeds.”

 סנהדרין עג ע”א: מניין לרואה את חבירו שהוא טובע בנהר, או חיה גוררתו, או לסטין באין עליו, שהוא חייב להצילו ־ תלמוד לומר לא תעמד על דם רעך.

Rabbi Yechiel Perr, rosh yeshiva of Derech Ayson of Far Rockaway, once asked his father R’ Menachem his opinion about the following story: a young lady was about to become engaged when someone divulged to her parents that her intended chosson had once been institutionalized in an asylum. A fierce dispute ensued within the community as to whether the tattler was a tzaddik or a rasha. R’ Menachem replied, “From this episode, you cannot tell. If his other actions are kindly, he did this out of tzidkus, and if his other actions are vicious, he did this out of rishus.”

Rabbi Nosson Kamenetsky compared this question to the Gemara’s analysis (Yuma 23b) of a story in which one kohein stabbed another to death in a dispute over who should have the right to do the avodah. The father of the murdered youth, finding his son in the throes of death, remarked, “My son is yet gasping, so the knife remains undefiled.” Asks the Gemara: Does this comment reflect a laxity in that generation’s concern with murder while its concern with purity was normal, or was it an expression of how meticulous that generation was with the purity of Temple utensils while its concern with bloodshed was at the normative level? Rabbi Chaim Shmulevitz (Sichos Mussar 5733, pp. 152-153) points out that we have an example here of how a single act or statement can reveal two diametrically opposed characteristics. That father might have personified the epitome of evil, callous even with regard to the life of his own child, or he might have been so saintly that in his moment of extreme anguish he still had the sanctity of the Beis Hamikdash in mind.

ועיין ספר חפץ חיים, ציורים, ציור שלישי: אם הוא רואה שאחד רוצה להשתדך עם אחד, וידוע לרואה הזה כי החתן יש לו חסרונות עצומים, כפי המבואר לקמן בסעיף ו מה נקרא חסרונות לענין זה, והמחותן אינו יודע מזה דבר, ואילו היה יודע לא היה מתרצה לזה, יש לגלות לו.

ובסעיף ו שם: אם החסרון הוא מצד חולי גופו, והמחותן אינו מכיר אותו מצד שהוא דבר פנימי אשר לא נגלה לכל, פשוט דאין על המגלה ענין זה חשש אסור רכילות. ושם בבאר מים חיים: שיכוין לתועלת המחותן ולא מצד שנאת החתן.

ואח”כ כתב ועוד יש אופן שני דצריך לגלות לו. היינו, אם נשמע על החתן שיש בו אפיקורסות, ח”ו, צריך לגלות לו, ועל זה נאמרו סמוכין “לא תלך רכיל בעמך” אבל “לא תעמד על דם רעך.” ודייק הגרש”ז אוירבאך (נשמת אברהם אהע”ז סימן ב ס”ק א) דלעיל גבי מחלה לא כתב הח”ח שחייב לגלות, משמע דאינו חייב לגלות, רק שאין בו משום איסור רכילות.

Kiddushin

Kiddushin 81a: Is yichud yehareg v’al yaavor?

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Kiddushin 81a: It is permitted to be alone with a woman in a room that has a door open to a public area.

קידושין פא ע”א: אמר רב יוסף: פתח פתח לרשות הרבים ־ אין חוששין משום ייחוד.

Rabbi Yaakov Kamenetsky related that he heard that Rabbi Yisroel Salanter once said, “If there would be a question of yichud on a train, I would jump out the window to avoid it.” R’ Yaakov reasoned that since jumping out of a moving train is life-threatening, the prohibition of yichud must be in the category of yehareg v’al yaavor, a sin that one must rather be killed than transgress.

Six years after R’ Yaakov passed away, his analysis was confirmed when the book Kisvei Hasaba Vetalmidav Mikelm was published. There in v. 2 p. 786 the full story appears in the name of Rabbi Naftali Amsterdam, a student of R’ Yisroel, as transcribed in a notebook by Rabbi Gershon Miadnik. The story was that R’ Yisroel had an actual problem of yichud during a train ride, and he stated explicitly that he was ready to endanger his life by jumping out the window – had he not found a leniency.

[It is not stated what the leniency was, but possibly it was that although at that moment R’ Yisroel and the woman may have been the only ones in the train car, people sometimes pass between cars, and it is similar to yichud with an open door to the street.

The question here is that even if yichud is considered to be in the category of arayos and is therefore yehareg v’al yaavor, why should that obligate him to kill himself to escape the transgression? In arayos itself there is a principle of קרקע עולם, that one who transgresses passively does not have to give his life. Tosafos argues (Pesachim 25b and other places) that this is derived from the laws of murder, where one need not forfeit his life to avoid allowing one’s body to be used as a murder weapon. The opinion of Tosafos is brought down as halacha by the Rema in Yoreh Deah 157:1. Here too, seemingly it would be allowed to remain sitting passively in the train after situation of yichud arises.

The answer is that R’ Yisroel was machmir for the opinion of the Rambam, who doesn’t bring down קרקע עולם. Reb Chaim in his first piece on the Rambam explains that he held that the Gemara in Sanhedrin 74b only uses the logic of passivity to explain Esther marrying Achashveirosh, since – according to that sugya – that was not an act of גילוי עריות at all. The problem there was a different one – that even the smallest sin becomes yehareg v’al yaavor when done in public. But real גילוי עריות is yehareg v’al yaavor even when done passively.

Reb Chaim there offers two possible explanations as to why the Rambam disagreed with Tosafos’ idea to derive from murder that a passive transgression is not yehareg v’al yaavor: 1) There it is one life against another and you have no right to decide which is more valuable, but here giluy arayos in any form, active or passive, is more valuable than your life; 2) Even in murder itself, letting one’s body be used as a weapon does not constitute any act of murder at all, even a passive one, but if a real passive case of murder could be found, it would be prohibited.] � �

Kiddushin

Kiddushin 34a: Forcing a husband to pay for mezuzos

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Kiddushin 34a: Women are obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah. But why not learn from the juxtaposition of mezuzah to learning Torah that just as women are exempt from learning Torah, they are exempt from mezuzah? Because the verse about mezuzah ends, “So that your lives may be long.” Do only men want to live long and not women?

ונקיש מזוזה לתלמוד תורהִ! לא סלקא דעתך, דכתיב: (דברים יא) למען ירבו ימיכם, גברי בעי חיי, נשי לא בעי חיי?

A woman was becoming religious and her husband was not. She wanted to buy mezuzos for the house, but her husband said, “The rabbis overcharge for them just to line their pockets. I won’t waste money on that.” So she asked her rav if she was allowed to steal her husband’s money to buy mezuzos. She would tell him that they were donated by a kiruv organization. The rav was uncertain what to answer: of course one may not steal to perform a mitzvah, but here one could argue that a husband is obligated to give his wife a house, and part of a house is the mezuzos. Thus, taking his money for something he is obligated to do is not stealing.

However, Rabbi Yitzchok Zilberstein ruled that she should not do it. First of all, it was not her house, but her husband’s, so she was not obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah – only he was. Second of all, if he ever found out, it would be a tremendous chillul Hashem for him to think that we steal in order to do mitzvos.

[In Read and Remember p. 332, I bring a similar story in which Rav Elyashiv zt”l was the posek, and ruled that she should not buy the mezuzos because the Mordechai says that one who has no money to buy mezuzos may still live in the house. However, here we are considering a different angle: the husband should be obligated to buy her the mezuzos as part of his obligations toward her as a husband.

The answer that “it’s not her house” doesn’t seem to be sufficient, either, because מזוזה חובת הדר היא. On p. 111 I brought the story of Reb Zalman Volozhiner who did not want to enter a house because the mezuzah was in the wrong place. It did not make a difference to him that the house belonged to someone else. Only when the owner declared the house hefker did he enter.

Rather it would seem that forcing a husband to fulfill his obligations to his wife is something only beis din can do. Stealing and going about it secretly is not allowed. Perhaps she did not want to challenge him openly before a beis din; in that case she was mochel on her rights.]

Chullin

Chullin 95a: Eating meat from a store that sells mostly kosher

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Chullin 95a: If there are nine stores that sell kosher meat and one that sells non-kosher meat, and a person bought from one of them but does not know which one, it is forbidden.

תא שמע: תשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה, ואחת מוכרת בשר נבלה, ולקח מאחת מהן, ואינו יודע מאיזה מהן לקח ־ ספקו אסור.

יו”ד סימן ק”י סעיף ה: מי שלקח בשר מהמקולין ואפילו חתיכה הראויה להתכבד ונמצאת טרפה במקולין ולא נודעו חתיכות הטרפה ואינו יודע מאיזו לקח, כל מה שלקחו מהמקולין קודם שנמצאת הטרפה מותר שלא נפל הספק בקבוע אלא לאחר שפירש וכיון שהרוב כשר מותר, אבל ליקח מכאן ואילך אסור ואפילו חתיכה שאינה ראויה להתכבד שאין הכל בקיאין בזה ויטעו בין ראויה להתכבד לשאינה ראויה.

Shortly before Pesach 2013, the owner of Doheny Glatt Kosher Meats in Los Angeles was caught on camera instructing his employees to bring boxes of unsupervised meat into his store. The video, shot by a private investigator, showed the owner waiting until the mashgiach left the premises and then having the boxes carried in from the back of his SUV.

On Sunday, the 13th of Nisan (March 24, 2013), staff members from the Rabbinical Council of California (RCC) as well as a handful of other rabbis and lay leaders from the Orthodox community gathered to watch the incriminating video in the office of Rabbi Kalman Topp, rav of Beth Jacob, the largest Orthodox synagogue in Pico-Robertson. Also present were Rabbi Elazar Muskin of Young Israel of Century City and Rabbi Yosef Kanefsky of B’nai David-Judea. After watching, the rabbis called in the store owner, who admitted that he brought in the unsupervised meat, although he claimed it was kosher.

Based on this information, the RCC revoked its certification from Doheny effective on March 24 at 3 PM. They stated, however, that any meat bought from the store before 3 PM on that day was considered kosher. Rabbi Yisroel Belsky was consulted and he also agreed with this ruling.

The reason is based on the rule that when it comes to kavua d’rabanan, there is no kavua lemafrea.

To explain: our Gemara is talking about a case when the non-kosher store was recognizable as such all along. This is kavua d’oraisa. If later on it became recognizable as treif, but it was not recognizable at the time of purchase, there is a dispute between the Ran and the Rashba as to whether the stringency of kavua applies retroactively. We pasken like the Rashba that it does apply. So, for example, let’s say the investigation had revealed that ALL the meat at Doheny was treif. A sign was promptly hung in the store window at 3:00 PM saying that the hashgacha was removed. Then someone came to a rav and asked, “I bought this meat at 2:00 PM and I’m not sure if I bought it from Doheny or one of the other 9 stores in Los Angeles.” The rav would tell him it is forbidden because it is kavua lemafrea.

However, in our case not all the meat in the store was treif. It was only 8 boxes of questionable meat out of about 300 coming into the store that day. There is no kavua d’oraisa, even retroactively, because it was never recognizable, even later, which pieces of meat were treif. But what about kavua d’rabanan? The Rabbinic rule that “a piece fit to serve to an honored guest” does not become nullified in a mixture is called kavua d’rabanan (see Zevachim 73a and 73b, and Tosafos on 73b s.v. ela), because it follows similar rules to those of kavua d’oraisa: you are not allowed to take directly from the mixture, but if somehow a piece got separated from the mixture on its own, you are allowed to eat it. Does this rule also operate retroactively? The Shulchan Aruch (110:5) rules that it does not. Thus  if Doheny was selling hundreds of nice pieces of meat fit for a guest, and it was discovered at 3:00 that a small fraction of them were treif, those pieces purchased before the discovery are not forbidden. After the discovery, all the meat in the store is forbidden, even the ground and chopped meat, because people might confuse it with the big pieces fit for a guest. )

Gittin

Gittin 8b: Asking a Non-Jew to Warm up Food on Shabbos

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Gittin 8b: Although it is prohibited to ask a non-Jew to do melachah on Shabbos, here for the sake of Yishuv Eretz Yisroel the Sages relaxed their decree.

Tosafos: But for any other mitzvah it is not allowed to ask a non-Jew to perform a Torah prohibition….

Certainly for the sake of Bris Milah it is allow to ask him to perform a Rabbinically prohibited act… but one cannot learn from here that it is allowed to ask a non-Jew to carry a sefer on Shabbos through a Rabbinically prohibited street, because only for Bris Milah, which itself pushes aside Shabbos, were they lenient.

Shulchan Aruch 307:5 quoting Rambam: It is permitted to ask a non-Jew to do an act of work that is Rabbinically prohibited, for the needs of a sick person, a great need (large loss) or a mitzvah. And some (Tosafos) disagree with this.

גיטין ח: אע”ג דאמירה לעובד כוכבים שבת משום ישוב ארץ ישראל לא גזרו רבנן. תוס’: אבל משום מצוה אחרת לא היינו מתירין אמירה לעובד כוכבים במלאכה דאוריית… ודאי איסורא דרבנן שרי בחצר שלא עירבו משום מצות מילה… ואין ללמוד מכאן היתר לומר לעובד כוכבים להביא ספר בשבת דרך כרמלית דלא דמי דדוקא משום מילה דהיא גופה דחיא שבת התירו.

שו”ע או”ח ש”ז ס”ה: דבר שאינו מלאכה ואינו אסור לעשותו בשבת אלא משום שבות מותר לישראל לומר לא״י לעשותו בשבת והוא שיהיה שם מקצת חולי או יהיה צריך לדבר צורך הרבה או מפני מצוה כיצד אומר ישראל לא״י בשבת לעלות באילן להביא שופר לתקוע תקיעת מצוה או להביא מים דרך חצר שלא עירבו לרחוץ בו המצטער ויש אוסרין.

One Friday night when Rabbi Yisroel Reisman was recently married and had just gotten semicha, his landlord asked him a shailah. He had the cholent fully cooked before Shabbos and his practice was to set the crockpot on a timer so that it would be off before the daytime meal when he removed the food from the pot. (Possibly he did this to avoid the prohibition of dishing food out from a pot that is currently standing on the fire – see Orach Chaim 318:18.) The problem was that just after Shabbos began, he realized that he had plugged the crockpot into the timer but forgotten to plug the timer into the wall. Could he call a goy to move the pot onto the blech?

Rabbi Reisman showed him that at the end of Siman 253, the Biur Halacha brings a dispute as to whether one may ask a non-Jew to re-heat solid food that was previously cooked. Most poskim hold it is forbidden, but the Pri Megadim says that since in general one may ask a non-Jew to do a D’rabbanan for the sake of Shabbos, here one should not rebuke one who is lenient. He also brings that the Shaarei Teshuva in 318 ruled leniently. The Biur Halacha concludes that one may rely on this for the sake of Shabbos. As soon as the landlord saw that, he said, “This is a case of great need,” and called in a non-Jew to move the pot.

Afterwards, Rabbi Reisman said, “I don’t know why that was such a desperate situation – you could have shared my cholent.” “No,” the man replied, “it was a desperate situation because this is the third time in the last few weeks that I’ve made this mistake, and those times I was strict about it and we ate cold cholent.  My wife was already mad at me, so imagine what she would have said this time!” Rabbi Reisman agreed that this was indeed a case of great need.

Megillah

Megillah 21b: May girls sing along with the Zemiros?

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Megillah 21b: The Targum should not be read publicly by two people in unison (Rashi: because two voices cannot be heard) but Hallel and the Megillah can be read even by ten people in unison. Why? Since it is beloved to the listeners, they will pay attention and hear.

מגילה כא ע”ב: תנו רבנן: בתורה אחד קורא ואחד מתרגם, ובלבד שלא יהא אחד קורא ושנים מתרגמין. (פירש רש”י וטעמא משום דתרי קלי לא מישתמעי.)  ובנביא אחד קורא ושנים מתרגמין, ובלבד שלא יהו שנים קורין ושנים מתרגמין. ובהלל ובמגילה ־ אפילו עשרה קורין ועשרה מתרגמין. מאי טעמא? כיון דחביבה ־ יהבי דעתייהו ושמעי.

Rabbi Yaakov Yitzchok Ruderman, in a conversation with some Torah educators, graduates of Yeshivas Rabbeinu Yisroel Meir Hakohein, noted the special stress Slabodka Yeshiva put on interpersonal relations, and told the following story. (It was apparent in his tone that he was unsure whether to tell the story to his interviewers – but he did.) In the 5690’s (1930’s), he was once invited to spend a Shabbos at the home of the Rav of Elizabeth, New Jersey. Before the arrival of Shabbos, the rav took him aside for a confidential exchange of words. He told his guest that he had several daughters eating at the Shabbos table who enjoyed Shabbos by singing the zemiros along with him. (At this point in the narrative, R’ Ruderman interjected that there were no Bais Yaakov schools in America at the time – indicating that Bais Yaakov graduates would know better than to do this.) The rav told him that R’ Boruch Ber Leibowitz had been a guest at his home sometime earlier, and when the girls began singing, he stood up and ran out of the room – perturbing the Shabbos for the girls and humiliating their father. The host then asked whether R’ Ruderman would do the same. The guest replied that with his Slabodka background, he would not destroy the family’s Shabbos spirit or embarrass his host; he would remain sitting and not listen to the girls. “My frumkeit does not have to hurt others,” he concluded.

[In Kol Isha there are two separate prohibitions: 1) hearing it, and 2) saying holy words and prayers while hearing it. For a father, the first is not a problem – a father is allowed to hear his daughters sing. Only the second problem exists. But a guest has to contend with both problems.

The Otzar Haposkim Even Ho’ezer 21 brings that the Chasan Sofer permitted listening to a man and woman sing together, because of the principle of our Gemara that “two voices cannot be heard.” In response to the argument that a woman’s voice is חביבה because it is attractive, he argues that one only becomes attracted to her after hearing her sing, but since he cannot hear her sing due to the principle that “two voices cannot be heard,” the problem doesn’t  begin.

The Otzar Haposkim then brings the Be’er Yehuda, who argues based on Rashi in Rosh Hashanah 27a that the reason why “two voices cannot be heard” is because they do not speak exactly in unison; one is always a little ahead of the other. But when they are singing, everyone sings together and they can be heard.

Moreover, it would seem that the Gemara uses this principle as a chumra, not a kula. The Gemara is not saying that when two people read from the Torah, the listeners will never hear a single word. They will probably catch a few words here and there, but they cannot fulfill their obligation that way. But when a woman is singing with a man, and you are looking to be lenient and allow a guest to listen based on “two voices cannot be heard” – this line of reasoning does not work, since at least some of the time he will hear the woman’s voice.

In light of the above, we could suggest a middle ground between these two opinions: for a father to sing with his daughters would be allowed, since we could say ממה נפשך: either way there is no problem. At the times when the daughters are singing at the exact same time as him, he does not hear them because “two voices cannot be heard” and therefore there is nothing wrong with him saying the holy words of Zemiros. (This logic would not apply to one’s wife singing, since her voice is חביבה to him.) And at the times when they are singing separately from him and he does hear them, there is no problem because he is their father and is permitted to listen to them – since he is not saying holy words at that moment. However, for a guest, no such ממה נפשך argument can be made.  

Regarding the apparent machlokes between R’ Boruch Ber and Rav Ruderman on what to do if already stuck in the situation, we can assume that Rav Ruderman relied on the principle of  אי אפשר ולא קמכוין (פסחים כה ע”ב) – that if one is walking on his way and is being exposed to a forbidden pleasure, if he has no way to reach his goal without passing this place, and he has no intention to derive pleasure, it is allowed. See the Mishnah Berurah 75:17 quoting the Chayei Adam:

 ומ״מ אם הוא בדרך בין העכו״ם או בעיר והוא אנוס שא״א לו למחות כיון דלא מצינו דמקרי ערוה מדאורייתא מותר לקרות ולברך דאל״כ כיון שאנו שרויין בין העכו״ם נתבטל מתורה ותפלה וע״ז נאמר עת לעשות לד׳ הפרו תורתך אך יתאמץ לבו לכוין להקדושה שהוא עוסק ולא יתן לבו לקול הזמר.

The Mishnah Berurah permits even saying holy words while listening to a woman singing because of עת לעשות. The implication is that for being on the road among such people, without saying holy words, we don’t need any special heterim; that is the regular rule of אי אפשר ולא קמכוין. In Rav Ruderman’s case, although it was possible to leave the room or, having been warned, find somewhere else to spend Shabbos, he held that that was considered  אי אפשר since it would be impossible to do so without embarrassing another person.

R’ Boruch Ber, on the other hand, probably held that although personally, he could have been lenient, he hoped that his actions would teach the family that it was unacceptable for girls to sing in front of a stranger. Rav Ruderman, however, realized in retrospect that they had not learned from R’ Boruch Ber and would probably not learn from him either.]