Author: YC

In preparation for a new volume of Read and Remember, I am collecting stories on halacha topics.
Kiddushin

Kiddushin 81a: Is yichud yehareg v’al yaavor?

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Kiddushin 81a: It is permitted to be alone with a woman in a room that has a door open to a public area.

קידושין פא ע”א: אמר רב יוסף: פתח פתח לרשות הרבים ־ אין חוששין משום ייחוד.

Rabbi Yaakov Kamenetsky related that he heard that Rabbi Yisroel Salanter once said, “If there would be a question of yichud on a train, I would jump out the window to avoid it.” R’ Yaakov reasoned that since jumping out of a moving train is life-threatening, the prohibition of yichud must be in the category of yehareg v’al yaavor, a sin that one must rather be killed than transgress.

Six years after R’ Yaakov passed away, his analysis was confirmed when the book Kisvei Hasaba Vetalmidav Mikelm was published. There in v. 2 p. 786 the full story appears in the name of Rabbi Naftali Amsterdam, a student of R’ Yisroel, as transcribed in a notebook by Rabbi Gershon Miadnik. The story was that R’ Yisroel had an actual problem of yichud during a train ride, and he stated explicitly that he was ready to endanger his life by jumping out the window – had he not found a leniency.

[It is not stated what the leniency was, but possibly it was that although at that moment R’ Yisroel and the woman may have been the only ones in the train car, people sometimes pass between cars, and it is similar to yichud with an open door to the street.

The question here is that even if yichud is considered to be in the category of arayos and is therefore yehareg v’al yaavor, why should that obligate him to kill himself to escape the transgression? In arayos itself there is a principle of קרקע עולם, that one who transgresses passively does not have to give his life. Tosafos argues (Pesachim 25b and other places) that this is derived from the laws of murder, where one need not forfeit his life to avoid allowing one’s body to be used as a murder weapon. The opinion of Tosafos is brought down as halacha by the Rema in Yoreh Deah 157:1. Here too, seemingly it would be allowed to remain sitting passively in the train after situation of yichud arises.

The answer is that R’ Yisroel was machmir for the opinion of the Rambam, who doesn’t bring down קרקע עולם. Reb Chaim in his first piece on the Rambam explains that he held that the Gemara in Sanhedrin 74b only uses the logic of passivity to explain Esther marrying Achashveirosh, since – according to that sugya – that was not an act of גילוי עריות at all. The problem there was a different one – that even the smallest sin becomes yehareg v’al yaavor when done in public. But real גילוי עריות is yehareg v’al yaavor even when done passively.

Reb Chaim there offers two possible explanations as to why the Rambam disagreed with Tosafos’ idea to derive from murder that a passive transgression is not yehareg v’al yaavor: 1) There it is one life against another and you have no right to decide which is more valuable, but here giluy arayos in any form, active or passive, is more valuable than your life; 2) Even in murder itself, letting one’s body be used as a weapon does not constitute any act of murder at all, even a passive one, but if a real passive case of murder could be found, it would be prohibited.] � �

Kiddushin

Kiddushin 34a: Forcing a husband to pay for mezuzos

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Kiddushin 34a: Women are obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah. But why not learn from the juxtaposition of mezuzah to learning Torah that just as women are exempt from learning Torah, they are exempt from mezuzah? Because the verse about mezuzah ends, “So that your lives may be long.” Do only men want to live long and not women?

ונקיש מזוזה לתלמוד תורהִ! לא סלקא דעתך, דכתיב: (דברים יא) למען ירבו ימיכם, גברי בעי חיי, נשי לא בעי חיי?

A woman was becoming religious and her husband was not. She wanted to buy mezuzos for the house, but her husband said, “The rabbis overcharge for them just to line their pockets. I won’t waste money on that.” So she asked her rav if she was allowed to steal her husband’s money to buy mezuzos. She would tell him that they were donated by a kiruv organization. The rav was uncertain what to answer: of course one may not steal to perform a mitzvah, but here one could argue that a husband is obligated to give his wife a house, and part of a house is the mezuzos. Thus, taking his money for something he is obligated to do is not stealing.

However, Rabbi Yitzchok Zilberstein ruled that she should not do it. First of all, it was not her house, but her husband’s, so she was not obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah – only he was. Second of all, if he ever found out, it would be a tremendous chillul Hashem for him to think that we steal in order to do mitzvos.

[In Read and Remember p. 332, I bring a similar story in which Rav Elyashiv zt”l was the posek, and ruled that she should not buy the mezuzos because the Mordechai says that one who has no money to buy mezuzos may still live in the house. However, here we are considering a different angle: the husband should be obligated to buy her the mezuzos as part of his obligations toward her as a husband.

The answer that “it’s not her house” doesn’t seem to be sufficient, either, because מזוזה חובת הדר היא. On p. 111 I brought the story of Reb Zalman Volozhiner who did not want to enter a house because the mezuzah was in the wrong place. It did not make a difference to him that the house belonged to someone else. Only when the owner declared the house hefker did he enter.

Rather it would seem that forcing a husband to fulfill his obligations to his wife is something only beis din can do. Stealing and going about it secretly is not allowed. Perhaps she did not want to challenge him openly before a beis din; in that case she was mochel on her rights.]

Chullin

Chullin 95a: Eating meat from a store that sells mostly kosher

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Chullin 95a: If there are nine stores that sell kosher meat and one that sells non-kosher meat, and a person bought from one of them but does not know which one, it is forbidden.

תא שמע: תשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה, ואחת מוכרת בשר נבלה, ולקח מאחת מהן, ואינו יודע מאיזה מהן לקח ־ ספקו אסור.

יו”ד סימן ק”י סעיף ה: מי שלקח בשר מהמקולין ואפילו חתיכה הראויה להתכבד ונמצאת טרפה במקולין ולא נודעו חתיכות הטרפה ואינו יודע מאיזו לקח, כל מה שלקחו מהמקולין קודם שנמצאת הטרפה מותר שלא נפל הספק בקבוע אלא לאחר שפירש וכיון שהרוב כשר מותר, אבל ליקח מכאן ואילך אסור ואפילו חתיכה שאינה ראויה להתכבד שאין הכל בקיאין בזה ויטעו בין ראויה להתכבד לשאינה ראויה.

Shortly before Pesach 2013, the owner of Doheny Glatt Kosher Meats in Los Angeles was caught on camera instructing his employees to bring boxes of unsupervised meat into his store. The video, shot by a private investigator, showed the owner waiting until the mashgiach left the premises and then having the boxes carried in from the back of his SUV.

On Sunday, the 13th of Nisan (March 24, 2013), staff members from the Rabbinical Council of California (RCC) as well as a handful of other rabbis and lay leaders from the Orthodox community gathered to watch the incriminating video in the office of Rabbi Kalman Topp, rav of Beth Jacob, the largest Orthodox synagogue in Pico-Robertson. Also present were Rabbi Elazar Muskin of Young Israel of Century City and Rabbi Yosef Kanefsky of B’nai David-Judea. After watching, the rabbis called in the store owner, who admitted that he brought in the unsupervised meat, although he claimed it was kosher.

Based on this information, the RCC revoked its certification from Doheny effective on March 24 at 3 PM. They stated, however, that any meat bought from the store before 3 PM on that day was considered kosher. Rabbi Yisroel Belsky was consulted and he also agreed with this ruling.

The reason is based on the rule that when it comes to kavua d’rabanan, there is no kavua lemafrea.

To explain: our Gemara is talking about a case when the non-kosher store was recognizable as such all along. This is kavua d’oraisa. If later on it became recognizable as treif, but it was not recognizable at the time of purchase, there is a dispute between the Ran and the Rashba as to whether the stringency of kavua applies retroactively. We pasken like the Rashba that it does apply. So, for example, let’s say the investigation had revealed that ALL the meat at Doheny was treif. A sign was promptly hung in the store window at 3:00 PM saying that the hashgacha was removed. Then someone came to a rav and asked, “I bought this meat at 2:00 PM and I’m not sure if I bought it from Doheny or one of the other 9 stores in Los Angeles.” The rav would tell him it is forbidden because it is kavua lemafrea.

However, in our case not all the meat in the store was treif. It was only 8 boxes of questionable meat out of about 300 coming into the store that day. There is no kavua d’oraisa, even retroactively, because it was never recognizable, even later, which pieces of meat were treif. But what about kavua d’rabanan? The Rabbinic rule that “a piece fit to serve to an honored guest” does not become nullified in a mixture is called kavua d’rabanan (see Zevachim 73a and 73b, and Tosafos on 73b s.v. ela), because it follows similar rules to those of kavua d’oraisa: you are not allowed to take directly from the mixture, but if somehow a piece got separated from the mixture on its own, you are allowed to eat it. Does this rule also operate retroactively? The Shulchan Aruch (110:5) rules that it does not. Thus  if Doheny was selling hundreds of nice pieces of meat fit for a guest, and it was discovered at 3:00 that a small fraction of them were treif, those pieces purchased before the discovery are not forbidden. After the discovery, all the meat in the store is forbidden, even the ground and chopped meat, because people might confuse it with the big pieces fit for a guest. )

Gittin

Gittin 8b: Asking a Non-Jew to Warm up Food on Shabbos

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Gittin 8b: Although it is prohibited to ask a non-Jew to do melachah on Shabbos, here for the sake of Yishuv Eretz Yisroel the Sages relaxed their decree.

Tosafos: But for any other mitzvah it is not allowed to ask a non-Jew to perform a Torah prohibition….

Certainly for the sake of Bris Milah it is allow to ask him to perform a Rabbinically prohibited act… but one cannot learn from here that it is allowed to ask a non-Jew to carry a sefer on Shabbos through a Rabbinically prohibited street, because only for Bris Milah, which itself pushes aside Shabbos, were they lenient.

Shulchan Aruch 307:5 quoting Rambam: It is permitted to ask a non-Jew to do an act of work that is Rabbinically prohibited, for the needs of a sick person, a great need (large loss) or a mitzvah. And some (Tosafos) disagree with this.

גיטין ח: אע”ג דאמירה לעובד כוכבים שבת משום ישוב ארץ ישראל לא גזרו רבנן. תוס’: אבל משום מצוה אחרת לא היינו מתירין אמירה לעובד כוכבים במלאכה דאוריית… ודאי איסורא דרבנן שרי בחצר שלא עירבו משום מצות מילה… ואין ללמוד מכאן היתר לומר לעובד כוכבים להביא ספר בשבת דרך כרמלית דלא דמי דדוקא משום מילה דהיא גופה דחיא שבת התירו.

שו”ע או”ח ש”ז ס”ה: דבר שאינו מלאכה ואינו אסור לעשותו בשבת אלא משום שבות מותר לישראל לומר לא״י לעשותו בשבת והוא שיהיה שם מקצת חולי או יהיה צריך לדבר צורך הרבה או מפני מצוה כיצד אומר ישראל לא״י בשבת לעלות באילן להביא שופר לתקוע תקיעת מצוה או להביא מים דרך חצר שלא עירבו לרחוץ בו המצטער ויש אוסרין.

One Friday night when Rabbi Yisroel Reisman was recently married and had just gotten semicha, his landlord asked him a shailah. He had the cholent fully cooked before Shabbos and his practice was to set the crockpot on a timer so that it would be off before the daytime meal when he removed the food from the pot. (Possibly he did this to avoid the prohibition of dishing food out from a pot that is currently standing on the fire – see Orach Chaim 318:18.) The problem was that just after Shabbos began, he realized that he had plugged the crockpot into the timer but forgotten to plug the timer into the wall. Could he call a goy to move the pot onto the blech?

Rabbi Reisman showed him that at the end of Siman 253, the Biur Halacha brings a dispute as to whether one may ask a non-Jew to re-heat solid food that was previously cooked. Most poskim hold it is forbidden, but the Pri Megadim says that since in general one may ask a non-Jew to do a D’rabbanan for the sake of Shabbos, here one should not rebuke one who is lenient. He also brings that the Shaarei Teshuva in 318 ruled leniently. The Biur Halacha concludes that one may rely on this for the sake of Shabbos. As soon as the landlord saw that, he said, “This is a case of great need,” and called in a non-Jew to move the pot.

Afterwards, Rabbi Reisman said, “I don’t know why that was such a desperate situation – you could have shared my cholent.” “No,” the man replied, “it was a desperate situation because this is the third time in the last few weeks that I’ve made this mistake, and those times I was strict about it and we ate cold cholent.  My wife was already mad at me, so imagine what she would have said this time!” Rabbi Reisman agreed that this was indeed a case of great need.

Megillah

Megillah 21b: May girls sing along with the Zemiros?

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Megillah 21b: The Targum should not be read publicly by two people in unison (Rashi: because two voices cannot be heard) but Hallel and the Megillah can be read even by ten people in unison. Why? Since it is beloved to the listeners, they will pay attention and hear.

מגילה כא ע”ב: תנו רבנן: בתורה אחד קורא ואחד מתרגם, ובלבד שלא יהא אחד קורא ושנים מתרגמין. (פירש רש”י וטעמא משום דתרי קלי לא מישתמעי.)  ובנביא אחד קורא ושנים מתרגמין, ובלבד שלא יהו שנים קורין ושנים מתרגמין. ובהלל ובמגילה ־ אפילו עשרה קורין ועשרה מתרגמין. מאי טעמא? כיון דחביבה ־ יהבי דעתייהו ושמעי.

Rabbi Yaakov Yitzchok Ruderman, in a conversation with some Torah educators, graduates of Yeshivas Rabbeinu Yisroel Meir Hakohein, noted the special stress Slabodka Yeshiva put on interpersonal relations, and told the following story. (It was apparent in his tone that he was unsure whether to tell the story to his interviewers – but he did.) In the 5690’s (1930’s), he was once invited to spend a Shabbos at the home of the Rav of Elizabeth, New Jersey. Before the arrival of Shabbos, the rav took him aside for a confidential exchange of words. He told his guest that he had several daughters eating at the Shabbos table who enjoyed Shabbos by singing the zemiros along with him. (At this point in the narrative, R’ Ruderman interjected that there were no Bais Yaakov schools in America at the time – indicating that Bais Yaakov graduates would know better than to do this.) The rav told him that R’ Boruch Ber Leibowitz had been a guest at his home sometime earlier, and when the girls began singing, he stood up and ran out of the room – perturbing the Shabbos for the girls and humiliating their father. The host then asked whether R’ Ruderman would do the same. The guest replied that with his Slabodka background, he would not destroy the family’s Shabbos spirit or embarrass his host; he would remain sitting and not listen to the girls. “My frumkeit does not have to hurt others,” he concluded.

[In Kol Isha there are two separate prohibitions: 1) hearing it, and 2) saying holy words and prayers while hearing it. For a father, the first is not a problem – a father is allowed to hear his daughters sing. Only the second problem exists. But a guest has to contend with both problems.

The Otzar Haposkim Even Ho’ezer 21 brings that the Chasan Sofer permitted listening to a man and woman sing together, because of the principle of our Gemara that “two voices cannot be heard.” In response to the argument that a woman’s voice is חביבה because it is attractive, he argues that one only becomes attracted to her after hearing her sing, but since he cannot hear her sing due to the principle that “two voices cannot be heard,” the problem doesn’t  begin.

The Otzar Haposkim then brings the Be’er Yehuda, who argues based on Rashi in Rosh Hashanah 27a that the reason why “two voices cannot be heard” is because they do not speak exactly in unison; one is always a little ahead of the other. But when they are singing, everyone sings together and they can be heard.

Moreover, it would seem that the Gemara uses this principle as a chumra, not a kula. The Gemara is not saying that when two people read from the Torah, the listeners will never hear a single word. They will probably catch a few words here and there, but they cannot fulfill their obligation that way. But when a woman is singing with a man, and you are looking to be lenient and allow a guest to listen based on “two voices cannot be heard” – this line of reasoning does not work, since at least some of the time he will hear the woman’s voice.

In light of the above, we could suggest a middle ground between these two opinions: for a father to sing with his daughters would be allowed, since we could say ממה נפשך: either way there is no problem. At the times when the daughters are singing at the exact same time as him, he does not hear them because “two voices cannot be heard” and therefore there is nothing wrong with him saying the holy words of Zemiros. (This logic would not apply to one’s wife singing, since her voice is חביבה to him.) And at the times when they are singing separately from him and he does hear them, there is no problem because he is their father and is permitted to listen to them – since he is not saying holy words at that moment. However, for a guest, no such ממה נפשך argument can be made.  

Regarding the apparent machlokes between R’ Boruch Ber and Rav Ruderman on what to do if already stuck in the situation, we can assume that Rav Ruderman relied on the principle of  אי אפשר ולא קמכוין (פסחים כה ע”ב) – that if one is walking on his way and is being exposed to a forbidden pleasure, if he has no way to reach his goal without passing this place, and he has no intention to derive pleasure, it is allowed. See the Mishnah Berurah 75:17 quoting the Chayei Adam:

 ומ״מ אם הוא בדרך בין העכו״ם או בעיר והוא אנוס שא״א לו למחות כיון דלא מצינו דמקרי ערוה מדאורייתא מותר לקרות ולברך דאל״כ כיון שאנו שרויין בין העכו״ם נתבטל מתורה ותפלה וע״ז נאמר עת לעשות לד׳ הפרו תורתך אך יתאמץ לבו לכוין להקדושה שהוא עוסק ולא יתן לבו לקול הזמר.

The Mishnah Berurah permits even saying holy words while listening to a woman singing because of עת לעשות. The implication is that for being on the road among such people, without saying holy words, we don’t need any special heterim; that is the regular rule of אי אפשר ולא קמכוין. In Rav Ruderman’s case, although it was possible to leave the room or, having been warned, find somewhere else to spend Shabbos, he held that that was considered  אי אפשר since it would be impossible to do so without embarrassing another person.

R’ Boruch Ber, on the other hand, probably held that although personally, he could have been lenient, he hoped that his actions would teach the family that it was unacceptable for girls to sing in front of a stranger. Rav Ruderman, however, realized in retrospect that they had not learned from R’ Boruch Ber and would probably not learn from him either.]

Sotah

Sotah 12a: Just do your job

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Sotah 12a: When Pharaoh decreed that all newborn Jewish boys be thrown into the river, Amram said: We are toiling [to have children] in vain. He got up and divorced his wife, and all the Jewish men followed his example and divorced their wives. His daughter said to him, “Father, your decree is harsher than Pharaoh, for Pharaoh’s decree applies only to boys, while yours applies to boys and girls. Pharaoh’s decree takes the children only out of this world, while you take them out of this world and the World to Come. Pharaoh’s decree may or may not be carried out, but you are a tzaddik and your decree will certainly be carried out.”

סוטה יב. עמרם גדול הדור היה, כיון שגזר פרעה הרשע כל הבן הילוד היאורה תשליכוהו, אמר: לשוא אנו עמליןִ עמד וגירש את אשתו, עמדו כולן וגירשו את נשותיהן. אמרה לו בתו: אבא, קשה גזירתך יותר משל פרעה, שפרעה לא גזר אלא על הזכרים, ואתה גזרת על הזכרים ועל הנקיבותִ פרעה לא גזר אלא בעוה״ז, ואתה בעוה״ז ולעוה״בִ פרעה הרשע, ספק מתקיימת גזירתו ספק אינה מתקיימת, אתה צדיק בודאי שגזירתך מתקיימת

Rabbi Elya Boruch Finkel zt”l asked: why did Miriam need to use these arguments? She could have argued simply that we must have children as we are commanded to do, and whatever Hashem does is His business.

Indeed we find two other places where this argument was used: 1) Adam used it to convince Lemech’s wives to return to him, after they had separated for fear that the flood would wipe out their children (Rashi on Bereishis 4:25). 2) Yishaya Hanavi told Chizkiyahu to get married and have children despite his prophecy that his children would be wicked (Berachos 10a).

R’ Elya Boruch answered that there is a difference between a Heavenly decree and a human decree. If one is afraid to have children because that will result in the children suffering from a misfortune that Hashem will cause, then he must know that the same Hashem who is bringing the misfortune also commanded you to have children. But if one is afraid the children will suffer from a human being who wishes to harm them, that is a good reason not to do the mitzvah.

This is similar to a question posed by Rabbi Yosef Aryeh Lorincz to Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky: The Nefesh Hachaim 4:11 famously says that if for one moment there would be no one in the world learning Torah, the world would be destroyed. What if a person knew that he was the only one in the world learning, and suddenly a life-threatening situation arose? Should he stop learning to save the life? If he does, then the whole world would be in danger.

According to the above, R’ Elya Boruch said, the answer is that yes, he must save the life. He must do as he was commanded in the Torah, and should not worry about the world being destroyed, since he is not the one doing the destruction – Hashem is, and Hashem commanded him to save the life.

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 11a: Embarrassing Someone Who Smells Bad

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Sanhedrin 11a: Rebbi was sitting and delivering a shiur, when he smelled garlic. He said, “Whoever ate garlic should leave.” Rabbi Chiya got up and left, and then everyone got up and left. The next morning, Rabbi Shimon son of Rebbi met Rabbi Chiya and said to him, “Are you the one who annoyed my father?” He replied, “Such a thing should not happen in Israel.”

 סנהדרין יא ע”א. כי הא דיתיב רבי וקא דריש, והריח ריח שום, אמר: מי שאכל שום ־ יצאִ, עמד רבי חייא ויצא. עמדו כולן ויצאו. בשחר מצאו רבי שמעון ברבי לרבי חייא, אמר ליה: אתה הוא שציערת לאבא? אמר לו: לא תהא כזאת בישראלִ

There was a daf yomi shiur in the city of Bat Yam at 5:30 PM, and one day a local butcher came in to attend the shiur, straight from the meat market, his hands and clothing stinking from meat. The stench was so powerful that no one was able to learn. The maggid shiur’s question was: should he approach the man and ask him to take a shower and change before coming, and the shiur would be scheduled a little later, or should they just cancel the whole shiur?

From this Gemara, it seems that Rebbi held it is permitted to embarrass the smelly person, while Rabbi Chiya held to cancel the shiur. But when they asked Rabbi Ahron Leib Shteinman, his reply was in this case, even according to Rebbi it would be wrong to embarrass him. Because in Rebbi’s case, who asked him to eat garlic right before the shiur? But here, the butcher was smelly because of his job and had no choice. Furthermore, if we embarrass him, who knows if we’ll ever see him again. Therefore, better to cancel the whole shiur. 9

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 22a: Chesed in the Bathhouse

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Sanhedrin 22a: No one may see the king when he is taking a haircut, when he is naked or when he is in the bathhouse, as the Torah says, “You shall surely place upon yourself a king” – his fear must be upon you.

סנהדרין כב. ואין רואין אותו כשהוא מסתפר, ולא כשהוא ערום, ולא כשהוא בבית המרחץ, שנאמר (דברים י״ז) שום תשים עליך מלך ־ שתהא אימתו עליך.

In Lublin, there was a Yid who would go to the bathhouse every Friday and distribute combs to all the people there. When the Lubliner Rav zt”l heard about it, he said, “I want to have a part in such a great mitzvah.”

A certain rav heard about this and laughed it off. He quoted a Gemara, proving that there is no mitzvah in this. The Gemara (Menachos 43b) states that Dovid Hamelech went to the bathhouse and said, “Woe unto me, that I stand without mitzvos.” If distributing combs would be a mitzvah, Dovid Hamelech could have done so and acquired many mitzvos in the process…

When the Lubliner Rav heard this comment, he said, “The Rav should forgive me, but it seems he forgot an explicit Mishnah, in which it says that no person may see the king while he is in the bathhouse (Sanhedrin 22a). If so, Dovid Hamelech could not have distributed combs, as there were no other people at the bathhouse while he was there.”

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 65b: Weddings in the second half of the month

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Sanhedrin 65b: Rabbi Akiva says: The type of forbidden superstition called “m’onen” means the practice of saying that certain days are luckier than others to embark on a trip, or certain days are luckier to buy merchandise.

סנהדרין סה ע”ב תנו רבנן: מעונן… רבי עקיבא אומר: זה המחשב עתים ושעות, ואומר: היום יפה לצאת, למחר יפה ליקח.

יו”ד קע”ט ב’ נהגו שאין מתחילין בב’ ובד’ ואין נושאין נשים אלא במילוי הלבנה.

רמ”א אה”ע ס”ד ד’ ונהגו שלא לישא נשים אלא בתחילת החדש בעוד שהלבנה במלואה.

A chassidishe Yid asked Rabbi Yisroel Reisman: “Is it allowed to make a chasunah on the 28th day of Sivan? That’s the only day I could find a hall available. Usually we don’t make chasunos during the second half of the month, but perhaps Sivan is different.”  

“I don’t know,” replied Rabbi Reisman, “but I’ll tell you a Hamakneh, written by the Baal Haflaah, Rabbi Pinchus Horowitz, who was chassidish. At the end of the sefer, in his comments on Even Hoezer 64, he asks why the Rema needs to say in Orach Chaim 551:2 that after the 17th of Tammuz we don’t make chasunos – isn’t that the second half of the month? He answers based on a teshuva from the Rema that the rule is that wherever he says נוהגין it means poskim taught that we should do so, but נהגו means that people just do it and we don’t stop them. Here, in the case of getting married in the second half of the month, the Rema (as well as the Mechaber in Yoreh Deah) says נהגו – we allow people to keep this custom. But the Rema never says that one is obligated to keep this custom.

A while later Rabbi Reisman met the man again and asked, “So when is the chasunah?” He replied, “Tu B’av.”

[It would seem that the Mechaber and Rema are telling us that it is allowed to keep this custom and there is no problem of לא לעוננו (superstition). The reason why it is not considered ניחוש and לא תעוננו is because we do it as a good sign, just as we anoint kings next to a spring (Beis Yosef, Yoreh Deah 179; Aryeh Devei Ilai Even Hoezer 18). A good sign is something that we aren’t particular about, but we just do to express our prayers that things will go well. A superstition, on the other hand, would mean refusing to get married in the second half of the month no matter what.] �

Megillah

Megillah 13b: Do live animals emit taste into a food?

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Megillah 13b: Haman said to Achashveirosh, “If a fly falls into a Jew’s cup of wine, he throws out the fly and drinks it, but if my lord the king touches it, he spills it on the floor and does not drink it.”

ואפילו נופל זבוב בכוסו של אחד מהן ־ זורקו ושותהו. ואם אדוני המלך נוגע בכוסו של אחד מהן ־ חובטו בקרקע ואינו שותהו.

The Chasam Sofer (Yoreh Deah 94) tells a story took place in Frankfurt: a chicken flew into a vat of boiling butter and died there. A great rabbi (the Chasam Sofer does not give his name, but some say that it was Rabbi Nosson Adler, the Chasam Sofer’s teacher) ruled that the butter was forbidden and they could not even sell it to non-Jews. So they poured it out onto the street. Afterwards, someone reminded him that the Rema says that any milk and meat mixture that is only Rabbinically forbidden to eat, such as chicken and milk, is permitted to derive benefit from, and therefore may be sold to non-Jews. He replied on the spot, “Yes, it was permitted to derive benefit from the butter, but it was forbidden to sell it to non-Jews, because it absorbed the taste of meat from a live animal.”

The Chasam Sofer comments that it was clear that Rabbi Nosson Adler’s original ruling was not because of meat from a live animal; rather, he had indeed forgotten the Rema’s rule that it is permitted to derive benefit from chicken with milk. But Hashem does not allow a tzaddik to make a mistake, and therefore the ruling turned out to be correct for a different reason. Hashem placed this quick answer in his mouth to save him from embarrassment.

We see from this story, concludes the Chasam Sofer, that live animals can give taste to a mixture. Thus the chicken, while still alive, was giving taste to the butter and forbidding it to non-Jews.

The Chasam Sofer’s student Reb Boruch brought additional proof to this from the Rosh in Avodah Zarah 68b, who cites the words of Haman – that a Jew would drink wine touched by a fly – as proof that cold things do not give taste. But maybe there the fly was alive and therefore could not give taste! From the fact that the Rosh ignores this argument, it would seem that he holds that live animals do emit taste.

However, the Amudei Ohr argues that it is unheard of that an animal or person, simply by touching a hot food, should render it forbidden. Therefore the Steipler (Chullin 5) argues that in Rabbi Nosson Adler’s case, the butter was forbidden because some part of the chicken may have become separated from the chicken while the chicken was still alive. That limb, forbidden to non-Jews, is itself dead, and therefore it can emit taste. But a completely live limb, such a human finger stuck into coffee, would not emit taste and forbid the coffee.

As to the Rosh’s comment on Haman’s words, perhaps the Rosh assumed that the fly in question was dead, but a live fly would indeed not emit taste.