Bava Kama

Bava Kama 110b: Annulling a Marriage Retroactively

YCLeave a comment

Bava Kama 110b: If so [if a person’s korban reverts to his heirs when he dies without getting kaparah from it, since he consecrated it in error], shall we then say when a woman’s husband dies and his brother is afflicted with ugly boils, she should be free without chalitzah, for she married him in error? – There it is different, because we are witness that she is happy with any marriage, and thus it was worth it to her to be married to her husband, even if that would result in her being stuck at the mercy of his ugly brother.

בבא קמא קי ע”ב: אלא מעתה, יבמה שנפלה לפני מוכה שחין תיפוק בלא חליצה, דאדעתא דהכי לא קדשה עצמהִ התם אנן סהדי דמינח ניחא לה בכל דהו, כריש לקיש, דאמר ר״ל: טב למיתב טן דו מלמיתב ארמלו.

In 1981, a woman in her 60s entered the office of Tel Aviv’s beis din, chaired by Rabbi Yitzchak Yedidya Frankel. The woman had recently arrived from Bukhara, and when she told her story, tears welled in the eyes of all those present.

She had married in 1941 while living in Bukhara, but just before the wedding the Germans swept into the Soviet Union in a surprise attack. Her fiancé was drafted into the Soviet army, they married, and shortly afterward he was sent to the battlefield and killed. His death was verified beyond a doubt, but this left the young widow in need of chalitzah from her late husband’s brother in order to be free to remarry. The brother, however, was an official in the Communist Party and he absolutely refused to participant in anything that smacked of religion. He left her as an agunah for 40 years – though he knew of the suffering he was imposing on her, he would not soften his position.

Despite this woman’s lack of any formal Jewish education, she stood fast to her principles and withstood this incredible nisayon. Now in her later years, she approached the beis din and asked if there was any way to permit her to marry, so that she would not be forced to spend the rest of her life all alone.

The beis din, which consisted of Rabbi Frankel, Rabbi Shmuel Baruch Werner and Rabbi Shlomo Tenne, searchd high and low to find a glimmer of hope for this courageous woman. Finally, they found grounds for leniency, based on the fact that her brother-in-law had discarded his Jewish identity entirely.  The Mordechai brings the Maharam, who says that although the Gemara says it is worth it to a woman to get married even at the risk of falling to the mercy of an ugly brother, it is not worth it to her when the brother is a mumar, someone who has discarded his Jewish identity. The only reason she married him, says the Maharam, was because she did not know about the existence or lifestyle of the brother, or else she did not know about the laws of chalitzah. Since this was a highly unusual case with little precedent, they were hesitant to rely on their own findings, so they sent them to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein for his approval.

Several weeks passed and they heard no word from Reb Moshe. Finally Rabbi Frankel called Reb Moshe’s home one day at 4:00 in the afternoon (9:00 in the morning in New York). He related the story of the poor woman’s plight and emphasized that we must not prolong her suffering any longer than necessary. It was obviously by the tone of Rabbi Frankel’s voice that he was upset by the fact that he had not received a reply all this time.

Reb Moshe apologized profusely, explaining that he had never seen the letter from the beis din. Apparently, his family members had withheld it from him due to his frail health (he was almost 90 years old). He promised to demand that he be shown the letter immediately and that he would respond promptly. Just four hours later, the doorbell rang. It was a messenger from the Israeli Postal Service with a telegram in hand. The message, in Hebrew words and in Latin characters, was: “She may get married. My responsum will follow. Moshe Feinstein.”

Reb Moshe’s handwritten responsum arrived via airmail some two weeks later. His decision was based not on the fact that the brother was anti-religious – we don’t pasken like the Maharam – but rather on the fact that this case is different from the Gemara’s in that there must have been information the wife did not know at the time of marriage. In the Gemara’s case, where the husband was healthy and his life was not in danger in any way, she made an informed decision to marry him and accept the risk of falling to yibum. In the Bukharian case, where there was a war raging and her husband had been drafted, why would she marry him knowing that he was likely to die? It could only be that she was misinformed: either she did not know about chalitzah at all, or she knew but assumed that this brother did not count as a Jew. Therefore her marriage was in error and she is permitted to remarry without chalitzah. 

[There is a question here in pshat in the Gemara. The Gemara distinguishes between the case of a person who was makdish a korban and then died, and the woman who got married and then her husband died. In the case of the korban, we say that had he known he was going to die, he would not have been makdish it, so retroactively the korban was never a korban and it falls to his heirs. In the case of the husband dying, we say that the woman got married knowing the risks and the marriage is not invalidated retroactively. What is the difference?

We could answer this by positing a difference in the case, or a difference in the logic. The “difference in the case” approach would be to say that in the korban case, he died quickly, within the short time it takes to bring the korban to the Beis Hamikdash. Thus we can assume that he must have had some hidden sickness before, of which he was not aware, and therefore this is not נולד. The consecration of the korban was בטעות because he was not fully aware of the risk he was taking. In the husband dying case, the husband may have died several years after the marriage. Quite probably he was not sick at the time of the marriage, so the risk of him dying was not any greater than anyone else. The woman’s decision was fully informed, so the marriage is not invalidated.

The “difference in logic” approach would be to say that in both cases the man probably had some condition that raised his risk of dying, but a wife has a higher risk tolerance, since the benefit of being married now tips the scales of her mind. So although she was unaware of the husband’s condition, still she would have married him even had she known the true risk. But in the korban case, had the man known about his own medical condition, he would not have been makdish the korban.

In our story, the woman was aware of the risks, since the German invasion had already happened and her husband had already been drafted before the marriage. These risks are much higher than the usual risk of a person dying, even a person with a medical condition. Also, there is a smaller benefit to tip the scale, since she would only be with the husband for the short time prior to his deployment. Reb Moshe therefore reasoned that there is no way she would have married him, unless she were misinformed about something else: she did not know about chalitzah at all, or she knew but assumed that this brother did not count as a Jew.]

Source: Hamodia, Vayeitzei 5780

Menachos

Menachos 21a: I Forgot Whether I Salted the Meat

YCLeave a comment

Menachos 21a: One who eats cooked blood does not transgress [the Torah prohibition].

מנחות כא ע”א: אמר זעירי א״ר חנינא: דם שבישלו אינו עובר עליו.

A woman came to the Taz and asked, “I cooked meat, but forgot whether I salted it beforehand.” The Taz permitted it because of ספק דרבנן לקולא – in a doubtful situation on an enactment of the Sages, we rule leniently. We salt meat to remove its blood, but even if we did not remove the blood, once the meat is cooked, cooked blood is forbidden only Rabbinically. Therefore, salting is only a Rabbinic question. Although the rule is that even a doubtful situation of a Rabbinic law, where there is a חזקה – a status quo situation where it is forbidden – we rule strictly, in this case the fact that the meat originally had blood is not considered a חזקה.

The Taz proves this from a case in Shulchan Aruch: meat was known to be soaked and salted, and then a non-Jewish employee cooked it, saying that he soaked it a second time. We rely on his words if he is מסיח לפי תומו – he is speaking casually, not aware that we are relying on him. Now, “speaking casually” is only relied upon when the prohibition is Rabbinic and there is no חזקה. So it must be the fact that the meat originally had blood is not considered a חזקה.

Why not? The Chavos Daas explains that the meat is one thing and its blood is another. The meat itself was never forbidden, only it had blood mixed into it. By salting, we are separating the two, but we are not permitting anything that was previously forbidden.  

The Shach (Nekudos Hakesef) disagrees and argues that in the case of the non-Jew, if there were no חזקה we would permit the meat even without the non-Jew’s casual testimony because every Rabbinic doubt is permitted (ספק דרבנן לקולא). From the fact that we do require his מסיח לפי תומו, we see that blood in the meat is called איתחזק איסורא. And why then is he believed? The Shach (Sifsei Kohein) already explains that non-Jews care about cleanliness and it is likely that he washed the meat anyway. Therefore, here in the case of the woman who is unsure whether she salted the meat, we follow the חזקה  and the meat is forbidden.

The Taz adds that she probably followed habit and salted the meat. To this, the Shach responds that since salting is a big job, the fact that she doesn’t remember it probably means she didn’t do it

[Seemingly there is a big question on this Taz. If blood in meat is not איתחזק איסורא, then treife taste absorbed in a pot is also not איזחזק איסורא for the same reason: the pot is one thing and the treife taste is another, and we are only separating the two. But the whole source for the rule that מסיח לפי תומו is not relied upon by an איסורא דרבנן דאיתחזק איסורא is the end of Siman 137, which says that aנכרי מסיח לפי תומו  is not believed to say that a pot was kashered!

This same question can be asked in Siman 102 in the laws of דבר שיש לו מתירין. The Rema (s’if 4) states that meat with blood in it is not דבר שיש לו מתירין because the meat itself doesn’t need to become permitted; the blood merely has to be extracted. But in s’if 3 all agree that treif utensils would be דבר שיש לו מתירין, if not for the fact that it would be expensive to kasher them.]

Source: Taz, Yoreh Deah 69:24

Avodah Zarah

Avodah Zarah 51b: Shaitels from the Temples of India

YCLeave a comment

Avodah Zarah 51b: If one found on the idol’s head money, garments or vessels, they are permitted. Clusters of grapes, crowns made of sheaves, wines, oils and flours, or anything similar to what is brought on the mizbeyach – they are forbidden.

Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 139:3: An offering to an idol becomes forbidden if either: 1) It is a item that is brought on the mizbeyach, like meat, oil, water or salt. 2) An action was done to it that is similar to slaughtering or splattering (זריקה), provided it is done with the object that is normally used in the worship of this idol, even if the slaughtering or splattering is not the normal manner.

For example, if the idol is usually worshipped by waving a stick in front of it, and one broke a stick in front of it, the stick becomes forbidden, because breaking the stick is similar to slaughtering. But if the idol is not worshipped with a stick at all and one broke a stick in front of it, he is not liable to punishment, nor does the stick become forbidden.  

עבודה זרה נא ע”ב: מצא בראשו מעות, כסות או כלים ־ הרי אלו מותרין.ֹ פרכילי ענבים, ועטרות של שבלים, ויינות ושמנים וסלתות, וכל דבר שכיוצא בו קרב ע״ג המזבח ־ אסור.

יורה דעה קלט ס”ג: איזהו נוי ואיזהו תקרובת? נוי כגון שמדליק לפניה נרות או שטח לפניה בגדים וכלים נאים לנוי. ותקרובת כל שכיוצא בו קרב על גבי מזבח כמו כל מיני מאכל כגון בשר שמנים וסלתות מים ומלח אם הניחו לפניה לשם תקרובת נאסר מיד אבל דבר שאין מקריבין ממנו בפנים אינו נאסר אלא א״כ עשה ממנו כעין זביחה או כעין זריקה המשתברת והוא דרך לעובדה באותו דבר אע״פ שאין דרך לעובדה בזה הענין. כיצד אליל שעובדים אותה שמקשקשים לפניה במקל ושיבר מקל לפניה נאסר מפני ששבירת המקל דומה לזביחה, אבל אם אין עובדים אותה במקל כלל ושיבר מקל לפניה אינו חייב ולא נאסר.

In 2004 the Jewish community became aware that some of the hair for shaitels comes from Indian temples, and they feared it might have the status of an offering to an idol, from which it is forbidden to derive benefit. Women were told not to wear human hair shaitels until the matter was investigated and a conclusion reached.

The problem had actually been raised many years earlier in 1990 by Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos Vehanhagos v. 2 siman 414). Rav Sternbuch wrote that Hindus believe that hair is holy and forbidden to cut outside of a religious context. If there is some danger in their family and they are saved, they give thanks to the idol by shaving off their hair and bringing it to the priest, who would burn it for the idol. But recently, with the rising demand for hair to make wigs, the priests stopped burning it and instead they sell it to companies and generate income for the temple. This is the source of the Indian hair on the market. The Shulchan Aruch requires an action similar to slaughtering, and the cutting of the hair is exactly that. The masses of villagers in India still believe that the priests burn their hair as an offering, otherwise they would not agree to shave it. That is why the merchants in the hair business or the government of India sometimes deny that the hair comes from the temples. But it is true and clear that it is so. Merchants who went to India to buy hair testified before Rav Sternbuch that they got it from the temples.

In a second teshuva on the subject (v. 3 siman 265), the asker argued that he heard from the priests that the hair cutting is not a service to the idol but simply a removal of the impure hair, so that they can go into the temple without it.

[At this point it will be helpful to split the various issues up and give them numbers, so that we can more easily follow the arguments of the poskim in this story.]

Issue (1): What defines דרך עבודתה, the standard method of worship? The Gemara defines two types of offerings that become forbidden: a) anything that is brought on the mizbeyach b) taking any object that is normal used in the service of that particular idol (e.g. an idol that is served using a stick) and performing an act of shechitah or zerikah on it. Rav Sternbuch wrote that all theory aside, we have to look what the women who actually get their hair cut off are thinking. Even if officially Hinduism says what the priests say, the women see the shaving as showing their dedication to their idol by giving up their beauty, and that is why they do it right near the temple – so that the idol should see their self-sacrifice for him and help them. They want to give the idol pleasure, even if their religion doesn’t require it.

Issue (2) The intent of the barbers. The asker also raised the question that perhaps the barber, who is doing the action of cutting, is not doing it for avodah zarah, just to earn a living. To this Rav Sternbuch responded that perhaps that is true, but there is another problem:

Issue (3): Are the women helping the barbers? Just as it says in Makos 20b that if someone turns his head to make it easier for the barber to cut his peyos, he is considered a participant in the sin of cutting peyos, here too, since the woman having her hair shaven helps the barber by sitting in the right place and moving her head, she is taking part in the action. Since her intention is to serve the avodah zarah, the hair is considered an offering.  

~~~

However, Rav Elyashiv in Kovetz Teshuvos v. 1 siman 77 ruled that the hair was mutar, and responded to the three issues mentioned above:

Issue (1): As mentioned, something not brought on the mizbeyach is only ossur if it is an object that is normally used in service of this idol. In this case, however, the Hindu idol is not served with hair, since official Hinduism does not consider hair a sacrifice. Therefore even if an individual worshipper did offer up her hair to the idol, and perfomed shechitah (cutting) on it, it would not become forbidden.

Issue (2): Secondly, even if someone were not to accept the above reasoning, the barber is the one doing the cutting. The barber certainly knows that the hair is sold, not offered to the idol.

Issue (3): Rav Sternbuch’s logic of מסייע, based on the Gemara in Makos 20b – that the woman is helping the barber by tilting her head and she intends to offer the hair – is not halachically valid, because the Shach (Nekudos Hakesef on Yoreh Deah 198:20) says that this principle only applies to shaving the peyos, where the Torah says לא תקיפו in the plural. The Taz disagrees and applies the principle of מסייע to a woman having her nails cut by a non-Jew on Shabbos before going to the mikveh. But even the Taz might agree that the “helping” doesn’t work to create the status of an offering to idolatry. In any case, the Sidrei Taharah rules like the Shach.

Issue (4): The cutting of the hair is not done in the temple itself, in front of the idol. The Gemara’s language, “If he broke a stick in front of it” implies that the stick only becomes forbidden when the service is done in front of the idol. The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch also copy this language.

Rav Elyashiv concludes with a word of caution: his psak was based only on the facts as presented to him, and it would be worthwhile to investigate and find out more.

~~~

In 2004 the issue was raised again when a British Jew at the airport on his way home from Canada met some Indians, who were talking about going to the temple to offer up their hair. The Eidah Chareidis and Rav Elyashiv asked Rabbi Ahron Dovid Dunner to investigate. He interviewed a professor of Hinduism, who explained all about their religion. Dayan Dunner asked him how a statue that was just built could help him. He said, “We serve the Creator of the world; these statues are just reminders. And the tonsuring (cutting the hair) is just a way of giving up our ego before going to the temple.” But when he interviewed Hindu laymen, he got varying answers. Some did really believe in the statues. Some said that the hair was a sacrifice to them. They bring their hair either as a request for something from the idol, or as thanks for saving them from danger. He reported back to the poskim in Eretz Yisroel, who encouraged him to go to India, visit the temples themselves and find out the true facts.

Dayan Dunner traveled with his wife and one other rav from the London beis din to visit the temple at Tirupati. They were assisted by a Jew living in India as well as a local translator. (Translation was difficult because there are over a hundred languages spoken in India. The people at the temple spoke Tamil, so the local translator had to translate from Tamil to Hindi, and then the Jew from Bombay translated from Hindi to a mixture of English and Hebrew.)

Issue (1): All the people cutting having their hair cut said that they were giving it to the idol because the idol likes it; it makes him happy. Also, they observed that the women put their hands on their hearts and said prayers during the tonsure. Also, they saw some girls who were not willing to sacrifice all their hair, so they just had a few strands cut off. This seemed to prove that the purpose is not to remove something impure or to break one’s ego and walk out with a bald head. When Dayan Dunner’s group asked some of the women if they minded that their hair was being sold, they said no, why not let the idol make a profit from it?

Issue (4): As to the argument that a sacrifice is only forbidden if done right in front of the idol, Dayan Dunner’s group saw thousands upon thousands of people walking up a 20 kilometer mountain barefoot to see this idol, and waiting in line for 24 hours to get in. The only service they do when passing in front of the idol is to recite a few of the idol’s names and put some money or jewelry in the collection box. The rest of the services, including hair tonsuring, are done in separate buildings. The entire mountain is considered holy by them and thus might be considered “in front of the idol.”

Issue (5): What percentage of Indian hair on the market comes from the temples? After this, Dayan Dunner and his group followed the hair out of the temple to Madras, a major city nearby where the human hair trade is a big business. The merchants there explained to them the high quality of temple hair. All over India, they said, women collect and sell their brush hair (hair that falls out during brushing) because they are afraid someone might find it and make witchcraft against them. This brush hair is not high quality, first of all because it is weak hair (the weakest hairs are generally the ones that fall out) and secondly because the roots and tails are not aligned, and when roots are placed next to tails they get caught and tangled like Velcro. Temple hair, which is cut off all at once, is the best.

From there he traveled to Eretz Yisroel and reported to Rav Elyashiv. Rav Elyashiv paskened: “Temple hair is an offering to avodah zarah and is therefore ossur. One may not use any shaitel made of Indian hair. According to current knowledge, most of the shaitels sold in Eretz Yisroel come from India. Therefore one may not buy a shaitel here unless one knows its source. In other places, it depends where the majority come from. If the majority is from other countries, it is permitted based on the rule of כל דפריש. But one is obligated to investigate the source of the hair.” Rabbi Tovia Weiss and the beis din of the Eidah Chareidis heard the facts too and gave the same psak.

[It seems that the new information changed Rav Elyashiv’s mind on issues (1) and (4). On (1), he saw that a significant number of worshippers look at the hair as a gift to the idol, and that was enough to be considered דרך עבודתה. On (4), the whole mountaintop was considered “in front of the idol.” The question is why he changed on issue (2) and (3). This will become clear below in his letter to Rabbi Belsky.]

News of the psak spread around the world in a matter of minutes. Women walked out of weddings and took off their sheitels. Teachers came to school in tichels.

~~~

Rabbi Dunner then traveled to America and gave his testimony in front of 60 rabbis. Rabbi Yisroel Belsky consulted with Hindu priests and scholars, including many converts and baalei teshuva, all of whom confirmed the facts established earlier, namely, that official Hinduism teaches that no holiness or sacrificial status is accorded to the hair. On the contrary, hair is a symbol of the ego, is impure, and thus held to be displeasing to their gods.

Issue (1): Rav Belsky took the position that דרך עבודתה is determined by the priests and the official books, no matter how many simple pilgrims believe differently. Besides, perhaps the words Dayan Dunner heard from the worshippers were garbled in the chain of translations. He pointed out that the translator from Tamil to Hindi spoken only broken Hindi, and the translator from Hindi to English was really a native Marathi speaker for whom Hindi was also a second language.

Issue (2): Dayan Dunner testified to Rav Belsky that the barbers told him that they were working because they were paid by the temple. A worker, however ignorant he may be, does his work in accordance with the intentions of the one who hired him and paid him. Therefore, the barbers are cutting the hair based on the priests’ version of Hinduism, not that of the worshippers. And it is only the barbers’ intent that counts since they are the ones doing the act.

Rav Belsky also heard from a baal teshuva who had once been a Hindu, and knew the language well, that the barbers constantly chat and joke with each other while they work, about politics or about their union. When he mentioned this to Dayan Dunner, he agreed, but argued that it’s no different from Jews who talk in shul. Rav Belsky said, “True, and who says they are having kavanah while they talk?”

Issue (5): Rav Belsky heard from experts that most hair exported from India is not from the temples. For example, in 2004 the amount of temple hair processed in India was about 300 tons, while the amount of brush hair was about 4000 tons.

Issue (6): Even if we were to consider it kavua, which makes it like a 50-50 question, the hair from India then gets taken to other countries where it is mixed with other hair. This is a case of two mixtures, which the Rambam permits in the case of avodah zarah (Shach Yoreh Deah 110:52).

Rav Belsky put all of the above arguments in a letter to Rav Elyashiv. 

~~~

Rav Elyashiv responded:

Issue (1): According to the testimony of Dayan Dunner, the tonsuring is עבודתה בכך – the normal manner of worshipper this idol. This is similar to the idol Kemosh mentioned in the Torah, of which the Rambam says in Sefer Hamitzvos (negative commandment #6)

שהעובד לאיזה דבר שהוא ממיני עבודה זרה באיזה מין שיהיה ממיני העבודה – הרי זה חייב כרת, בתנאי שיעבד כדרכה, כלומר: בדבר שדרכה להעבד בו, כגון פוער לפעור וזורק אבן למרקוליס, ומעביר שערו לכמוש.

“One who worships avodah zarah is liable to the punishment of kareis, as long as he did it in the normal manner for that idol, for example… if one shaves his hair off to Kemosh.”

Here, during the haircut the women say the name of the idol.

Issue (2): And the barbers said to him [Dayan Dunner] that even though they are working for money, still – they said – they are also Hindus who see this as service to the avodah zarah. In such a case we clearly apply the rule that “we can assume an idol worshipper does things for idolatry” (Chullin 13a), since that is the goal of the women getting their hair cut.

Issue (5): Rav Elyashiv says he was shown a document from the Indian government stating that 75% of the hair exported from India is from the temples. And even if most were not from the temples, it would be considered kavua. The Divrei Chaim (2:57) says that when a Jew orders something from a non-Jewish store and the non-Jew ships it to him, it is as if the Jew himself took from the store, so the rule of כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה applies and it is a 50-50 question. 

Issue (6): As to Rav Belsky’s argument that there are two mixtures, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 110:8) requires three mixtures and doesn’t mention the Rambam’s leniency about two mixtures to permit avodah zarah. Furthermore, how can one use the mixture of hair from different countries to nullify Indian hair, when there are different qualities and prices for hair from different sources, and they are sold separately?

~~~

Subsequently, Rav Belsky met with Rav Elyashiv, did more research and wrote a letter back to him.

Issue (1): Rav Elyashiv quoted the Rambam about shaving one’s hair for the idol Kemosh. The fact that donating one’s hair is the normal manner of service to Kemosh does not prove it is normal for the Hindu idols. The Hindu priests themselves all say that it is not. The only indication that it is normal comes from a few statements that Dayan Dunner heard, through a chain of unreliable translators. Even if the translation was correct, the understanding of simple people does not determine the normal manner of service for halachic purposes.

Besides, even if the Hindu religion were exactly like the worship of Kemosh, the Rambam is only saying that the act of shaving one’s hair for Kemosh is the normal manner of service, and therefore one who does so would be punished. He is not saying that the worshippers actually dedicate their hair to Kemosh, rendering the hair forbidden. Lehavdil, we Jews also have a mitzvah to shave hair for Hashem in certain cases (e.g. a Nazir) but we don’t dedicate the hair itself to hekdesh in any way. Rather, the act of service is performed on the person.

We can prove that the Rambam did not mean that the worshippers dedicate their hair to Kemosh, because if he did, the hair would be like a korban that is slaughtered, and the Rambam would have listed it in his next sentence where he says that one is punishable for worshipping avodah zarah through any of the four standard avodos, of which shechitah is one.

Issue (2): Rav Elyashiv seemed to have heard from Dayan Dunner that the barbers said they saw the haircuts as service to the avodah zarah, but when Rav Belsky and the other American rabbis pressed him to tell them what exactly he had heard from the barbers, it appears that he only heard them say they were working for their pay, and perhaps that they saw their work as holy, but nothing more. In any case, the baal teshuva who knew their language well testified that the barbers chat about politics and other mundane matters as they work, like all barbers. If they have any religious intent, it is that of the priests who pay their salaries.

Issue (5): The “Indian government statement” that 75% of Indian hair is temple hair was made by a low-ranking office worker who took it from a webpage. When the rabbis investigated the webpage, they saw that he had read it backwards and most of the hair was not from the temples. Furthermore, the rabbis spent 8 hours with the owner of a large hair processing firm in India and determined that none of his hair was from the temples. A statement quoted from a rav in Antwerp that supposedly claimed that most of the shaitels come from temple hair was likewise proven to be a misquotation.  

The reason why there is so much non-temple hair is that in India, hair is collected in a different manner from most other countries. In Romania, Hungary, Spain and Russia, women interested in selling their hair grow their hair for up to several years and then cut it all off at one time. The hair must be grown to at least eight inches long in order to be used for a wig. Women in India generally do not cut their hair all at once. Rather, they grow their hair extremely long, not cutting it for years, and whenever they brush their hair they collect the strands that fall out. Every few weeks representatives from hair collection firms visit these women and buy the brush hair in exchange for cash. Indeed, selling brush hair is an important source of income for many poverty-stricken families. It is one of the reasons they do not cut their hair all at once. Were they to do that, the women would only make money once every few years. This way, they can put food on the table each week.

The brush hair is sorted by quality, shade and length in large facilities in India. Then it is shipped to Romania or Ukraine for bleaching and dyeing. From there it is shipped to the wig-weaving factories in China and Korea.

The only time Indian women cut their hair off all at once is in the temples. This is called “Indian Remy hair” in the industry. With Remy hair, there is no need for sorting. Before the hair is cut, the hair is gathered together with two ribbons, one at the end near the tip and another close to the scalp. This keeps all the hair strands root to root and tip to tip. Brush hairs are much longer than the Remy hair, but Remy is by far the better of the two types. There is also European Remy hair, tied and cut in the same way. Whether from India or elsewhere, Remy hair is generally used without processing and in its natural color. It is known for its silky texture and natural luster.  Almost all Indian Remy hair is solid black and comes in four natural shades.

The bleaching and dyeing process is used only for brush hair, but Remy hair is used in its natural color. Wig manufacturers would never subject Remy hair to bleaching and dyeing because it is worth much more in its natural state. Thus only a woman buying a black shaitel need worry about temple hair. Any other color is certainly either Indian brush hair, or European Remy hair.

In any case, even if we were to doubt the above facts, gathered from people in the industry, the hair being exported from India is at worst a mixture of temple and brush hair, with brush hair as the majority. The rule of kavua would not apply because the hair already became mixed beyond recognition while in the hands of the goy, before the Jewish company ordered. Therefore it is not comparable to the case of the Divrei Chaim, where a Jew orders something from a store that sells separate recognizable items.

Issue (6): As to the rule that avodah zarah is never nullified in a mixture, and according to the Shulchan Aruch even two mixtures, that halacha was only stated in Zevachim 74b regarding rings or silver cups which are expensive and valuable. But hair is nullified. In any case, here we have two mixtures and the Rambam permits that, as mentioned. 

Regarding Rav Elyashiv’s argument that hair is recognizable as Indian and therefore is not considered mixed, Rav Belsky replied that of course if it is labeled Indian that is true. Rav Belsky’s two mixtures argument applies in a case where it is labeled Ukrainian or Hungarian, yet we fear that some Indian hair is mixed into it.

[It would seem that the dispute on Issue (1) hinges on how to apply the rule of “normal manner of service.” Everyone would agree that if someone went to the Hindu idol and threw stones, because he believed that was the normal manner of worship, it would not make him liable to the punishment for idolatry, nor would the stones become forbidden, since the official religion does not prescribe that. But here, everyone agrees that Hinduism does encourage having one’s hair cut. The act is certainly “the normal manner of service” and someone doing so would be liable to punishment. The question is only in how to interpret the act. The official religion interprets it as an act of surrendering one’s pride. The simple people see it as giving the hair to the idol. Do we say that these simple people are still within the bounds of “the normal manner” since, after all, their action is the normal action and it is only their thoughts that are deviant?

Furthermore, the Gemara does say, and the Shulchan Aruch does rule, that if an idol is normally served with a stick and one breaks a stick in front of it, even though breaking is not the normal manner of service, the stick becomes forbidden. Thus only the object has to be normal, but the action done with it can be abnormal. Perhaps here as well, Rav Elyashiv would argue that since the object, hair, is normally used for service, only the dedication of the hair is abnormal, that is enough to forbid the hair. Rav Belsky would argue that the hair is not used for service at all; it is just an irrelevant by-product of the service done on the body of the one getting her hair cut.]

Sources: Shulchan Halevi pp. 437-446; Shulchan Halevi – Halachic Responsa from the Desk of Harav Yisroel Belsky, v. 1 p. 155; Rabbi Ahron Dovid Dunner – Lecture available on Kol Halashon

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 19a: Keeping an Eye on your Children

YCLeave a comment

Sanhedrin 19a: Rabbi Yosi in Tzipori made a law that a woman may not walk in the street with her son behind her, because of a story that happened. Rashi: A boy was kidnapped and taken into a house, and when the mother began to cry, one of the kidnappers offered to help and show her where her son went. When she entered the house, they raped her.

סנהדרין יט ע”א: ואמר רמי בר אבא: התקין רבי יוסי בציפורי שלא תהא אשה מהלכת בשוק ובנה אחריה, משום מעשה שהיה. פירש רש”י:  שגנבוהו פריצים מאחריה ונתנוהו בבית, וכשחזרה ולא ראתהו, התחילה צועקת ובוכה, בא אחד מהם ואמר: בואי ואראנו ליך, ונכנסה אחריו ועינו אותה. והובא להלכה באה”ע כב,יד.

A tichel-clad young woman walked into a Judaica shop in Yerushalayim with her 1-year-old baby in a stroller. “Please, I’d like to see your finest gold menorah,” she said. The saleslady pulled over a ladder and took down the $5,000 gold menorah – the most expensive item in the shop. The young lady’s eyes lit up. “Wow, this is really something,” she gushed. “Do you mind watching my baby while I run out and show it to my husband in the car? This is his idea, but it is a lot of money so I’d like to just double-check with him before finalizing.” As the recipient of commissions on high-end items, the saleslady’s eyes also lit up. “Sure, no problem.”

Five minutes passed, and then ten, but the saleslady wasn’t worried. After all, spending $5,000 is not a snap decision, and the young woman had left her baby there, so she would certainly be back soon.

Fifteen minutes later, a woman burst into the shop, screaming hysterically, “My baby! My baby!” This woman had left her baby unattended on the sidewalk while she entered a store, and the first lady – a professional con artist – took advantage by taking the baby, entering the Judaica shop with a tichel on her head and a baby in tow, and then absconding with the menorah.

The owner of the shop took the saleslady to a din Torah before Rabbi Yitzchok Zilberstein, claiming that she had acted irresponsibly by allowing the menorah out of the shop unsupervised. The saleslady responded that she had done exactly as the owner would have wanted her to do, and in fact what he himself would have done had he been there. After all, who would suspect that the baby had been nabbed off the street?

Harav Zilberstein paskened that the saleslady indeed had acted as the owner would have wanted, and therefore was not liable to pay. But the real guilty party in this story was the woman who had left her baby unattended. She violated the takanah of Chazal that a woman may not walk in the street with her child trailing behind her, out of her sight.

Source: Hamodia November 27, 2019

Bava Metzia

Bava Metzia 66b: Selling the Reward for One’s Mitzvos

YCLeave a comment

Bava Metzia 66b: If someone sells the future fruits of a date palm to his friend, Rav Huna said: Until they grow, he can back out, but once they grow he cannot back out. Rav Nachman said: Even after they grow he can back out.

בבא מציעא סו ע”ב: המוכר פירות דקל לחבירו, אמר רב הונא: עד שלא באו לעולם ־ יכול לחזור בו. משבאו לעולם ־ אין יכול לחזור בו, ורב נחמן אמר: אף משבאו לעולם ־ יכול לחזור בו.

A Jew in Tiberias who was known as a tzaddik sold half of his mitzvos to a wealthy man for 22,000 rubles. The buyer paid half the amount, but before paying the other half he went to see a rav, who asked Hashem to send him an answer through a dream as to whether this was a worthwhile purchase. He received the answer that this “tzaddik” was not any better than anyone else. The buyer went back to the “tzaddik” and demanded a refund. But the seller refused, and instead demanded the other half of the sale price. The dispute was presented to the Netziv (Meishiv Davar v. 3, siman 14)

The Netziv commented that this seller showed, by the very fact that he sold his mitzvos, that he was not a tzaddik. He brings several proofs:

  1. Selling one’s mitzvos is what Esav did. The Torah’s criticism of Esav is not that he sold the birthright for a bowl of soup. The Rashbam says that Esav sold it for its full value, and the soup was only to close the deal. Still, the Torah says that he despised the birthright, because a right-thinking person realizes that spiritual reward is priceless and should not be sold for any money in the world.
  2. We see in the Gemara in Taanis (25a) that Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa received a golden leg from his table in Olam Haba and he returned it to Heaven. In Shemos Rabbah (52) we see that his wife was the one who demanded that he return it. So how much more wrong it is to deliberately sell the honor of Hashem, to take pleasure in Hashem in Olam Haba, in order to receive physical pleasure in this world. It is like one whom the king honored with a medal and he sold it to something else. Such a person has despised the honor of the king and deserves a punishment.  
  3. The Torah says, “You have cried in the ears of Hashem, saying, ‘We wish we could eat meat! It was better for us Egypt.’ Hashem will give you meat and you will eat.” (Bamidbar 11:18) The complainers remembered the physical pleasures of Egypt, and paid no attention to the spiritual pleasures in the desert, where they enjoyed the revelation of the Shechinah on a constant basis. Therefore Hashem said, I will give you meat until it comes out of your noses, because you rejected Hashem who is in your midst. The same could be said of this man who despised the pleasure of Olam Haba and sold it for physical pleasure, for money. He is deserving of punishment and does not fit the description of a man on a high spiritual level.

Then the Netziv asks on himself from the story (Sotah 21a) of Shimon the brother of Azariah and Rabbi Yochanan of the Nasi’s house, who sold half their reward for learning Torah to those who supported them. He answers that there it is different because they did it in order to be able to learn Torah. The Mishnah in Avos (4:17) says, “One hour of teshuva and good deeds in this world is better than all the life of Olam Haba.” They loved the Torah so much that they didn’t demand full reward for it in Olam Haba, only to take pleasure in Hashem through the battle of Torah. The Gemara also brings the story of Hillel and his brother Shevna, where Shevna offered Hillel money in return for partnership in the reward for his Torah, but a Heavenly voice proclaimed, “If a man gives all the wealth of his house for love, they would despise him.” [Most understand this to be because Hillel had already learned Torah, so the money would not help him learn more; it was merely an attempt to buy off his reward. But the Netziv disagreed with this – perhaps Hillel would continue learning thanks to Shevna’s money.] The money would have helped Hillel learn with a clear mind and no worries. But Hillel was so engrossed in his learning that his poverty did not bother him in the least, as the Gemara tells about him (Yuma 35b) that he used to earn a small coin and give half to the guard at the Beis Medrash door and sit and learn. Therefore he refused to take the money. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Shimon the brother of Azariah knew that if they would have to worry about making a living, it would disturb their learning, as we find in Eiruvin 65a that Abaye said that even a small interruption, like his mother asking him to bring the cereal to the table, would decrease his ability to learn. Therefore they agreed to give up spiritual pleasure in Olam Haba in order to learn diligently. But to simply exchange spiritual pleasure for physical pleasure – that is like the attitude of the complainers in the desert.

The Netziv then takes the position that the sale was not valid, and offers six arguments:

  1. The man sold half of his reward, presumably including Torah. But one cannot sell reward for Torah, because that means sitting in the yeshiva in Olam Haba, and only real scholars can do this. As an analogy, there is difference between selling an honor bestowed by a king, which can be done, although it is insulting to the king to do so, and selling a position conferred by the king on a skilled person. One cannot sell the position because the buyer doesn’t have the requisite skills. So once the part of the sale that covers reward for Torah is invalid, the entire sale is invalid.
  2. Reward for mitzvos is a דבר שלא בא לעולם which we hold one cannot sell. And even according to the opinion that one can sell דבר שלא בא לעולם, the sale only takes effect when it comes into existence (Bava Metzia 66b), which in this case would be after the seller’s death, at which time no sale can take place.
  3. There is no act of kinyan.
  4. The Rosh and the Shiltei Hagiborim (in the 8th chapter of Bava Kama) disagree on whether one can sell the rights to a mitzvah. For example, the mitzvah of bris milah falls upon the father: can the father sell the right to do the mitzvah to someone else? Their disagreement stems from two different interpretations of the story of Yaakov and Esav. The Shiltei Hagiborim holds that Esav really sold the right to offer korbanos to Yaakov, only that he could go back on the sale since there was no kinyan; therefore Yaakov made him swear not to go back. The Rosh holds that the sale was not effective at all. But both agree that if one has already done a mitzvah, one cannot sell the reward to another person.
  5. The Gemara in Kiddushin says that a person who regrets doing a mitzvah loses his reward. If it were possible to sell the reward, we could have the absurd situation where the seller could regret his mitzvah and buyer would lose the reward he paid for.
  6. The reason why you cannot sell the reward of a mitzvah, says the Netziv, is because the reward comes as a natural consequence of the mitzvah, just as healing is a consequence of taking medicine (Midrash Rabbah beginning of Re’eh, Midrash Tehillim 132). The reason why teshuva helps is that teshuva is a type of medicine too.

Therefore, the sale of the mitzvos was invalid and the buyer can demand back his 11,000 rubles.

Source: Meishiv Davar Chelek 3, Siman 14

Sotah

Sotah 21a: Selling the Reward for a Mitzvah

YCLeave a comment

Sotah 21a: What is the meaning of the verse (Shir Hashirim 8:7), “If a man gives all the wealth of his house for love, they would despise him”? Ulla said: Not like Shimon, brother of Azariah (Shimon was supported by his brother Azariah so that he could learn Torah) and not like Rabbi Yochanan and house of the Nasi, but rather like Hillel and Shevna. As Rav Dimi related: Hillel and Shevna were brothers. Hillel learned Torah while Shevna went into business. Afterwards Shevna said, “Come, let us divide our earnings.” A Heavenly voice came out and said, “If a man gives all the wealth of his house for love, they would despise him.”

Rema in Shulchan Aruch 246:1: One may make an agreement with his friend that he will learn Torah and his friend will support him, and receive a portion of his reward. But if he already learned Torah, he cannot sell his reward for money.

מאי (שיר השירים ח) בוז יבוזו לו? אמר עולא: לא כשמעון אחי עזריה, ולא כר׳ יוחנן דבי נשיאה, אלא כהלל ושבנאֹ דכי אתא רב דימי אמר: הלל ושבנא אחי הוו, הלל עסק בתורה, שבנא עבד עיסקא, לסוף א״ל: תא נערוב וליפלוג, יצתה בת קול ואמרה: (שיר השירים ח) אם יתן איש את כל הון ביתו וגו׳.

שו”ע יו”ד רמ”ו ס”א: ומי שא״א לו ללמוד מפני שאינו יודע כלל ללמוד או מפני הטרדות שיש לו יספיק לאחרים הלומדים: הגה ותחשב לו כאילו לומד בעצמו (טור) ויכול אדם להתנות עם חבירו שהוא יעסוק בתורה והוא ימציא לו פרנסה ויחלוק עמו בשכר אבל אם כבר עסק בתורה אינו יכול למכור לו חלקו בשביל ממון שיתן לו (תולדות אדם וחוה נתיב ב׳ מש״ס דסוטה).

Rabbi Shmuel Berenbaum, the Mirrer Rosh Yeshiva, told the following story to give his talmidim a sense of how European Jews once lived. The story took place in his home town of Kaneshen, Poland when he was 4 years old (1924). It became the talk of the town, and so he remembered it well despite his young age at the time.

In Kaneshen there lived a peddler who would travel around the nearby villages to sell his wares. He was driving his wagon back toward the town when he met a poor Jew by the roadside, looking for a ride to Kaneshen. The peddler invited him to ride in his wagon. As they rode into town, they passed several unemployed men standing by the entrance to the town, hoping to get hired for day jobs. One of them, who we’ll call R’ Reuven, called out to the peddler, “I didn’t know you were such a rodef mitzvos that you give people rides!” The peddler, not wishing to boast about his chesed, said, “I didn’t do it for the mitzvah, I just had extra room in my wagon, so why shouldn’t I give him a ride?” R’ Reuven, thinking that the peddler did not value his mitzvah so much, said, “Can I buy from you the zechus of your mitzvah of chesed for 5 zlotys?” The peddler didn’t think R’ Reuven was serious, and he nodded in agreement.

The conversation turned to other matters for about 10 minutes, and then R’ Reuven took out 5 zlotys and offered them to the peddler. Realizing for the first time that Reuven was serious, the peddler said, “No, I will not sell you my mitzvah! When I nodded my head I was joking, but I never agreed to the sale.” Reuven argued, “That’s devarim shebalev – thoughts don’t count when they contradict one’s actions. From my point of view, you agreed to the sale and you can’t go back on it now.” “I never sell my mitzvos!” said the peddler in a louder voice. The argument became heated and a group of bystanders gathered around them, some taking the peddler’s side and others backing R’ Reuven. Neither was willing to back down. Finally, they agreed to present the question to the rav of the town and follow his psak.

The rav listened to both sides, studied the subject and gave his decision: the mitzvah belonged to R’ Reuven, since the peddler did initially agree to sell it to him. However, since the peddler argued that he did not really want to sell it, he had the right to buy it back for 50 zlotys. (Reb Shmuel added that he did not understand the logic behind this decision.) Once the rav paskened, no one in town dared question him. And indeed, the peddler bought his mitzvah back for 50 zlotys, an amount far above his means.

[The obvious question is that based on the Gemara in Sotah and the Rema, the Rav should have ruled that the entire sale was invalid and no one has to pay anyone anything. One cannot sell a mitzvah after it was done already!

R’ Yosef Simcha Klein, grandson-in-law of Reb Shmuel, proposed the following explanation: Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Shulchan Aruch cites two responsa that deal with this subject, Rav Hai Gaon and the Eish Das. Rav Hai Gaon speaks of a person who fasted every Monday and Thursday for a year, and then gave the reward as a gift to someone, or sold it. He says the sale is ineffective, and then adds, “This fool who sold his fasts is like one whose meal was eaten by a dog (he gets no reward, like someone who simply had nothing to eat – Rashi Taanis 11b). What reward could he receive from Hashem, when he has already taken money? He did not fast for Hashem’s sake; he just afflicted himself to get the money. He is more likely to get punished than rewarded, for he made the name of Heaven worthless, like a shovel with which to earn his bread.”

The Eish Das deals with someone who bought his friend’s share of the Livyasan for 100 gold coins. Like Rav Hai Gaon, he says the seller will be punished for making light of the World to Come, and then adds, “Still it would seem that the buyer gets reward for his desire and love of Olam Haba, since he spent a lot of money on it.”

Accordingly, the Rav of Kaneshen may have decided that by agreeing to sell his mitzvah, the peddler sinned and now needed to do teshuva by showing Hashem how beloved the mitzvah was to him. R’ Reuven, who gained reward for trying to buy the mitzvah, would not lose by selling it back, since it was not his choice; he was ordered to do so by the Rav.]

Source: Kisrah Shel Torah, p. 91

Bava Metzia

Bava Metzia 10b: A Kosher Heter Mechirah?

YCLeave a comment

Bava Metzia 10b: There is no agency for sin.

בבא מציעא י ע”ב: אין שליח לדבר עבירה

During the Shmitah of 5761, one religious kibbutz decided to invent a heter mechirah that would work even according to the Chazon Ish. The Chazon Ish objected to the regular heter mechirah done by the chief rabbinate for four reasons: 1) Since it is forbidden to sell land to a non-Jew in Eretz Yisroel, the representative carrying out the sale on behalf of all the land owners is a שליח לדבר עבירה – a representative to commit a sin – and his representation is invalid. 2) The sale is not serious since it is not accompanied by a professional survey and appraisal. 3) The sale is not legally binding since it is not registered with the government. 4) They make a condition that the non-Jew must sell it back after Shmitah, which renders it a temporary sale, and a temporary sale is like a קנין פירות which does not remove the restrictions of Shmitah.

(It would seem that these objections are mutually exclusive and asked as a ממה נפשך type reasoning: if anyone finds a way to disagree with arguments 2, 3 and 4 and believes that the sale is 100% valid, then it is a sin and one cannot appoint a representative to commit a sin.)

This hechsher had the land owners carry out the sale themselves, they used professional appraisals, they registered it with the government and they made no conditions. They drew up a separate contract to sell the land back, which would go into effect after a year. A reliable hechsher endorsed their products.

Some customers in America, surprised to see Shmittah produce on their supermarket shelves, approached Rabbi Yisroel Belsky and asked him whether to buy it.

Upon investigation, Rav Belsky discovered that the land was owned as a general partnership by all members of the kibbutz, but only the officers of the community directly participated in the sale. One partner acting on behalf of the others is still shlichus (agency) and so the first objection of the Chazon Ish was never really eliminated.

Furthermore, many poskim object to the heter mechirah on different grounds than the Chazon Ish. They argue that the sale is not real since the Jewish owner continues to control all decisions regarding the land’s usage, sells the produce and keeps the profits earned. This is similar to one who sells his property on paper to prevent his creditors from seizing it, but continues to act as the owner (Choshen Mishpat 99:7). (Contrast this with the sale of chometz, where the Jew has nothing to do with the chometz until after Pesach.) The heter mechirah done by this kibbutz was subject to this same objection.

And of course, the sale of land only solved the problem according to the practice of Yerushalayim that fruit grown on non-Jewish owned land does not have holiness of Shmittah. People in Bnei Brak, on the other hand, are stringent about this.

Yevamos

Yevamos 90b: The Miraculous Power of Learning Torah

YCLeave a comment

Yevamos 90b: One may listen to a Navi even if he tells you to transgress a mitzvah in the Torah, like Eliyahu on Mount Carmel. This proves that the Sages have the power to permit a sin! – There is it different because the Torah says, “To him you shall listen.” But why not generalize from there? – There it was different because Eliyahu needed to stand up against the sin [of idolatry].

Tosafos: How could we have learned it out from a Navi? Maybe a Navi is different because Hashem told him to do it. The Ri answers: to permit the sin, prophecy would not help. He is only using his prophecy to know that the plan will be effective – in Eliyahu’s case, that fire would come down from the sky on the mizbeach.  

יבמות צ ע”ב: ת״ש: (דברים י״ח) אליו תשמעון ־ אפילו אומר לך עבור על אחת מכל מצות שבתורה, כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל, הכל לפי שעה שמע לוִ שאני התם, דכתיב: אליו תשמעון. וליגמר מיניהִ! – מיגדר מילתא שאני.

תוס’ ד”ה וליגמר מיניה. וא״ת שאני התם דעל פי הדבור היה מתנבא לעבור והיכי נגמר מיניה לעבור משום תקנתא דרבנן שלא על פי הדבור ונראה דכיון דעל פי הדבור שרי משום צורך שעה הוא הדין שלא על פי הדבור שהרי אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה וכו’ ואר״י משום דאיתחזק בנביאות היו סומכים עליו במה שהיה מבטיח בירידת אש ושוחטים על הבטחתו קדשים בחוץ שבזכותו ותפלתו תרד אש מן השמים ויהיה מיגדר מילתא שיתקדש שמו של הקב״ה ברבים וע״י כך יחזרו ישראל למוטב.

When Rabbi Shmuel Berenbaum, the Mirrer rosh yeshiva, was sitting shiva for his son R’ Leibel, people told him stories about miraculous recoveries and yeshuos people had experienced through R’ Leibel’s brachos and tefillos. Reb Shmuel listened the entire time quietly. Someone pressed him to express his opinion on such things, and he said, “Nu, he learned so much Torah – it could be true.”

R’ Yosef Simcha Klein, his grandson-in-law, noted that the same was true of Reb Shmuel himself: When he was niftar, many people came during shiva and told stories about how every blessing and promise he gave had come true.

The source for the idea that learning Torah enables one to perform miracles is the Tzidkas Hatzadik (72), who says that Moshe Rabbeinu performed his miracles through learning Torah. (This could be based on the Pesikta brought in the Yalkut on Parshas Chukas, which says that when Hashem told Moshe to speak to the rock, He meant that Moshe should teach Torah in front of the rock, and it would give water – see Emek Hanetziv, Matos 5.) The Tzidkas Hatzadik also says that Eliyahu performed the miracle of bringing down fire from heaven through the power of the chiddush in halacha that he was mechadesh to permit offering a korban outside the Beis Hamikdash.

R’ Yosef Simcha adds that there were two other reasons why Reb Shmuel’s words came true. The first was he felt the pain of others exactly like his own. The Shem Mishmuel relates (Beshalach p. 206) that his father, the Avnei Nezer, once told him, “Anyone can save his friend through his prayer, but only if his friend’s pain touches him to the depths of his heart. This is not easy and only someone on a high spiritual level can fulfill this condition.”

The second was that he was careful with his speech. As R’ Elchonon writes (Kovetz Shiurim Kesubos 208, on daf 62b), we find stories in the Gemara where someone died because a tzaddik suggested that they might be dead, כשגגה שיוצא מלפני השליט. Normally, Hashem fulfills the blessings or curses of a tzaddik because “He does the will of those who fear Him” but in these cases it was not the tzaddik’s will at all. Rather, it is because the speech of someone who guards his tongue is like a sharp axe, which can cut even accidentally. By the same token, his blessings are fulfilled. But when someone does not guard his speech, it is like a dirty and rusty blade that cannot cut.

Bava Kama

Bava Kama 94a: Making a bracha on stolen food

YCLeave a comment

Bava Kama 94a:  Abaye said: From where do we see that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is of the opinion that a physical change in the stolen object does not cause the thief to acquire it? From this Baraisa: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If someone stole a measure of wheat, ground it, kneaded it, baked it and separated challah, how can he make the blessing? He would not be blessing but rather insulting, and regarding this Scripture says, “If one steals and blesses, he has insulted Hashem” (Tehillim 10:3).

Rava replied: How do you know? Maybe Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov only said that regarding the blessing, because it is a mitzvah that came through a sin.

 ר’ אליעזר בן יעקב מאי היא? דתניא, ר׳ אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: הרי שגזל סאה של חטין, טחנה, לשה ואפאה והפריש ממנה חלה, כיצד מברך? אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ, ועל זה נאמר: (תהלים י׳) בוצע ברך נאץ ה׳. … אמר רבא: ממאי? דלמא … עד כאן לא קאמר ר׳ אליעזר בן יעקב התם ־ אלא לענין ברכה, משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירהֹ.

Rabbi Yisroel Salanter, when he lived in Vilna, made his living by saying shiurim. When he moved to Kovna, the kehillah appointed him to an administrative position. After he left Kovna, he had no source of income, so one of his talmidim began to support him. Reb Yisroel hated to have to take from others, firstly because he followed the Rambam’s opinion that a talmid chochom should never take support for his learning, and secondly because he was afraid that he was not as great as people thought he was, so they were giving him under a false assumption, and thus he was stealing their money.

Once, a rav came to visit him during a meal, and Reb Yisroel said to him, “Would you like something to eat? It’s kosher food.” The rav was puzzled, so Reb Yisroel explained with a smile, “For me it could be that the food is not kosher, since it’s stolen, but I have already acquired it by making a שינוי מעשה, a physical change, so for you the food is kosher.”

[It would seem that since we hold שינוי מעשה קונה – a physical change causes the thief to acquire the item – the thief himself is allowed to eat it too, and the only problem is making a bracha on the food. This is brought down by the Mishnah Berurah 196:4, and his conclusion is that one should not make the bracha, except for Birkas Hamazon which is a Torah obligation.

משנה ברורה קצ”ו סק”ד: אם גנב או גזל חטים וטחנן ואפאן י״א שאע״פ שקנאן בשינוי והרי הם שלו אלא שחייב לשלם לו דמים עבורם מ״מ אסור לברך ע״ז בין ברכה ראשונה ובין בהמ״ז דלענין ברכה דאית בה הזכרת השם חמיר טפי ותמיד הוא בכלל נאוץ וי״א דהואיל וקנה יכול לברך ודעת המ״א דלענין בהמ״ז אם אכל כדי שביעה יש להורות בזה שיברך בהמ״ז דהוא דאורייתא ויש להחמיר ולברך.

Accordingly, it would seem that Reb Yisroel meant that perhaps he himself should not make a bracha on the food, but the guest could certainly make a bracha. Besides this chiddush – that the prohibition on making a bracha on stolen, changed food does not apply to the thief’s guest – we also see here that Reb Yisroel considered buying food with stolen money no better than a physical change. The counterargument would be that since this is not the same item at all, but something else exchanged for it, the rule that the bracha is an insult does not apply.]

Source: Kisvei Hasaba Vetalmidav Mikelm, v. 2 p. 787

Bava Basra

Bava Basra 21a: Good jealousy and bad jealousy

YCLeave a comment

Bava Basra 21a: Jealousy of scholars leads to more scholarship.

בבא בתרא כא ע”א: קנאת סופרים תרבה חכמה

A couple once came to Rabbi Shmuel Berenbaum with a question: the wife wanted to buy an expensive luxury car, but the husband was worried that this might give rise to jealousy and ayin hara. Reb Shmuel lifted his eyes from the sefer he was learning and asked the man a seemingly unrelated question, “Do you already know Nashim and Nezikin?” “The rosh yeshiva sees that I don’t sit and learn all day,” the man replied. “Do you know at least one masechta well?” asked Reb Shmuel. “No,” said the man softly. “Do you know at least one daf Gemara by heart?” The man lowered his eyes and admitted, “Unfortunately, although I try to be kovea itim for Torah, I don’t learn it well enough to know the Gemara by heart.” “If so,” Reb Shmuel said, “you have nothing to worry about. You can buy the car – no one has anything to be jealous of you for.”

[We know that there are two types of jealousy: jealousy of physical possessions, which is wrong and may cause ayin hara, and jealousy of someone else’s Torah accomplishments, which is good and admirable, as our Gemara says, and will not lead to ayin hara. In this story, it seems that Reb Shmuel was not afraid of jealousy of the first kind – he assumed people are above that level. But what if the man had replied that he was a talmid chacham who knew Shas? Why then would Reb Shmuel have told him not to buy the car? If people are above jealousy of a car, why would they suddenly be jealous of it if he knew Shas? And if people would be jealous of him for knowing Shas, then good – קנאת סופרים תרבה חכמה!

The answer, explained Rabbi Elya Boruch Finkel (Mishulchan R’ Eliyahu Boruch, Parshas Vayikra) is that there is a third type of jealousy: jealousy of another person’s Torah accomplishments or mitzvos that he was able to do because Hashem granted him more money or a better mind. This, says the Ibn Ezra, is why the Torah says that the middle level of a קרבן עולה ויורד is to bring both a chatas and an olah – unlike the wealthy man, who brings only a chatas. The olah is to atone for the sinner’s thoughts of envy toward the wealthy sinner, who has the means to bring a nicer korban. But why wasn’t he envious of his possessions until now? The answer is that we don’t assume he is on such a low level. It doesn’t bother him that someone else has a nicer house or car. But it does bother him that he has a nicer korban.

Reb Shmuel’s point was that it’s good to be jealous of someone for knowing Shas, because that will motivate you to learn better. But if you see a man driving a luxury car who knows Shas, you might think, “The only reason he has time to sit and learn so much is because he has money. If I had money I would also become a talmid chacham.” That is the wrong kind of jealousy, the kind that might cause ayin hara.]