Berachos

Berachos 61b: Fish Were Created for the Water

Berachos 61b: Once the evil government decreed that Jews were forbidden to study Torah. Papus ben Yehuda found Rabbi Akiva gathering groups in public and teaching Torah. He said to him, “Akiva, aren’t you afraid of the government?” He said to him, “I will give you a parable: A fox was walking on the bank of the river, and saw the fish gathering in one place and then another. ‘Why are you fleeing?’ he asked them. ‘From the nets cast by men,’ they said. He said to them, ‘Would you like to come up onto the dry land, and I will live with you just as my fathers lived with your fathers?’ They said to him: ‘Are you the one they call the wisest of the animals?’ You are not wise, but foolish. If in our element of life we are afraid, all the more so in our element of death!’ So too with us: if now, when we study Torah, our life and the length of our days (Devarim 30:20), we are killed, all the more so if we ignore Torah study!”

ברכות סא ע”ב: תנו רבנן: פעם אחת גזרה מלכות הרשעה שלא יעסקו ישראל בתורה, בא פפוס בן יהודה ומצאו לרבי עקיבא שהיה מקהיל קהלות ברבים ועוסק בתורה. אמר ליה: עקיבא, אי אתה מתירא מפני מלכות? אמר לו: אמשול לך משל, למה הדבר דומה ־ לשועל שהיה מהלך על גב הנהר, וראה דגים שהיו מתקבצים ממקום למקום, אמר להם: מפני מה אתם בורחים? אמרו לו: מפני רשתות שמביאין עלינו בני אדם. אמר להם: רצונכם שתעלו ליבשה, ונדור אני ואתם כשם שדרו אבותי עם אבותיכם? אמרו לו: אתה הוא שאומרים עליך פקח שבחיות? לא פקח אתה, אלא טפש אתהִ ומה במקום חיותנו אנו מתיראין, במקום מיתתנו על אחת כמה וכמהִ אף אנחנו, עכשיו שאנו יושבים ועוסקים בתורה, שכתוב בה (דברים ל׳) כי הוא חייך וארך ימיך ־ כך, אם אנו הולכים ומבטלים ממנה ־ על אחת כמה וכמה.

Before Theodor Herzl became a Zionist, he contemplated assimilation as a solution for anti-Semitism. He thought that Jews had devised the Jewish religion as a response to their rejection by the hostile outside world. Now, however, the outside world had since changed for the better, granting equality to the Jews, yet the Jews remained separate; this aroused anti-Semitism. The solution, therefore, was for Jews to assimilate.

In a conversation with his friend Ludwig Speidel, he compared Jews to seals which, according to the theory of evolution, were originally land animals that evolved to live in water. They could therefore evolve back into land animals again.

“However, anti-Semitism, which is a strong if unconscious force among the masses, will do the Jews no harm. I hold it to be a movement useful for the development of Jewish character. It is the education of a group by the surrounding populations and will perhaps in the end lead to its absorption. We are educated only through hard knocks. A sort of Darwinian mimicry will set in. The Jews will adapt themselves. They are like the seals, which a natural catastrophe cast into the ocean. There they took on the appearance and property of fish, which of course they are not. If they ever return to dry land and are allowed to remain there a few generations, they will do away with their finny feet.” (The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, p. 10)

Amazingly, Herzl’s argument is exactly that of the fox in Rabbi Akiva’s parable. The fox says, “Come and live on the land with me, just as my fathers lived with your fathers.” In other words, the fox is arguing that the fish were not really created for the water. They originally lived on land, and only adapted to live in water due to the circumstances.

The fish’s response, and our response to Herzl is no! The Jewish people were created to live by the Torah. The Torah is not just a temporary response to circumstances. Therefore, leaving the Torah is like a fish leaving the water. Without Torah, the Jewish people would be unable to breathe and would certainly die out. Herzl thought you can take away Judaism from the Jews, and they can continue to be Jews. With his subsequent idea of Zionism, he, and his successors, continued to think the same way, except that the abandonment of Torah would take place on a national scale. The response to him is that Torah is the defining feature of Jews, and without it, there will be no Jews.

But there is more. The fish made a “kal vachomer” – they told the fox that coming onto the land would solve nothing as far as the fishermen, and it would create the additional danger of lack of oxygen. Here too, time proved that Jews who assimilate – whether on a personal or a national level – are still attacked by anti-Semites, and even if they escape, die out spiritually. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, died personally at the hands of the Romans, but kept Klal Yisroel alive by passing down the Torah to the next generation.

Gittin

Gittin 77b: The Brisker Get

Gittin 77b: A man on his deathbed wrote a get for his wife on Friday afternoon, but did not manage to give it to her before Shabbos. On Shabbos day, he felt his end was near, so they asked Rava what to do. He said, “Go tell him to transfer to his wife ownership of the room where the get is lying, and let her go and close the door or open it, making a kinyan chazakah.”

Tosafos: Isn’t this similar to the case of the wife picking up her get from the ground, which is invalid because the husband must hand it to her? The answer is that since the get is coming from the domain of the husband to her domain, it is as if he handed it to her.

גיטין עז ע”ב: ההוא שכיב מרע דכתב לה גיטא לדביתהו בהדי פניא דמעלי שבתא ולא הספיק למיתביה לה, למחר תקף ליה עלמא, אתו לקמיה דרבא, אמר להו: זילו אמרו ליה ליקניה ניהלה לההוא דוכתא דיתיב ביה גיטא, ותיזל איהי ותיחוד ותפתח ותחזיק ביה.

תוס’: ולא הוי כמו טלי גיטיך מעל גבי קרקע דכיון שהגט בא מרשות הבעל לרשותה הוי כאילו נתנו לה.

It once happened in Brisk that a husband wanted to give his wife a get, but she was unwilling to accept it. So he devised a trick: he put the get in an envelope, dropped it on the table and said, “You got a letter from your brother.” She picked it up, opened it and discovered that it was a get. The dayan paskened that it was invalid because of “tli gitech” – the husband must hand the wife the get; she may not pick it up herself.

Reb Chaim, however, said it was not so simple. The envelope has the status of a room or courtyard, so when the husband transfers ownership to her, it is considered that he handed it to her; it makes no difference that the final act of acquisition was done by her, as in the Gemara on 77b. On the other hand, maybe here it is worse than the Gemara’s case, because she is picking up the get with her hand and can obtain it with kinyan yad (acquiring an object by virtue of hold it in one’s hand), even without the husband’s willingness to give her the envelope. This depends if kinyan yad works when there is a chatzitzah (something separating the object from the hand, in this case the envelope). Therefore, Reb Chaim concluded, the woman is sofek megureshes – she may or may not be divorced.  

Source: Rabbi Moshe Meiselman, shiur on Gittin

[Another version of this story appears in the new Chiddushei Hagrach Al Hashas, p. 246. There it does not mention that the wife was refusing the get. Also, it says that Reb Chaim’s sofek was about כליו של מוכר ברשות לוקח – whether a person can acquire an object by lifting or dragging it when it is inside a container that still belongs to the seller. This is an unresolved question in Bava Basra 85b. If she cannot acquire the get without owning the envelope, then she needs the husband to willingly give her the envelope, and it is considered as if he is handing her the get. If she can acquire the get without owning the envelope, that means she took the get herself without the husband’s giving.

The Imrei Moshe (end of Siman 21) brings this same version, and proceeds to question Reb Chaim’s logic. A get only needs to be in the wife’s hand, he says; no kinyan is necessary. So even if one cannot acquire an object while it is in the container belonging to the giver, here she is holding the get and does not need the husband’s willingness to grant her the envelope. Therefore the get should definitely be invalid.

Putting the two versions together, it emerges that there are two reasons to cast doubt on the validity of this get:

1) She picked up the get herself with kinyan yad.

2) Even if you say that kinyan yad doesn’t work due to the chatzitzah, she could be koneh the get with hagbo’oh. But that would depend (if the story took place in her house) on the question of keilav shel mocher.

According to the version that the wife was refusing the get, there is another question we could ask on Reb Chaim. What is the logic behind the possibility that the get was valid? Only because the husband had to be makneh to her the envelope, which is like a chatzer. But if she did not wish to acquire the get at all, the kinyan would not work. She picked it up and made the kinyan thinking it was a letter, but since it was actually a get, the kinyan was done on a false assumption and is therefore invalid.]  

Yevamos

Yevamos 62b: When to Do Kiruv

Yevamos 62b: Rabbi Akiva had 12,000 pairs of students from Gevas to Antipras, and all of them died in the same period, because they did not treat each other respectfully. And the world was desolate until Rabbi Akiva came to our rabbis in the south… and they were the ones who built back the Torah at that time.

Bereishis Rabbah 61:3: Because they were stingy with each other. And in the end he established seven disciples… he said to them, “My sons! The first ones died because they were stingy with each other. Be careful not to do what they did.” They arose and filled all of Eretz Yisroel with Torah.

יבמות סב ע”ב: שנים עשר אלף זוגים תלמידים היו לו לרבי עקיבא, מגבת עד אנטיפרס, וכולן מתו בפרק אחד מפני שלא נהגו כבוד זה לזה, והיה העולם שמם, עד שבא ר״ע אצל רבותינו שבדרום, ושנאה להם ר״מ ור׳ יהודה ור׳ יוסי ורבי שמעון ורבי אלעזר בן שמוע, והם הם העמידו תורה אותה שעה.

ובבראשית רבה סא,ג מסיים: למה? שהיתה עיניהם צרה אלו באלו. ובסוף העמיד שבעה וכו’ אמר להם בניי, הראשונים לא מתו אלא שהיתה עיניהם צרה אלו לאלו תנו דעתכם שלא תעשו כמעשיהם, עמדו ומלאו כל ארץ ישראל תורה.  

In June of 1999, Michael Kaufman, founder of VISA (Visiting Israel Students Association) and today a lecturer at Aish Hatorah, brought 25 college age young men and women, with little or no Jewish background, to attend kiruv programs in Jerusalem. Unlike VISA’s usual “foreign exchange” students, this group had not been attracted to the country in order to study at universities, but only because the tour was heavily subsidized, costing them very little.

At the end of the tour, Michael had the idea to bring them to see the Mirrer Yeshiva. The other leaders of the tour thought it would be a turn off, but he persisted. They first visited the rosh yeshiva, Rabbi Nosson Tzvi Finkel, who asked them each about themselves, their families and hometowns. Then they walked through the beis medrash and watched the hundreds of talmidim learning, most of whom paid virtually no attention to the visitors. Everyone was awed by the experience.

As they went out, two of the boys came over to Michael and said, “We want to learn here.” When he recovered from his shock, Michael said, “You know, of course, that what you’re saying might be akin to children in kindergarten announcing that they would like to take courses in nuclear physics.”  “If what they learn there is the Jewish nuclear physics, then that’s exactly what we want to do,” replied the boys.  

Michael consulted with Reb Nosson Tzvi, who gave his approval. While the rest of the group flew back to the States, arrangements were made with a number of American bachurim to leave their regular chavrusas for one hour every day, in order to learn with these two novices in a non-structured manner for the next two months. At the end of this period, the two college students concluded that it would be best to learn in a yeshiva that catered to their backgrounds. So they left Mir to attend institutions for baalei teshuva in Jerusalem, where they stayed for a number of years. Today both are married with children; one is learning in a kollel in Jerusalem, and the other works in kiruv in a western American city.

Michael came to Reb Nosson Tzvi again after that summer and commented that several of the Mir bochurim showed great potential in the field of kiruv. He suggested that they attend a 90-minute class each week, for six weeks, on kiruv techniques. “Absolutely not!” said Reb Nosson Tzvi. “Their job here is to learn Torah – not to be involved in anything else but the study of Torah!”

“But,” Michael protested, “the Midrash Rabbah (Bereishis 61:3) says that Rabbi Akiva’s 24,000 talmidim died because they were stingy with each other. This is usually explained to mean that they were concerned only with learning Torah for themselves, and not with others.”

At this point the Rosh Yeshiva recited the continuation of the Midrash from memory: “And Rabbi Akiva subsequently appointed seven talmidim –  Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yossi, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua, Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov… and said to them: ‘My sons, the first disciples died only because their approach to Torah was narrow. Make it your business not to emulate them – don’t learn Torah only for yourselves, but rather go out and teach it to others. Therefore, they went out and filled all of Eretz Yisroel with Torah.”

Reb Nosson Tzvi then smiled and said, “The seven talmidim whom Rabbi Akiva sent out were established talmidei chachomim. Our talmidim are not yet in that category. Their task is to learn Torah and to grow in Torah until they attain the status of talmidei chachomim. Until that time, they must remain within the walls of the beis medrash.”

Sources: In One Era, Out the Other, by Michael Kaufman p. 436-442; quoted in For the Love of Torah, by Hanoch Teller, p. 214-218

[To be sure, the seven Tannaim mentioned were already great talmidei chachomim before they began to spread Torah. But how did Reb Nosson Tzvi deduce that the earlier 24,000 were on such a level? Perhaps they were young beginners, and still they were faulted for not sharing whatever they knew with others! – Apparently, Reb Nosson Tzvi reasoned that since the Midrash compares the two groups, they must have been on a similar level.

But we can conjecture that Reb Nosson Tzvi’s position was based on his own wisdom and experience, not only on the Midrash. He held that yeshiva talmidim should not go into kiruv until they have accumulated enough Torah knowledge to answer the questions posed by Jews who have grown up in the modern secular world, instead of just repeating what they have been taught to say, or referring the questioners to others. Also, he was concerned that kiruv workers should be strong enough in their own knowledge and emunah not to be influenced by the people and material they may encounter.]  

Yuma

Yuma 85a: Being Mechalel Shabbos for Kiruv

Yuma 85a. The question was asked of the Tannaim: From where do we learn that saving a life supercedes Shabbos? Rabbi Shimon ben Menasia said, “And the children of Israel shall keep the Shabbos.” The Torah says: Violate one Shabbos for him, so that he may keep many Shabbosos. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have given an answer better than all of them: “Live by them” – and not die by them. Rava said: All of the arguments can be refuted except that of Shmuel, because the Tannaim’s arguments only work when one is certainly saving a life, but Shmuel’s works even when one is possibly saving a life.

יומא פה. נשאלה שאלה זו בפניהם: מניין לפקוח נפש שדוחה את השבת? …. רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר: (שמות לא) ושמרו בני ישראל את השבת, אמרה תורה: חלל עליו שבת אחת, כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: אי הואי התם הוה אמינא: דידי עדיפא מדידהו, (ויקרא יח) וחי בהם ־ ולא שימות בהם. אמר רבא: לכולהו אית להו פירכא, בר מדשמואל דלית ליה פרכא… אשכחן ודאי, ספק מנלן.

A man came to Rabbi Naftali Jaeger, Rosh Yeshiva of Sh’or Yoshuv, and asked the following question: The Rema (Orach Chaim 306:14) says that someone whose daughter was kidnapped by the priests for forced conversion must violate Shabbos to save her. In other words, saving someone from shmad has the same status as saving a life. If so, it should be allowed to violate Shabbos in order to do kiruv, for example driving to give shiurim or participate in a kiruv event. He said he had asked the question to many rabbis and no one had been able to answer.

Rabbi Jaeger did not have an answer either. But some time later, Rabbi Moshe Shapiro came to New York, and Rabbi Jaeger brought him to visit this man. The man presented his question, and Rabbi Shapiro answered immediately.

The Gemara in Yuma says that there are two reasons to violate Shabbos when saving a life: 1) “Violate one Shabbos so that he may keep many.” 2) Vachai bahem – “Live by them.” Rava then states that the principle of “violate one Shabbos” works only if the life will certainly be saved, but “vachai bahem” works even in a case where there is only a possibility of saving a life.

The Netziv (Haamek Sheilah 167:13) shows that there are cases when only “violate one Shabbos” works but not “vachai bahem.” In Bava Metzia 114b, the story is told that Rabbah bar Avuha met Eliyahu Hanavi in a non-Jewish cemetery. He asked, “Isn’t the Master a kohein?” Eliyahu replied that the graves of non-Jews do not contaminate their airspace. Tosafos asks: If Eliyahu was a kohein, how could he have touched the boy he brought back to life? Tosafos answers that he was certain that he would succeed in resurrecting him, so it was permitted for pikuach nefesh. The question is: if resurrecting a dead person is considered like saving a life, why did Tosafos have to say Eliyahu was sure he would succeed? Even if there was only a small chance of success, it should be allowed, just like pikuach nefesh pushes aside Shabbos even when there is a chance of success. The Netziv answers: “Vachai bahem” doesn’t apply when the person is already dead. But “violate one Shabbos” does – because indeed, after he comes back to life, he will be keeping many Shabbosos. And as Rava said in Yuma, “violate one Shabbos” works only in a case of certainty.

“Now we can answer your question very simply,” concluded R’ Moshe Shapiro. “Saving the girl from the priests may or may not be successful. But since she is still a religious Jew now, she is considered spiritually alive. The rule of ‘vachai bahem’ thus applies and one may violate Shabbos to save her. The secular Jews who are the targets of kiruv, on the other hand, are already spiritually dead. We are trying to bring them back to life. For bringing back to life, we don’t use ‘vachai bahem.’ The only reason to do it would be ‘violate one Shabbos so that he may keep many.’ And since we have only a chance of success, this principle doesn’t apply!”

Source: Shiur by Rabbi Naftali Jaeger, 7 Teves 5778

Niddah

Niddah 30b: The Innate Ability to See All

Niddah 30b: Rabbi Simlai expounded: What does a fetus in his mother’s womb look like? Like a folded writing tablet, his hands on his temples, his elbows on his knees, his two heels on his two buttocks, and his head between his knees. His mouth is closed and his navel is open, and he eats from what his mother eats, drinks from what his mother drinks, and does not eliminate waste, lest he kill his mother. And once he emerges into the air of the world, that which was closed opens and that which was open closes, for if not, he would not be able to live even for a short time. And there is a candle burning above his head, and he gazes and sees from one end of the world to the other, as it is written (Iyov 29:3), “When He lit His candle over my head; by His light I would go through the darkness.” And do not be surprised, for a person can sleep here and dream about Spain.   

נדה ל ע”ב: דרש רבי שמלאי: למה הולד דומה במעי אמו ־ לפנקס שמקופל ומונח. ידיו על שתי צדעיו, שתי אציליו על ב׳ ארכובותיו, וב׳ עקביו על ב׳ עגבותיו, וראשו מונח לו בין ברכיו, ופיו סתום וטבורו פתוח, ואוכל ממה שאמו אוכלת, ושותה ממה שאמו שותה, ואינו מוציא רעי שמא יהרוג את אמו. וכיון שיצא לאויר העולם ־ נפתח הסתום ונסתם הפתוח, שאלמלא כן אינו יכול לחיות אפילו שעה אחת. ונר דלוק לו על ראשו וצופה ומביט מסוף העולם ועד סופו, שנאמר (איוב כ״ט) בהלו נרו עלי ראשי לאורו אלך חשך. ואל תתמה, שהרי אדם ישן כאן ורואה חלום באספמיא.

Rabbi Elchonon Wasserman said that the Chofetz Chaim possessed miraculous spiritual intuition, to the extent that he knew the next person’s thoughts and general situation. He added, in explanation, that the human personality was created with the capacity of seeing and knowing everything. And so we find in Niddah that a child in its mother’s womb looks and sees from one end of the world to the other, for such is the nature of the soul which the Holy One, blessed is He, has molded, and every Jew has such a soul. The trouble is the soul resides within a corporeal body, which acts as a barrier and blocks our vision. The body of a person whose every action is performed for the sake of Heaven, however, becomes so purified as no longer to constitute a barrier. Everything becomes transparent to him.

Rabbi Aharon Kotler was with the Chofetz Chaim at the Warsaw conference in Shevat 5690 (1930). Before leaving to return home, Reb Aharon went to take leave of the Chofetz Chaim, who took him by the hand and talked about the problems discussed at the conference. In the course of the conversation, he remarked: “It should also be known that once a masechta is begun, it should be completed.” And then he reverted once more to the topic of their conversation. Reb Ahraon was shocked, since just at that time of year he often had begun the study of an additional masechta besides the one he taught to his yeshiva in Kletzk, but did not complete it. He himself had not mentioned the subject to anyone else. The Chofetz Chaim could only have known this because “G-d reveals His secrets to those that fear Him.”

When Reb Aharon related the incident to Reb Elchonon, the latter revealed that this had happened to him as well. Once, the Chofetz Chaim had said to him, quite unexpectedly: “We consider ourselves lomdim. How is it possible to think so, if we omit a single masechta, like Nazir or such-and-such?” Until then, for some reason or other, Reb Elchonon had neglected studying in depth Nazir and the other tractates mentioned by the Chofetz Chaim.

Rabbi Mendel Kaplan related that whenever Reb Elchonon would return to Baranovich from a visit in Radun with his Rebbe, he would be in a festive spirit and would hardly stop speaking about what he had seen and heard on his visit to the Chofetz Chaim. But on one occasion, he hardly spoke. Instead, he remarked with deep emotion, “The Chofetz Chaim looks and sees from one end of the world to the other… I heard terrible things from him… and were I permitted to divulge to you what he said, you yourselves would certainly be convinced that he observes and literally sees from one end of the world to the other.” Reb Mendel later conjectured that the Chofetz Chaim had spoken about the impending Holocaust, to which he had alluded beforehand on several occasions.

A remarkable personal anecdote was related by Rabbi Yechezkel Abramsky: “In August 1930 I was sent to prison by the Russian Bolsheviks for engaging in religious activities. I was tried and sentenced to five years of hard labor in exile in Siberia. For almost 14 months I was kept in prison and persecuted. On Erev Yom Kippur 1931, they suddenly came to me and informed me that I was to be freed, and was to leave Russia within one month… When I escaped and traveled by train from Moscow to Riga, the first person to greet me in the railroad car was Reb Elchonon of Baranovich, who fell on my neck with tears of joy. And after I had settled in London, I was privileged once again to meet Reb Elchonon, who was there in the interests of his yeshiva. This time I met him on the platform of the railway station. And while we were standing there, we talked Torah and spoke of the Chofetz Chaim. Then Reb Elchonon told me: “On Erev Yom Kippur of that year, I was staying in the Chofetz Chaim’s home. We were studying together. Suddenly he interrupted the subject of our discussion, and without any connection with what we had been talking of beforehand, he announced again and again, triumphantly, raising his hands: ‘The Bolsheviks didn’t accomplish anything; the Bolsheviks didn’t accomplish anything. They were forced against their will to release the Slutzker Rav.’ Then he resumed his studies. Reb Elchonon looked at his watch and noted the time. Years later, he learned that this was the very moment when I was given my liberty.”  His son, Rabbi Mordechai Ezra Abramsky, added that during the entire period of his imprisonment, the Chofetz Chaim would recite eight chapters of Tehillim each day after Shacharis to pray for his release. On the day of the release itself, however, he did not.

Source: Reb Elchonon (Artscroll), pp. 52-54

Bava Kama

Bava Kama 78b: Making Restitution with a Cheaper Esrog

Bava Kama 78b: Rava asked: If a man vowed to bring an olah, and set aside an ox, and someone stole it, can the thief make restitution with a sheep (or a bird according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah who holds that one making a vow without specifying the size of the animal can use a bird)? Do we focus on the vow which was to bring any olah, or can he demand an ox on the grounds that he wishes to perform the mitzvah in the best way? Rava answered his own question: He may make restitution with a sheep or a bird.

בבא קמא עח ע”ב: בעי רבא: הרי עלי עולה והפריש שור, ובא אחר וגנב, מי פטר גנב נפשיה בכבש לרבנן, בעולת העוף לר׳ אלעזר בן עזריה? דתנן: הרי עלי עולה ־ יביא כבש, ר״א בן עזריה אומר: יביא תור או בן יונה, מאי? מי אמרינן שם עולה קביל עילויה, או דלמא מצי א״ל אנא מצוה מן המובחר בעינא למיעבד? בתר דאיבעיא הדר פשט: גנב פטר עצמו בכבש לרבנן, בעולת העוף לר׳ אלעזר בן עזריה.

In 1903, Rabbi Elchonon Wasserman began his first position as rosh yeshiva in Mtsislavl. One of his talmidim from that period, Rabbi Shmaryahu Nochum Shushenkin, kept a diary in which he described Reb Elchonon’s teaching method. “It was Reb Elchonon’s practice to stop delivering his shiur for a day or two after the completion of a Perek, or half a Perek, if it was lengthy, to allow the students to review what they had learned so far. For this he would organize groups of four or five students with similar abilities. Because of his erudition in the writings of the Acharonim, he was capable of sharpening and testing his students by means of an interesting device. He would pose questions to them which had been answered by the Acharonim, for instance Noda Beyehuda, Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Chasam Sofer and others, by reference to the Gemara or Tosafos which the pupils had been studying. If the Gemara or Tosafos had been thoroughly assimilated and retained in the student’s mind, he would discover the answer to Reb Elchonon’s questions in the Gemara he had been studying that day or the day before.

“I remember one question posed to us by Reb Elchonon. Someone had stolen an esrog of superior quality. Could he make restitution by giving the owner a kosher, but not so beautiful esrog? We found the answer in Rava’s remark in Merubah. There the case is mentioned of someone who had vowed to bring a korban olah and had set aside an ox for the fulfillment of his vow. A thief stole the ox. According to the Sages, the thief can free himself from further obligation by restoring a sheep, and according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, even by a bird suitable for a korban olah. Similarly in our case, the thief may free himself of further obligation by restoring an esrog of inferior quality, as long as it is kosher. The plaintiff’s argument – “I want to perform a mitzvah in the most elegant manner” – has no validity.

Source; Reb Elchonon (Artscroll), p. 41

[The comparison between a korban and an esrog is surprising. A korban does not belong to the vower, and the thief is only paying because of Rabbi Shimon’s rule that דבר הגורם לממון כממון דמי (something that causes you to lose money is like your money), as Rashi says. Since if the thief were not caught, the vower would only have to bring a sheep to replace the ox, the thief too need only pay for a sheep. But an esrog is not consecrated to hekdesh, and it is the regular property of the owner. How then can a thief make restitution with something worth less than what he stole?

It seems that Reb Elchonon was saying a tremendous chiddush here: an esrog is not intrinsically worth the amount of money you pay for it. It is valuable only as a דבר הגורם לממון, and is therefore only worth the amount that you would have to pay to do the mitzvah at the simplest level.

Of course, this would only apply to the person planning to use the esrog for the mitzvah on Succos, not to a merchant. Thus a thief who stole a $100 esrog from an esrog store could not make restitution with a $50 esrog. (See the article “Purloined Esrogim” by Rabbi Meir Orlian of the Business Halacha Institute, in which someone stole expensive esrogim from a merchant before Succos and returned them after Succos. The psak there was that he must pay their full pre-Succos value.)

The Chazon Ish (Bava Kama 6:3) similarly rules that if someone damages a person’s house, the amount he pays would depend on what the owner intends on doing with the house. If he plans to fix the damage, he would pay the cost to fix it, but if he plans to sell it, he would only pay the negligible amount by which the house dropped in value.

However, the Chazon Ish there quotes a Rashi that seems to contradict all of the above. Rashi in Gittin 53a says that if kohanim ruin a korban through pigul, they have to pay even if the korban was a nedavah, an optional korban for which the owner is not responsible if lost. Even though they didn’t cause the owner any loss, he can argue that he wanted to bring his korban and thus suffered a loss. How does this fit with Reb Elchonon, and indeed, with the Gemara we began with in Bava Kama 78b? Maybe Rashi means that he will not replace the korban at all, so he is demanding compensation for his disappointment at not bringing any korban. In our case, however, he is replacing the korban (or esrog), albeit with a less expensive one.

As an aside, we can learn from Reb Elchonon the great value of analyzing stories and real life cases in order to better understand the Gemara.]

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 61b: Was the Emperor Hirohito Considered an Avodah Zarah?

Sanhedrin 61b: If one worships an idol out of love or fear, Abaye says he is liable, Rava says he is exempt. Abaye said: I can prove my opinion from the following Baraisa: The Torah says, “You shall not bow down to them.” To them you shall not bow, but you may bow to a fellow man, unless he is worshipped like Haman. Now, Haman was worshipped out of fear, yet it says you may not bow to him. Rava replied: The Baraisa only cites Haman as an example of a person who was worshipped, but in Haman’s actual case, it would have been permitted to bow down because he was worshipped only out of fear. Only in a case when the people worshipped a human being not out of fear but out of real belief, would the Baraisa prohibit bowing.

Tosafos begins by assuming Rashi’s explanation of the Gemara: that we are discussing an idol that has real believers, but this particular Jew does not believe and is only bowing to it out of love for a person or fear of a person. Tosafos asks: isn’t a Jew forbidden to bow to an idol even when threatened with death? Obviously, if he bows at gunpoint, he doesn’t actually believe and is only bowing out of fear, yet the rule is “be killed rather than transgress” – יהרג ואל יעבור.  How can Rava permit this?

Tosafos answers that, true, one is forbidden to bow at gunpoint, and Rava only meant that if he does so, he is not liable to punishment. (According to this, Abaye would hold that he is punished even if he bowed at gunpoint. The halacha, brought by the Rambam in Yesodei Hatorah 5:4, that one who failed the trial of Kiddush Hashem and bowed to the idol is not executed by Beis Din, would be true only according to Rava.)

Then Tosafos offers a second answer that revises our understanding of the whole sugya: that the case of the Gemara is where no one actually believes in the idol; all of them bow only out of love or fear. In this case Rava permits bowing along with them. The Baraisa cites Haman as an example of someone worshipped only out of fear, and Rava says that in Haman’s exact case, it would have been permitted to bow. Why then did Mordechai refuse to bow? Because Haman had an idol on his heart, or because Mordechai wished to go beyond the call of duty and made a Kiddush Hashem.

Although Rashi and the first opinion in Tosafos do not learn the sugya this way, there is no reason to assume that they would disagree in halacha if such a case – where no one actually believes in the idol – were to arise.

סנהדרין סא ע”ב: איתמר, העובד עבודה זרה מאהבה ומיראה, אביי אמר: חייב, רבא אמר: פטור. אביי אמר: חייב, דהא פלחה. רבא אמר: פטור, אי קבליה עליה באלוה ־ אין, אי לא ־ לא…. אמר אביי: מנא אמינא לה ־ דתניא: (שמות כ׳) לא תשתחוה להם, להם אי אתה משתחוה, אבל אתה משתחוה לאדם כמותך. יכול אפילו נעבד כהמן ־ תלמוד לומר (שמות כ׳) ולא תעבדם. ־ והא המן מיראה הוה נעבד. ־ ורבא: כהמן ־ ולא כהמן. כהמן ־ דאיהו גופיה עבודה זרה, ולא כהמן ־ דאילו המן מיראה, והכא לאו מיראה.

תוספות: אע״ג דבפ׳ בן סורר ומורה (לקמן דף עד.) אמר בעבודת כוכבים יהרג ואל יעבור י״ל נהי דחייב למסור עצמו לכתחלה מ״מ היכא דלא מסר את עצמו לא מיחייב מיתה וכו’ וי״מ הא דאמר יהרג ואל יעבור היינו בסתם עבודת כוכבים והכא איירי בעבודת כוכבים שהכל עובדים מאהבה ומיראה דומיא דהמן דמייתי וכו’ וא״ת לרבא אמאי לא השתחוה מרדכי להמן וי״ל כדאמר במדרש שהיו צלמים על לבו אי נמי משום קידוש השם כדאמרינן בירושלמי דשביעית (פ״ד) כגון פפוס ולוליינוס אחים שנתן להם מים בזכוכית צבועה ולא קיבלו:

During WWII, Harav Aharon Kotler spent time in Japan. There was a law in Japan that if ever the Emperor’s vehicle drove through a street a siren was sounded and anyone in the area had to immediately fall to the ground – a law which was enforced instantly and forcefully. One was not required to bow directly towards the Emperor, rather to just fall to the ground as a matter of respect, and it seems even Yeshiva men complied. The Rosh Yeshiva in general refrained from walking in the street as much as possible, but one day he had to go to the bank and did so accompanied by a certain Reb Moshe Cohen. Sure enough, the Emperor appeared. Everyone, including Reb Moshe Cohen, fell immediately to the ground. Everyone that is, except the Rosh Yeshiva, who feared that the show of respect was connected to the Japanese belief in the divinity of the Emperor. Immediately the Rosh Yeshiva was clubbed on the back by a policeman so hard that he was laid up in bed for days. When he next saw his companion he berated him. “R’ Moshe, Hayitochen? How could you fall? Abizraya d’avodah zarah! There was a taint of avodah zarah involved.”

Source: The Legacy of Maran Rav Aharon Kotler, p. 437, related by Rav Zvulun Schwartzman.

[The Japanese fascist government of that period encouraged emperor worship in order to unify the people and motivate them to fight to the death in World War II. During earlier periods, as well as today, the emperor was not worshipped, although he was believed to be descended from the sun. 

The dispute between Reb Aharon and the others seems to hinge on the above Tosafos. Reb Aharon feared that the Japanese people really believed in the divinity of the Emperor, while the others held that even the Japanese only bowed out of love for their country, dedication to the Emperor and fear of the police.

How many Japanese would have to view their emperor as a god in order for Reb Aharon to be correct? Tosafos says:

והכא איירי בעבודת כוכבים שהכל עובדים מאהבה ומיראה

“Here [that Rava says it is permitted to bow down] we are talking about an idol that everyone worships out of love or fear.”

The implication is that if some people, even a small number, actually believe in the idol, it is forbidden to bow.

However, the Piskei Hatosfos (123) says:

ע”ז שדרכה לעבוד מאהבה ויראה או שמפרש מאהבה ויראה פטור עליה

“If an idol is normally worshipped out of love and fear, or when the Jew bowing states explicitly that he is only doing so out of love or fear, he is exempt.”

The first part of this quote indicates that what is usually done is the determining factor; it does not matter if there is a small minority of believers. The second part, that the Jew’s statement helps, comes from Tosafos in Shabbos 72b. In fact, it seems that the reason why “usually” is enough is precisely because it allows us to assume that that is the Jew’s intent too even without him making an explicit statement.]

Niddah

Niddah 70b: He Came Back to Life, Must He Remarry His Wife?

Niddah 70b: The men of Alexandria asked twelve questions to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananya… three of them were foolish. 1) Does Lot’s wife make someone tamei? He replied: A dead person can make someone tamei, but a pillar of salt cannot. 2) Does the Ben Hashunamis brought back to life by Elisha make someone tamei? He replied: A dead person can make someone tamei, but a live person cannot. 3) Will the dead who are resurrected in the future require sprinkling of the red heifer? He replied: When they are resurrected we will come up with the answer. Some say he replied: When Moshe Rabbeinu comes with them, we will ask him.

נדה ע ע”ב: שלשה דברי בורותֹ: אשתו של לוט מהו שתטמא? אמר להם: מת מטמא, ואין נציב מלח מטמא. בן שונמית מהו שיטמא? אמר להן: מת מטמא, ואין חי מטמא. מתים לעתיד לבא, צריכין הזאה שלישי ושביעי, או אין צריכין? אמר להן: לכשיחיו ־ נחכם להן. איכא דאמרי: לכשיבא משה רבינו עמהם.

Rabbi Yechezkel Roth, the Karlsburger Rov, suffered a heart attack in 2016 and was hospitalized at Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn, where he was placed on a respirator.

Upon his release from the hospital, Harav Roth asked his wife, Rebbetzin Chaya Rechel, if she wanted to stay with him. When she of course replied in the affirmative, he performed a kiddushin before two witnesses. He explained that he was being machmir for the opinion of the Terumas Hadeshen.

Source: Matzav.com

[The Terumas Hadeshen, Psakim Uksavim 102, is responding to the question of whether Eliyahu Hanavi’s wife or Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s wife could remarry. He adds, “This would have an implication for the future too, if someone else was zocheh to be like them. “

He quotes our Gemara in Niddah and then comments:

אע”פ שודאי אשתו של לוט מתה אלא שנהפכה לגוף אחר ובן השונמית היה מת אלא חזר ויחי אעפ”כ אמר שאין מטמאין ה”נ י”ל אשת רעהו אסורה ולא אשת מלאך שכולן רוחני ולא גופני.

 “Although certainly Lot’s wife died, only that she turned into another substance; and the Ben Hashunamis was dead, only that he came back to life, still the Gemara says that they do not transmit tumah. Here too, the wife of one’s fellow man is forbidden and not the wife of an angel, for the angels are completely spiritual, not physical.”

What is his comparison between a live person who was once dead and Eliyahu Hanavi, who is still alive? (Or, if Eliyahu Hanavi is considered dead, then what is the need for a proof from this Gemara?) It seems he means to argue as follows: why isn’t the Ben Hashunamis still tamei now, since he was dead and had tumah then? True, he is alive now and cannot generate new tumah. But where did the old tumah go? His answer is that Rabbi Yehoshua was teaching the Alexandrians that it’s possible for a person to be transformed so completely that nothing of his previous state remains. Here too, Eliyahu Hanavi turned into an angel and an angel cannot have a wife, but one might have argued that his ties to his wife from the time when he was human still remained. From the Gemara we see that no, he was completely transformed and nothing remained.

Now, in theory, the story of the Ben Hashunamis could be understood in four ways: 1) Even after Elisha revived him, he was actually still dead, only he appeared to be alive. 2) He was really revived at the end, yet he maintained the tumah acquired when dead. 3) The fact that Elisha revived him shows that he was never actually dead at any point. 4) He was truly dead, yet Elisha revived him and he became truly alive and completed transformed so that no tumah remained.

The Alexandrians’ question showed that they entertained possibilities 1 and/or 2. Rabbi Yehoshua’s reply can be understood as either 3 or 4. The Terumas Hadeshen is interpreting it as 4.

R’ Chatzkel Roth evidently extended this concept to the technological advances of modern medicine. It is possible nowadays for a person to exhibit signs of death – heart and breathing stopped – and yet be revived with machines. Position 3 would say that this shows the person was never dead. But position 4 – the Terumas Hadeshen – would say, yes he was dead, but he was revived and completely transformed. He was tamei while his heart was stopped, but now he is tahor. His wife was unmarried while his heart was stopped, and now he needs to remarry her.   

The Chida disagrees with the Terumas Hadeshen. In Birkei Yosef Even Hoezer 17:1, the Chida brings the Gemara in Megillah 7b where Rabbah slaughtered Rabbi Zeira and then brought him back to life the next day, and poses the question of whether Rabbi Zeira had to make a new kiddushin on his wife. Do we say that the old kiddushin disappeared when he died, and when he came back to life it was a fresh start, or do we say that the techiyas hameisim reveals that his death was not a real death?

He brings proof to the latter position from the Yerushalmi Gittin 40b, which discusses a man who, before leaving on a trip, gives his wife a get on condition that he will not return after 12 months, and then dies before the 12 months are up. Rabbi Chaggai says she is permitted immediately, but Rabbi Yossi says she is forbidden, for perhaps a miracle happened and the husband came back to life. The Bavli (Gittin 76b) asks the same question and leaves it unanswered. The Chida argues we see from Rabbi Yossi that if the man did come back to life, she would still be married to him. And even Rabbi Chaggai, as well as the other position in the Bavli, only disagree with him because they are not afraid of such a rare occurrence. But if it did happen, all would agree that she remains married to him.

However, the Chida says he wrote all of this quickly (אני אמרתי בחפזי) and this is only the way it seems superficially (לפום ריהטא). Actually, there is a tremendous problem with this reading of the Yerushalmi. If Rabbi Yossi holds that we are afraid of people coming back to life, what does he do with all the chapters of Yevamos and sugyos throughout Shas that discuss giving testimony that a husband died in order to permit his wife? How will it ever help? Even if it is proven that he died, perhaps he will come back to life. How can his wife ever remarry? Now, the Chida does say that he admits in the case when the husband was buried and then came back, that his wife is no longer married. He is only speaking about Rabbi Zeira, who was not buried. But if so, all who testify on a husband being dead would have to testify that he was buried too, and we don’t find this. Rather, it seems clear that Rabbi Yossi never meant to say that the wife is still married after the techiyas hameisim. He meant only that there would be no get and the wife would need chalitzah. This is because the husband gave her the get only on condition that he would not return from his trip by 12 months. He then died during the trip. Rabbi Yossi is afraid that he may come back to life and return before 12 months, rendering the get null and void. True, she would no longer be married to him due to his death, but since there was no get, she would need chalitzah and would be forbidden to remarry without chalitzah.]

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 74b: Forced Intermarriage

Sanhedrin 74b: When a Jew is forced to commit a sin in public, even if it is not one of the three cardinal sins, he must give his life. But Esther married Achashveirosh in public! Abaye said: Esther was passive. Rava said: When the forcer’s goal is his own pleasure, it is different.

סנהדרין עד ע”ב: והא אסתר פרהסיא הואיִ ־ אמר אביי: אסתר קרקע עולם היתה. רבא אמר: הנאת עצמן שאני.

Sulika Hajuel was a teenager who was known both for her physical and inner beauty. She lived with her parents in Tangiers, Morocco and usually stayed within the small Jewish neighborhood. One day in 1834 as she was walking near a Muslim neighborhood, a wealthy young man saw her and wanted to marry her. He tried to talk to her, but she ignored him. The young man was a member of a very wealthy and influential family and was accustomed to getting whatever he wanted. He told his father that he had seen the girl he wanted to marry. His father assured him that he would do everything in his power to see to it that it happened. By law, a Muslim could not marry a Jew, but they were sure that Sulika’s conversion could be arranged, by persuasion or force.

A few days later, the father and his entourage came to Sulika’s father, Haim, and offered him lavish gifts if he would give them his daughter in marriage. He would not hear of it. “Sulika will not marry a non-Jew,” he stated emphatically. “She is very religious and will not violate Torah law.”

Sulika, too, stated unequivocally that she would not marry a Muslim. Once again, they tried to persuade Haim with promises of wealth and gifts for the entire family, but Sulika and her father would not be swayed. The wealthy man left in anger and said there were other methods that would “convince” the Hajuels to change their minds.

The Muslim family had political connections, so they fabricated a story that Sulika had indeed converted to Islam and now wanted to convert back to Judaism, a capital crime under Islamic law. When she and her family heard about it, she went into hiding to avoid being arrested. A few days later, government officers came to the Hajuel home and were told that Sulika had run away; they arrested her mother instead and told Haim that she would be kept imprisoned until Sulika was found.

When Sulika heard about her mother’s arrest, she immediately turned herself in to the authorities. Her mother was released and Sulika was imprisoned. The authorities told the family that she would be jailed in Fez, the city of Sultan Mawlay Abd al-Rahman, where the Supreme Islamic Court ruled on such life-and-death issues. There she would await judgment.

While she was in her dark dungeon, the sultan’s son saw her and told her he wished to marry her. If she would convert to Islam, she would live in the lap of luxury for the rest of her life. She adamantly refused, and said she was willing to die, but would never sin against her G-d.

Even before the trial she was tortured mercilessly. She became weaker every day because she would not eat non-kosher food. Rav Rafael Tzarfati of Fez had government connections and secured special permission to visit her. He would smuggle in kosher food and she survived on what he brought her. Soon the officials tried a new tack. They warned her that being obstinate would put the Jews of Morocco in danger. She was putting not only her life in jeopardy, but also the lives of many others.

The Moroccan Jews knew that Sulika was awaiting trial and that she was defying any attempt to force her to convert. One day Rav Tzarfati pleaded with her, “My child, do you realize how many Jews are now in danger because of you? Only you can save them.”

Perhaps Rav Tzarfati relied on the Rambam, who writes in Iggeres Hashmad that converting to Islam is not idolatry, because conversion in Islam is merely a verbal declaration which the Muslims themselves realize is insincere, coming from a Jew under the threat of death, and Islam does not involve actual idolatrous practices. Sulika was unwavering. “Is it permissible for a Jew to trample on the mitzvos of the Torah and betray Hashem just to help others?”

“My child,” Rav Tzarfati replied, “we find that Esther married Achashveirosh. So if she did it to save the Jews, why won’t you?” Sulika’s answer astounded the rabbi. “It is not the same at all! The Megillah tells us that Esther had not told of her people or her birthplace (Esther 2:10). No one knew that she was Jewish, so her being with Achashveirosh was not a Chillul Hashem. Today everyone knows I am Jewish; were I to convert to marry a Muslim it would be a Chillul Hashem of the worst order. I am not willing to do that. I would rather die for Hashem.”

Rav Tzarfati cried when he heard these words and realized the greatness and commitment of this young woman. He blessed her and left her prison cell, brokenhearted. A few days later, the trial began. It was all anyone talked about. The judges were shocked that a young girl would rather die than become a traitor to her religion. They postponed the final judgment so she could reconsider. The trial eventually resumed and the harsh judgment was handed down. The guilty apostate would be hanged in the city square in front of the entire community. However, the night before her execution she would be tied to the back of a horse-drawn wagon and dragged through the street to the gallows. The night before she was to be taken to be killed, Sulika sewed the bottom of her dress to her legs so that it would not be lifted in an immodest manner as she was being dragged.

A bloodthirsty mob yelled vicious epithets against the Jews as they gathered in the square to see the young girl hanged. As Jews cried and Muslims ridiculed, the precious soul of Sulika was returned to her Maker. As her limp body was dropped to the ground in disgrace, an argument ensued among the Jews gathered there as to where she should be buried. It was finally decided that she be buried in Fez, the city where she had sanctified Hashem’s Name.

She was buried near the graves of two tzaddikim, Rabbi Yehuda ibn Attar and Rabbi Avner Tzarfati. Moroccan Jews say that the Shechinah rests over the three graves and over the years people have told of miracles and wondrous occurrences that happened to those who prayed there.

The Jews began to refer to her as Lala Sulika. (In Arabic, “lala” means prominent lady.) Soon after, Sulika came to Rav Tzarfati in a dream and pleaded, “All my life I ran away from honor and glory. Please do not allow people to use a term that bestows prominence to my name.” Rav Tzarfati announced that from then on she may only be referred to simply as Sulika.  

It was noted that the Hebrew letters of the year תקצ”ד (1834) spell צדקת – righteous woman.

Sources: Illuminations of the Maggid 

[Sulika argued that Esther was not known as a Jew, so her sin was not public and involved no Chillul Hashem. Seemingly, the Gemara explicitly contradicts this: it says Esther’s sin was בפרהסיא, committed in public. And the Gemara gives two answers, both of which could have applied to Sulika. She could have married the Muslim and remained passive, and the Muslim’s goal was his own pleasure.

Of course, it could be that her refusal was due to the conversion to Islam issue. The Ridvaz (4:92) rules that one must give one’s life rather than convert to Islam, because although it is not idolatry, it is denial of the Torah. The Ritva in Pesachim 25b takes the same position. And even the Rambam, who permits it, says that it is praiseworthy to give up one’s life rather than convert. However, from her distinction between Esther and herself, it sounds like that was the main factor, or at least one factor, in her decision to be moser nefesh. 

It’s also true that Sulika probably didn’t know the Gemara. But Rav Tzarfati did, and he made no attempt to point out her mistake. And it seems Hashem agreed with her mesirus nefesh: she was accepted in Gan Eden as a tzadekes who could come back in people’s dreams, and prayers were answered at her grave. Is there any way the Gemara can be reconciled with what she said?

I think the answer is that the Gemara is discussing a different kind of “public”. The Gemara’s בפרהסיא means in front of ten Jews. All the Jews of Shushan knew that Esther was Jewish.  In Megillah 15b the Gemara says that one of the reasons why Esther invited Haman to the feast was so that the Jews should not rely on her to avert the decree, so that they should continue davening.  When Sulika said Esther was not known as a Jew, she meant that she was not known to the Persians as a Jew. Thus Achashveirosh did not mean to force her to violate the Torah – להעבירה על דתה. Rather, his goal was הנאת עצמו – his own pleasure. However, Sulika was known to the Muslims as a Jew who refused to marry one of them. And the campaign against her was carried out not only by the man who wanted her, but by the whole government. Therefore she felt that the real motivation was to force her to violate the Torah.

Now, the Gemara gives two answers for Esther: Abaye says passivity, and Rava says the forcer’s goal is his own pleasure. Both heterim are brought down in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 157:1. So even if Sulika was right that the Muslim’s goal was not his own pleasure, seemingly the heter of passivity still remains.

The answer may be that actually, we don’t pasken like Abaye who says passivity is a heter for Chillul Hashem in public. Tosafos asks why the Gemara poses the question והא אסתר פרהסיא הואיִ – Esther did it in public. Seemingly, the Gemara could have asked a stronger question: that Esther did גילוי עריות, which is יהרג ואל יעבור even in private. Rabbeinu Yitzchok ben Mordechai answers that the Gemara already knew that passivity is a heter for גילוי עריות. This is because the יהרג ואל יעבור of עריות is derived from the law of murder, and for a passive murder one need not give up his life.  However, the Gemara’s question was that in public, one must give up one’s life for any sin in the Torah. We are no longer deriving it from the law of murder, so passivity should no longer be a heter! On this Abaye answers: No, passivity is a heter even for sinning in public. Rava answers: Achashveirosh’s goal was his own pleasure. As usual, in disputes between Abaye and Rava, we pasken like Rava. True, the Rema in YD 157 does bring down the heter of קרקע עולם – passivity, but only in the case of regular גילוי עריות that is not done in public.

Another comment on the Sulika story is in order. Rav Tzarfati asked her, “If Esther married a non-Jew to save the Jewish people, why won’t you?” It seems he asked the wrong question. Esther’s heter when she first married Achashveirosh was based either upon קרקע עולם or הנאת עצמן. It had nothing to do with saving the Jewish people. How could Esther have known that five years later, Haman would decree death upon the Jews? So his argument was unnecessary. However, after Sulika’s answer, the argument of saving the Jews still remains. Because when it did come time to intercede with the king and save the Jews, Esther went in for the first time on her own initiative. We read in the Gemara Megillah 15a: Esther said, “I will go in to the king in violation of the law.” Rabbi Abba said: In violation of Torah law, because until that point she had been forced by him, but this time she was going willingly. 

So whatever argument Sulika had that her case was different from Esther’s and it would be forbidden to marry the Muslim man, don’t we see that Esther eventually did something that was definitely an aveirah in order to save the Jews? 

The answer lies in the Noda Biyehuda Yoreh Deah 154, who quotes the Maharik 167 who deals with the case of a caravan of Jews who were attacked by robbers intending to murder the group. One married Jewish woman seduced the gang leader and convinced him to spare their lives. The Maharik ruled that the woman did the right thing, and he brings proof from Esther going to Achashveirosh willingly to save the Jewish people. Still, she is forbidden to return to her husband, because she was מעלה מעל באישה – she was unfaithful to her husband, despite the fact that what she did was right given the circumstances. In the same way, Esther was forbidden to her husband Mordechai – כשם שאבדתי מבית אבא כן אובד ממך. 

The Noda Biyehuda himself disagrees. Esther was a special case, he says, because she was saving the entire Jewish people, and perhaps she acted on orders from Mordechai, with his ruach hakodesh. But in general, a woman may not commit גילוי עריות  actively, even in order to save a group of Jews from death. Sulika evidently held like the Noda Biyehuda.]

Avodah Zarah

Avodah Zarah 75b: Immodest Dress and Lifnei Iver

Avodah Zarah 75b: According to the opinion that spoiled taste [coming from a pot used more than 24 hours ago] is permitted, then in what case did the Torah forbid cooking with the pots of non-Jews? Rav Chiya son of Rav Huna said: The Torah only forbade a pot that was used within the last day, for that is not spoiled taste. Why then is it not completely permitted to use such a pot after a day has passed? – It is a Rabbinic decree on treif pots after a day, lest one come to use a treif pot on the same day.



עבודה זרה עה ע”ב: ולמאן דאמר נותן טעם לפגם ־ מותר, גיעולי עובדי כוכבים דאסר רחמנא היכי משכחת לה? אמר רב חייא בריה דרב הונא: לא אסרה תורה אלא קדירה בת יומא, דלאו נותן טעם לפגם הוא. מכאן ואילך לישתריִ! גזירה קדירה שאינה בת יומא משום קדירה בת יומא.

A woman who was becoming frum, and only had a certain amount of money to spend, asked Rabbi Ahron Leib Shteinman, “Should I buy new modest clothing, or should I buy kosher dishes?” Rav Shteinman replied, “Buy the modest clothing, because the prohibition of using your old treif dishes is only Rabbinic, and it’s only a aveirah for yourself, but the aveirah of wearing immodest clothing is a Torah prohibition of not placing a stumbling block before the blind, and it involves sins for others as well.”

Source: Rabbi Ahron Shmuel Pessin

[What is the source for the idea that a woman wearing immodest clothing is “placing a stumbling block before the blind”?  It may seem obvious, but one could argue as follows: The Gemara says in Bava Basra 57b that If a man walks down a path where he can see women washing clothing in the river, if there was another path he could have taken, he is wicked, but if there was no other path, he can’t help it and he is not held responsible for the sin. Still, it is praiseworthy to close his eyes. Thus it is possible that a woman could walk out in immodest clothing and cause no man to sin. All the men walking in the street with her might be on their way somewhere and have no other path to walk on. On the other hand, a man might have a different path available to him but still walk on her path, or he might gaze at her on purpose, which would be a sin no matter what.

This brings us to the question of whether “lifnei iver” – placing a stumbling block – applies only when one knows that the other person will commit the sin if he makes it available to him, or even if one doesn’t know.  The classic case of “lifnei iver” is handing a cup of wine to a nazir or a limb of a live animal to a Ben Noach (Avodah Zara 6b). There the giver indeed knows that the taker intends to consume the item. However, the Gemara also says that one who smacks his grownup son is transgressing “lifnei iver” (Moed Katan 17a), although is not known whether he will hit back. Similarly, lending money without witnesses is “lifei iver” (Bava Metzia 75b) because the borrower may deny the loan, although it is far from certain that he will do so. So we can conclude that making a possible sin available also constitutes placing a stumbling block.

One might ask that the Gemara does permit selling wood to an idolatrous temple of fire, on the grounds that most wood is used for regular burning (Nedarim 62b). And the Mishnah says that although one may not sell a plow in Shmitah, one may sell a tool that can be used for either prohibited or permitted work (Shviis 5:6). The answer must be that where the item itself is definitely forbidden, and the doubt is only whether the person will commit the sin or resist his impulse, then giving it to him is placing a stumbling block. We are not allowed to test another person’s power to subdue his yetzer hara. But where the item itself can be used for a permitted purpose, perhaps the buyer is simply buying it for that permitted purpose, and he will not need to stuggle with his yetzer hara at all.

In our case, wearing immodest clothing would definitely be placing other people in a struggle with their yetzer hara, so it is “lifnei iver.” This is especially true if the woman in question lived in a neighborhood with non-religious Jews, who would certainly sin.

In fact, there is a Gemara in Taanis 24a that seems to say that immodest behavior is “lifnei iver”. We are told that Rabbi Yossi of Yukras had a beautiful daughter. One day he saw a man making a hole in the fence around his house. The man explained, “If I was not privileged to marry her, can’t I be privileged to see her?” Rabbi Yossi then said to his daughter, “My daughter, you are causing people to suffer. Go back to your dust, and let people not stumble because of you.” Rabbi Yossi of Yukras was criticized by Rabbi Yossi bar Avin for not having mercy on his own daughter. Still, she must have done something wrong, or else she would not have deserved any punishment at all. And the language “let people not stumble” indicates that her sin was “lifnei iver.”]