Yuma 85a: Rabbi Yishmoel, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were walking on the road, and Levi the Sadar and Rabbi Yishmoel the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were following them, and the following question was asked of them: How do we know that danger to life overrides Shabbos? [Each sage went on to offer a drasha, but all agreed on the halacha itself.]

יומא פה ע”א: וכבר היה רבי ישמעאל ורבי עקיבא ורבי אלעזר בן עזריה מהלכין בדרך, ולוי הסדר ורבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי אלעזר בן עזריה מהלכין אחריהן. נשאלה שאלה זו בפניהם: מניין לפקוח נפש שדוחה את השבת?

In the First Book of Maccabees 2:31-41, we read:

It was reported to the officers and soldiers of the king [Antiochus] who were in the City of David, in Jerusalem, that those who had flouted the king’s order had gone out to secret refuges in the wilderness. Many hurried out after them, and having caught up with them, camped opposite and prepared to attack them on the Sabbath. The pursuers said to them, “Enough of this! Come out and obey the king’s command, and you will live.” But they replied, “We will not come out, nor will we obey the king’s command to profane the Sabbath.” Then the enemy attacked them at once. But they did not retaliate; they neither threw stones, nor blocked up their secret refuges. They said, “Let us all die in innocence; heaven and earth are our witnesses that you destroy us unjustly.” So the officers and soldiers attacked them on the Sabbath, and they died with their wives, their children and their animals, to the number of a thousand persons. When Matisyahu and his friends heard of it, they mourned deeply for them. They said to one another, “If we all do as our kindred have done, and do not fight against the Gentiles for our lives and our laws, they will soon destroy us from the earth.” So on that day they came to this decision: “Let us fight against anyone who attacks us on the Sabbath, so that we may not all die as our kindred died in their secret refuges.”

The question is: why didn’t those thousand Jews defend themselves? How could it be that these kedoshim, who were so moser nefesh for the Torah, were not aware of the halacha, universally agreed upon in the Gemara, that danger to life overrides Shabbos?

The answer is that this was a time of shmad. The Gemara says in Sanhedrin 74a: Rabbi Yochanan said that this whole rule – that danger to life overrides all mitzvos except for three – was only said when it is not a time of shmad, but at a time of shmad, even a small mitzvah takes precedence over life. This is provided, of course, that the gentile’s intent is to force the Jew to transgress. If the gentile’s intent is for his own convenience (e.g. he orders the Jew to cook a meal for him on Shabbos), then even during a time of shmad the Jew should obey.

The Jews in Matisyahu’s time held that when the Greeks attacked them on Shabbos, their intent was to force the Jews to violate Shabbos. The Greeks figured that they would score a victory either way. If the Jews refused to defend themselves, they would slaughter them and get rid of these stubborn religious people. If the Jews did defend themselves on Shabbos, they would be making them violate Shabbos.

Matisyahu agreed to this argument in principle, but said, “If we don’t fight back, they will soon destroy us from the earth.” In other words, he argued that although in a time of shmad, any mitzvah takes precedence over life, danger to the entire Jewish people is different. This is the same argument that obligated Esther to go to Achashveirosh willingly, committing an aveirah for the sake of saving the Jewish people. (See Noda Biyehuda Yoreh Deah 154)

[This is how it sounds from the words of the Book of Maccabees, but Matisyahu may have also argued that the Greeks attacked on Shabbos solely for their own convenience. They figured that the Jews would not defend themselves, so this would be an easy win for them.]

Yuma 87a: One who angers his friend, even with words, must apologize to him.

יומא פז ע”א: אמר רבי יצחק: כל המקניט את חבירו, אפילו בדברים ־ צריך לפייסו.

When R’ Yisroel Meir Hakohein published his sefer Chofetz Chaim, he brought it to various gedolim for haskamos. R’ Yisroel Salanter told him, “Leave your sefer with me, and I will read it and decide.” When he returned, R’ Yisroel said, “You write (4:12) that if one person spoke lashon hara against another, and that person ended up being harmed by it (i.e. the listeners believed the lashon hara and acted on it), he must come to him to ask forgiveness, and if the victim doesn’t know about it, he must tell him what he said about him and ask forgiveness. I don’t understand – just because he wants to do teshuva, does that give him the right to pain his friend even more by telling him what he said about him?” The Chofetz Chaim replied, “I took this halacha from Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuva 207.”

They discussed the Rabbeinu Yonah, but still could not agree.

The Chofetz Chaim then asked R’ Yisroel to write him a haskamah and specify that his approval is on everything except this halacha. R’ Yisroel replied, “I’m afraid not, because there are some people who don’t read the full haskamah, and would just see my approval, and I would be guilty of causing others to sin (lifnei iver).” So the Chofetz Chaim left without a haskamah.

Rav Moshe Sternbuch shlita heard from Rav Dessler in the name of Reb Yisroel Salanter that in such a case, one should ask mechilah in general for anything he did, not telling the person exactly what it was.

Sources: Az Nidberu 7:66 and Moadim Uzmanim 1:54, Dirshu notes on Sefer Chofetz Chaim, quoting the sefer Meir Einei Yisroel v. 6 p. 353.

[We are left wondering: What did Reb Yisroel Salanter do with the proof from Rabbeinu Yonah? Let’s look at Rabbeinu Yonah inside:

אם ישוב בעל הלשון בתשובה צריך לבקש מחילה לאשר מוצק לו מזעם לשונו, והוא לא יזכור מספר כלם, כי רבים מכאובים הכאיב וכמה נפשות הדאיב, גם רבים מאשר זכר, כי אותם עכר, והם לא ידעו כי הדיח עליהם את הרעה, יתבייש להודיעם ולגלות אזנם על אשר גמלם רעה, כי הוא מכה ואין מכתו ידועה, כענין שנאמר (תהלים קכ): ״מה יתן לך ומה יוסיף לך לשון רמיה חצי גבור שנונים״, על כן נמשל לשון הרע לחץ, כי המושך בקשת פעמים רבות ישלח חציו באדם ולא נודע מי הכהו.

“If the speaker of lashon hara wishes to repent, he must ask forgiveness from whomever he has harmed with his angry tongue, and he will not remember all his victims, for he has caused many wounds and pained many souls. Also, in many cases, even where he does remember harming others, they may not know that he brought misfortune upon them, and he will be embarrassed to tell them that he did harm to them. For lashon hara is a wound that is not recognizable, as it states in Tehillim (120:3-4), ‘What further safeguard could one give or add to a cunning tongue? It is like the sharp arrows of a warrior.’ This is why lashon hara is compared to an arrow: for when one draws his bow, he will often shoot arrows at a person without the person knowing who shot him.”

It’s clear from the analogy to the arrow that Rabbeinu Yonah is talking about a case where the victim already knows that someone has spread lashon hara about him, only he doesn’t know who spread it.  In that case, Reb Yisroel would agree that the speaker stepping forward and confessing won’t cause the victim any additional pain.

However, what about a case where the victim suffered a loss (e.g. his shidduch was broken off, or he was denied a job) but never knew the real reason why? He might have assumed until now that it was because the girl simply didn’t like him, or the boss found a more capable candidate. But when the speaker confesses, he will find out that negative information was spread about him. That’s where Reb Yisroel held he shouldn’t tell him.

But the Chofetz Chaim says that even in this case one must tell him, as is clear from his words:

ואפילו אם חבירו אינו יודע עדיין כלל מזה צריך לגלות לו מה שעשה נגדו שלא כדין ולבקש ממנו מחילה על זה, כיון שהוא יודע שעל ידו נסבב לו דבר זה.

“And even if the other person does not yet know anything about this, he must reveal to him what he did against him in violation of halacha, and ask him forgiveness for it, since he knows that he was the cause of harm to the other person.”

So the Chofetz Chaim actually went a step beyond Rabbeinu Yonah, and it was in this step beyond that Reb Yisroel did not agree with him and therefore refused to grant him a haskamah.

So what does their disagreement hinge upon? Let’s remember: Reb Yisroel made two arguments: 1) Why should your doing teshuva give you the right to hurt him? Better suffer without a mechilah rather than hurt him. 2) It really is possible to get mechilah without hurting him, by asking in general without specifying the sin.

The Chofetz Chaim disagreed with both of those arguments. On 1), he held that although it would cause the victim pain, he would still rather know what was said about him. A person does not want to be ignorant, even when knowledge is painful. Not only that, but sometimes it could be useful to know; he might take steps to correct the fault that people found in him. Reb Yisroel, on the other hand, may have held that a person would rather remain ignorant of painful information. Alternatively, he held that even if the victim himself would rather know, from the speaker’s standpoint, it would be wrong to disturb his ignorance and cause him pain.  

On 2), the Chofetz Chaim held that mechilah without knowing the extent of the offense is like a mekach taus – a transaction on false pretenses. Let’s say A owes B a million dollars and B forgot about it, and A goes to B and says, “If I owe you some money, are you mochel?” and B says yes, that mechilah is invalid. Reb Yisroel, on the other hand, looked at mechilah as a tenai, a condition. The sinner doesn’t owe anything to his victim. It’s Hashem who punishes, not the victim. You have to do teshuva to Hashem. Except that Hashem makes a condition and says, “For sins against your fellow man, I will take off the punishment only if you obtain mechilah from the victim.” For this purpose, a mechilah without knowledge of the crime is also a mechilah.

Another approach to the second dispute is that the Chofetz Chaim held that the purpose of asking mechilah is to humble oneself and feel embarrassed for one’s sin. Asking mechilah without specifying the sin does not fulfill that purpose, because the small amount of embarrassment it takes to do that is not commensurate with the gravity of the sin. Reb Yisroel held that a little embarrassment is also enough; it need not be commensurate with the sin.

One cannot say that Reb Yisroel also agreed that a general mechilah does not work, and still he held that the speaker of the lashon hara must forego his mechilah in order not to cause the other person pain. For if then, what would be the purpose in asking for a general mechilah if it doesn’t accomplish anything?

However, we could learn that Reb Yisroel was uncertain of whether a general mechilah works, so he said one should ask for a general mechilah just in case it works. If it doesn’t work, then too bad – the sinner must forego his mechilah. Alternatively, he held there are two dinim – two reasons for asking forgiveness: the embarrassment, and the tenai, as outlined above. Both are true. In this case, where the sinner cannot achieve one, he might as well get the other.]

Yuma 10a: Rabbi Yehuda holds that a succah on Succos is considered a house for the purposes of maaser (i.e. if one brings in produce to a succah, it becomes obligated in maaser). The Sages hold it does not. Rabbi Yehuda holds that a succah must participate in an eiruv and must have a mezuzah.

Rambam, Hilchos Mezuzah 6:9: A succah on Succos and a house on a boat are exempt from mezuzah because they are not made for permanent residence.

Rambam, Hilchos Berachos 11:2: There are some mitzvos that are not obligatory, but similar to optional, for example, mezuzah and building a fence around one’s roof. A person is not obligated to live in a house requiring a mezuzah in order to make a mezuzah; if he wishes, he may live his entire life in a tent or a boat. And he is not obligated to build a house in order to make a fence around his roof. 

יומא י ע”א סוכת חג בחג רבי יהודה מחייב וחכמים פוטרים. ותני עלה ר’ יהודה מחייב בעירוב ובמזוזה. רמב”ם הלכות מזוזה פרק ו הלכה ט: סוכת החג בחג ובית שבספינה פטורין מן המזוזה לפי שאינן עשויין לדירת קבע. וכן הובא ביו”ד רפ”ו סעיף יא.

רמב”ם הלכות ברכות פרק יא הלכה ב: ויש מצוה שאינה חובה אלא דומין לרשות כגון מזוזה ומעקה שאין אדם חייב לשכון בבית החייב מזוזה כדי שיעשה מזוזה אלא אם רצה לשכון כל ימיו באהל או בספינה ישב, וכן אינו חייב לבנות בית כדי לעשות מעקה.

The Steipler was once asked whether one need put a mezuzah on the doorways of a yacht. The Steipler searched the poskim in Hilchos Mezuzah and could not find a source. Rav Chaim Kanievsky asked his father what he was looking for, and when he heard, Rav Chaim said that the Rambam writes explicitly that one doesn’t need to have a mezuzah on a boat. “But I just reviewed the Rambam’s Hilchos Mezuzah and it’s not there,” said the Steipler. Rav Chaim agreed that it is not there, however, the Rambam mentions in passing, as an example, in Hilchos Berachos 11:2, that if one chooses to life his whole life in a boat, he will not need a mezuzah.

Source: FJJ March 24, 2022, p. 12.

[The Steipler certainly saw the Rambam in Hilchos Mezuzah stating that a boat does not require a mezuzah. However, the Rambam adds “because they are not made for permanent residence”. Apparently the questioner here wanted to live in his yacht all year. The Steipler thought that perhaps the Rambam only meant that a boat is exempt when one lives in it temporarily, like a succah used only on Succos. It is only in Hilchos Berachos that the Rambam says explicitly that even if one lives his whole life in a boat, he will not need a mezuzah.

Why is the boat different from the succah? The answer may be that if one lives all year in a succah, he will certainly make it waterproof, and then it will become a regular house, not a succah. But the yacht will remain the same yacht even when used all year. The aspects of the yacht that make it unfit for permanent residence (the rocking of the boat etc.) will still be present.

Interestingly, the Rambam’s source for this halacha about boats – temporary or permanent – is unknown to us. The Bach says that he saw someone write that it is a Tosefta, but we don’t have it in our Tosefta. The footnote on the Tur Hashalem says that it is found in a version of the Gemara quoted in Midrash Hagadol, a 14^th century Yemenite work, on Vaeschanan, but the author of that work may have taken it from the Rambam.]

Yuma 85a. The question was asked of the Tannaim: From where do we learn that saving a life supercedes Shabbos? Rabbi Shimon ben Menasia said, “And the children of Israel shall keep the Shabbos.” The Torah says: Violate one Shabbos for him, so that he may keep many Shabbosos. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have given an answer better than all of them: “Live by them” – and not die by them. Rava said: All of the arguments can be refuted except that of Shmuel, because the Tannaim’s arguments only work when one is certainly saving a life, but Shmuel’s works even when one is possibly saving a life.

יומא פה. נשאלה שאלה זו בפניהם: מניין לפקוח נפש שדוחה את השבת? …. רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר: (שמות לא) ושמרו בני ישראל את השבת, אמרה תורה: חלל עליו שבת אחת, כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: אי הואי התם הוה אמינא: דידי עדיפא מדידהו, (ויקרא יח) וחי בהם ־ ולא שימות בהם. אמר רבא: לכולהו אית להו פירכא, בר מדשמואל דלית ליה פרכא… אשכחן ודאי, ספק מנלן.

A man came to Rabbi Naftali Jaeger, Rosh Yeshiva of Sh’or Yoshuv, and asked the following question: The Rema (Orach Chaim 306:14) says that someone whose daughter was kidnapped by the priests for forced conversion must violate Shabbos to save her. In other words, saving someone from shmad has the same status as saving a life. If so, it should be allowed to violate Shabbos in order to do kiruv, for example driving to give shiurim or participate in a kiruv event. He said he had asked the question to many rabbis and no one had been able to answer.

Rabbi Jaeger did not have an answer either. But some time later, Rabbi Moshe Shapiro came to New York, and Rabbi Jaeger brought him to visit this man. The man presented his question, and Rabbi Shapiro answered immediately.

The Gemara in Yuma says that there are two reasons to violate Shabbos when saving a life: 1) “Violate one Shabbos so that he may keep many.” 2) Vachai bahem – “Live by them.” Rava then states that the principle of “violate one Shabbos” works only if the life will certainly be saved, but “vachai bahem” works even in a case where there is only a possibility of saving a life.

The Netziv (Haamek Sheilah 167:13) shows that there are cases when only “violate one Shabbos” works but not “vachai bahem.” In Bava Metzia 114b, the story is told that Rabbah bar Avuha met Eliyahu Hanavi in a non-Jewish cemetery. He asked, “Isn’t the Master a kohein?” Eliyahu replied that the graves of non-Jews do not contaminate their airspace. Tosafos asks: If Eliyahu was a kohein, how could he have touched the boy he brought back to life? Tosafos answers that he was certain that he would succeed in resurrecting him, so it was permitted for pikuach nefesh. The question is: if resurrecting a dead person is considered like saving a life, why did Tosafos have to say Eliyahu was sure he would succeed? Even if there was only a small chance of success, it should be allowed, just like pikuach nefesh pushes aside Shabbos even when there is a chance of success. The Netziv answers: “Vachai bahem” doesn’t apply when the person is already dead. But “violate one Shabbos” does – because indeed, after he comes back to life, he will be keeping many Shabbosos. And as Rava said in Yuma, “violate one Shabbos” works only in a case of certainty.

“Now we can answer your question very simply,” concluded R’ Moshe Shapiro. “Saving the girl from the priests may or may not be successful. But since she is still a religious Jew now, she is considered spiritually alive. The rule of ‘vachai bahem’ thus applies and one may violate Shabbos to save her. The secular Jews who are the targets of kiruv, on the other hand, are already spiritually dead. We are trying to bring them back to life. For bringing back to life, we don’t use ‘vachai bahem.’ The only reason to do it would be ‘violate one Shabbos so that he may keep many.’ And since we have only a chance of success, this principle doesn’t apply!”

Source: Shiur by Rabbi Naftali Jaeger, 7 Teves 5778

Yuma 18b: They said to him, “We are the representatives of Beis Din, and you are our representative as well as the representative of Beis Din. We impose on you an oath, by the One who made His name dwell in this Temple, that you will not deviate from the instructions we have given you.” 

יומא יח ע”ב: אמרו לו: אישי כהן גדול, אנו שלוחי בית דין ואתה שלוחנו ושליח בית דין, משביעין אנו עליך במי ששכן שמו בבית הזה שלא תשנה דבר מכל מה שאמרנו לך.

Before the First Zionist Congress took place in Switzerland in 1897, Herzl sought out 100 rabbis from Poland and Lithuania who would attend the event and lend Jewish legitimacy to the new movement.  In the city of Kosova, where Rabbi Shmaryahu Yosef Karelitz, father of the Chazon Ish, served as rav, there was one rav who believed in Zionism. He was invited to the congress and he planned to attend. When R’ Shmaryahu Yosef heard about this, he called in this rav and tried to convince him not to go. In the end, he made him swear that he would not go to the congress, and indeed he did not go. Eventually he recognized his mistake and dropped Zionism altogether.

Someone asked the Chazon Ish, “Why did your father think that swearing would stop him from going to the congress? Didn’t he think he was doing a mitzvah by participating in the Zionist congress that would promote the settlement of Eretz Yisroel? If so, the oath would be, according to him, like swearing not to do a mitzvah, and he would still do the mitzvah.”

The Chazon Ish replied, “We find that before the Yom Kippur service in the Beis Hamikdash, the Beis Din made the Kohein Gadol swear that he would do the Avodah of the Ketores as they instructed him. Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Mishnayos quotes the Pri Chadash who asks the same question you asked: According to the Tzedukim, their practice of burning the Ketores before entering the Kodesh Hakodashim is the right way to do the mitzvah, so why would a Tzeduki be deterred by the oath? One who swears not to do a mitzvah must still do the mitzvah.

“My answer (Chazon Ish Orach Chaim 126:17) is that deep down, the Tzedukim did not really believe in their own shitah; it was only their yetzer hara that convinced them to sin, but they took an oath seriously, and would not transgress it.  So too with Zionism, even though the yetzer hara convinces them with Yishuv Eretz Yisroel and beautiful words, in their hearts they know the truth: Zionism is heresy and a departure from the path of the Torah; therefore the man knew that swearing not to attend the congress is not swearing not to do a mitzvah. It is a real oath, and he would not violate his oath.”

Source: Orchos Rabbeinu v. 4, p. 189

[The Pri Chadash answers that when one swears not to do a mitzvah, it’s true that he should still do the mitzvah, but nevertheless the oath is a שבועת שוא, a vain oath (Shevuos 29a). Since it was well-known that every Kohein Gadol had to swear, this would stop at least those Tzedukim who took the prohibition of a vain oath more seriously than the mitzvah of doing the avodah their way. Others, who might be willing to do the Tzeduki avodah even at the expense of a vain oath, might still do it. 

We could also propose two other answers:

1) Perhaps it was known to Chazal that the Tzedukim, having their own interpretation of the Written Torah, held that when one swears not to do a mitzvah, the oath is effective and one may indeed not do the mitzvah.

2) The answer may lie in the introductory sentence, “We are the representatives of Beis Din, and you are our representative as well as the representative of Beis Din.” This meant that they were making the Kohein Gadol the representative of the Jewish people to burn the Ketores, only on condition that he would burn it the way they instructed him. If he chose to do it the Tzeduki way, he would cease to function as Kohein Gadol, and his service would not be a mitzvah even according to the Tzedukim. Thus it would not be allowed under the rule of one who swears not to do a mitzvah. (This answer would only work according to the opinion that the kohanim are the representatives of the people. The Gemara (bottom of 19a) points out that the Mishnah reads better according to that opinion.)]