Gittin 57a: There was once a young betrothed couple who were captured into slavery by the gentiles, who married them. She said to him, “I ask you, please, not to touch me, because I have no kesubah from you.” And he did not touch her until the day he died. And when he died, she said to the others, “Say a hesped on this man who fought his yetzer hara more than Yosef, because Yosef’s challenge lasted only an hour, but my husband faced it every day. Yosef was not sleeping in the same bed, but my husband slept in the same bed. With Yosef it was not his own wife, but here it was his own wife.”  

גיטין נז ע”א מעשה בארוס וארוסתו שנשבו לבין העובדי כוכבים והשיאום זה לזה, אמרה לו: בבקשה ממך, אל תגע בי, שאין לי כתובה ממך, ולא נגע בה עד יום מותו. וכשמת, אמרה להן: סיפדו לזה שפטפט ביצרו יותר מיוסף, דאילו ביוסף לא הוה אלא חדא שעתא, והאי כל יומא ויומאֹ ואילו יוסף לאו בחדא מטה, והאי בחדא מטהֹ ואילו יוסף לאו אשתו, והא אשתו.

A few years ago, a Russian Jew known as “Reb Moshe” passed away. He left Russia after the fall of Communism, living out his remaining years in Boro Park.

R’ Mendel Rosenberg, of the Chevra Kadisha Chesed Shel Emes told the following story:

Reb Moshe’s funeral took place at Shomrei Hadas in Boro Park. Chesed Shel Emes did the taharah, and then brought him to Shomrei Hadas. There was barely a minyan present. Reb Moshe’s wife said, “I would like to say a few words.” She went over to the coffin and said, “Moshe, the reason we don’t have any children is because we lived in a place with no mikvah and not even a body of water that could be used as a mikvah, so you couldn’t touch me. You have no children who can say Yisgadal after you. Let the Eibershter say Yisgadal after you!” 

Source: Sefer Taharas Chaya

[On the Gemara’s story, the Maharsha asks that according to one opinion in the Gemara, a betrothed woman also has an automatic kesubah. (We can add that as the Maharsha himself points out, it seems the problem was only the kesubah, but not nisuin. But don’t Chazal say, “A kallah without a bracha is forbidden to her husband like a niddah”? The answer is that there were other Jews with them, the same ones who said the hesped, and they could have and perhaps did perform nisuin with the berachos. And a fully married woman definitely has an automatic kesubah, without the written document. Besides, they could have written a kesubah.) The Maharsha answers that the man was a slave and all his property belonged to his master; therefore effectively there was no kesubah because there was nothing to pay it with.

Does this mean that any man who is totally broke is not allowed to touch his wife? Possibly there is a difference, because at least the kesubah guarantees that anything he will own in the future will go to his wife, so the deterrent to divorce (שלא יהא קל בעיניו להוציאה) is effective. With the slave, on the other hand, anything he would ever own would belong to his master, so there would be no deterrent.]

On the story of the couple who had no mikvah, we can ask: how did they live together in the same house? True, the prohibition of yichud doesn’t apply to a niddah. The poskim give two reasons for that. The Mechaber (Yoreh Deah 195:1) explains: “Since he has had relations with her once, his yetzer hara will not overtake him anymore.” The Toras Hashelamim there says since he knows she will be permitted to him in a few days, he is able to conquer his yetzer hara. According to the Toras Hashlamim’s reason, in this case, where they might not find a mikvah anytime soon, they would not be allowed to be alone together. If we say that all poskim agree that we need both conditions (had relations already, and will be permitted later), then there is a problem with our story.]

Gittin 45b: A sefer Torah written by a heretic must be burnt. Rashi: Because he certainly wrote it with idolatry in mind.

Rambam Yesodei Hatorah 6:8: One may not burn or erase a sefer Torah, but if it was written by a Jewish heretic, we burn it, including the names of Hashem, because he doesn’t believe in the holiness of Hashem and he did not write the name with Hashem in mind; he thinks the name is no different from any other word, so the name is not considered holy. And it is a mitzvah to burn it in order not to leave any reminder of the heretics or their actions.

אמר רב נחמן, נקטינן: ספר תורה שכתבו מין ־ ישרף. פירש”י ישרף־ דודאי לשם עבודת כוכבים כתבו.

רמב”ם הלכות יסודי התורה ו,ח: כתבי הקדש כולן ופירושיהן וביאוריהן אסור לשורפם או לאבדם ביד והמאבדן ביד מכין אותו מכת מרדות, במה דברים אמורים בכתבי הקדש שכתבם ישראל בקדושה אבל אפיקורוס ישראל שכתב ספר תורה שורפין אותו עם האזכרות שבו, מפני שאינו מאמין בקדושת השם ולא כתבו לשמו אלא שהוא מעלה בדעתו שזה כשאר הדברים והואיל ודעתו כן לא נתקדש השם, ומצוה לשורפו כדי שלא להניח שם לאפיקורוסים ולא למעשיהם.

It was early Shabbos afternoon in the basement of Shomrei Shabbos in Borough Park, where minyanim are held one after the other, every 20 minutes. In one particular minyan, the only kohein present was a man wearing a black hat who, the people said, was a mechalel Shabbos. The baal korei argued that this kohein should nevertheless be called up for the first aliyah because of the mitzvah of “v’kidashto” (sanctify the kohein by giving him the most honorable place), but the rest of the people there were against it. They pushed the baal korei and the mechalel Shabbos away from the sefer Torah by force, although he had already made the bracha, and called up a Yisrael.

Then someone said, “Wait a minute. This shul has a rav, Rabbi Yidel Tirnauer, who is upstairs right now giving a shiur. Why don’t we ask him what the shul’s policy is?” Two representatives went up to Rabbi Tirnauer and interrupted the shiur with this urgent question. The rav’s reply was, “They don’t have to call him up.”

[Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 3:12 and 22) rules that an atheist Jew may not get an aliyah, because to him saying the name of Hashem is just like saying any word, as the Rambam says regarding writing the name, and therefore his bracha is considered a bracha without Hashem’s name, which is not a bracha. If he does make a bracha, one may not answer amein. However, a Jew who believes in Hashem, but due to his desires or other pressures violates Shabbos, is allowed to get an aliyah. Still, Reb Moshe says that the aliyahs in the shul should be arranged such that he does not get an aliyah too often.

In OC 4:91:8 Reb Moshe adds that even if the mechalel Shabbos is a kohein, he should not be called. It seems he meant that even in the case when he believes in Hashem and can theoretically get an aliyah, one need not call him for kohein. Rabbi Tirnauer clearly followed this psak, saying that one need not call him (implying that occasionally, it is allowed to give him an aliyah if necessary, e.g. out of respect or appreciation).

In OC 2:50, Reb Moshe raises the question of whether Rashi disagrees with this ruling. Rashi says that the reason for burning the sefer Torah is because the heretic wrote it with idolatry in mind. If so, an atheist’s sefer Torah would not require burning, and perhaps his bracha is a bracha. (The logic would be that a name of Hashem recited without any intent – for Hashem or for an idol – is סתמן לשמה: it is automatically taken to mean Hashem.) However, Reb Moshe argues that in order to minimize the extent of the dispute between Rashi and the Rambam, we should say that Rashi only disagrees on the obligation to burn an atheist’s Torah. The Rambam gives the reason, “In order not to leave any reminder of the heretics or their actions,” and Rashi disagrees with this. But Rashi could still agree to the first half of the Rambam: that a name of Hashem written by a non-believer would have no holiness and one would be permitted (not obligated) to burn it. In Orach Chaim 215:10, the Mishnah Berurah cites a dispute between the Mechaber and the Gra as to whether one may answer amein after the bracha of an apikoros. In the Biur Halacha, he concludes that one should follow the Gra and answer amein, provided that he heard the entire bracha. Seemingly, this is against the ruling of Reb Moshe. But it may be that the apikoros in question there is someone who believes in Hashem but denies other principles of Judaism, whereas Reb Moshe is referring to an atheist.]

Gittin 53a: If someone damages property in an invisible manner (e.g. he makes someone else’s food tamei), if he does so accidentally he is exempt; but if it is intentional, he is liable. Chizkiyah said that, according to strict Torah law, he would be liable in both cases… Rabbi Yochanan said that according to Torah law, both are exempt, but the Sages made the intentional perpetrator liable so that people should not go around with impunity making other people’s food tamei.    

גיטין נג ע”א: אמר חזקיה: דבר תורה אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד ־ חייבֹ, מאי טעמא? היזק שאינו ניכר שמיה היזק, ומה טעם אמרו בשוגג פטור? כדי שיודיעו. אי הכי, אפילו במזיד נמיִ השתא לאוזוקי קא מכוין, אודועי לא מודע ליה? ור׳ יוחנן אמר: דבר תורה אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד ־ פטורֹ מאי טעמא? היזק שאינו ניכר לא שמיה היזק, ומה טעם אמרו במזיד חייב? שלא יהא כל אחד ואחד הולך ומטמא טהרותיו של חבירו, ואומר פטור אני.

Once, there was a shul that sold seats, charging a higher price for the seats closest to the east wall.  At that time, there was space between those seats and the wall. Later, the congregation grew, and the gabbai decided to install new benches in that space along the east wall. These seats were then sold for a high price.

Those who had bought the original eastern seats were now in the second row. They felt this was unfair, given the high price they had paid specifically to sit on “Mizrach Vant.” They argued that the new seats should be given to them, and the second row sold to the newcomers. The gabbai countered that they still had the exact seats they had paid for, so they had no right to complain. Unable to settle the dispute, they presented their arguments before a Rav.

The Rav thought for a while and then said, “Moshe changed the name of Hoshea bin Nun to Yehoshua. Where did he get the yud? The Gemara in Sanhedrin 107a, quoted by Rashi on Bereishis 17:5, says that when Hashem took the yud from Sarai and changed her name to Sarah, the yud complained for years, until finally Hashem added it to the name of Hoshea to make it Yehoshua. But we don’t find that the hei complained that it went from being the first letter to the second letter in Yehoshua’s name. From this we learn that when someone is added in front of you and you become second, you have no right to complain.”   

Source: Rabbi Shmuel Fishbain of White Lake

[According to the opinion that invisible damage is called damage (היזק שאינו ניכר שמיה היזק), the gabbai definitely caused their seats to go down in value and is therefore liable.

Even according to the opinion that invisible damage is not called damage (היזק שאינו ניכר לא שמיה היזק), which is how we pasken, perhaps here it is considered that the gabbai was מזיד – he intentionally devalued their seats.

Even if not, perhaps here it is considered visibly damaged (היזק ניכר) because there is now another row of seats in front.

Also, even if we say היזק שאינו ניכר לא שמיה היזק, here the people are considered to be renting their seats for life. They don’t actually own part of the shul; rather, they have a right to the seats closest to the Mizrach Vant every day for the rest of their lives. And since these are no longer the easternmost seats, the gabbai is not continuing to give them what they paid for.

As to the psak of the rav in the story, the response could be that we never find that being at the front of a tzaddik’s name is more valuable than being in the middle, whereas here, it was clear to all that the Mizrach Vant seats were more valuable.]

Gittin 77b: A man on his deathbed wrote a get for his wife on Friday afternoon, but did not manage to give it to her before Shabbos. On Shabbos day, he felt his end was near, so they asked Rava what to do. He said, “Go tell him to transfer to his wife ownership of the room where the get is lying, and let her go and close the door or open it, making a kinyan chazakah.”

Tosafos: Isn’t this similar to the case of the wife picking up her get from the ground, which is invalid because the husband must hand it to her? The answer is that since the get is coming from the domain of the husband to her domain, it is as if he handed it to her.

גיטין עז ע”ב: ההוא שכיב מרע דכתב לה גיטא לדביתהו בהדי פניא דמעלי שבתא ולא הספיק למיתביה לה, למחר תקף ליה עלמא, אתו לקמיה דרבא, אמר להו: זילו אמרו ליה ליקניה ניהלה לההוא דוכתא דיתיב ביה גיטא, ותיזל איהי ותיחוד ותפתח ותחזיק ביה.

תוס’: ולא הוי כמו טלי גיטיך מעל גבי קרקע דכיון שהגט בא מרשות הבעל לרשותה הוי כאילו נתנו לה.

It once happened in Brisk that a husband wanted to give his wife a get, but she was unwilling to accept it. So he devised a trick: he put the get in an envelope, dropped it on the table and said, “You got a letter from your brother.” She picked it up, opened it and discovered that it was a get. The dayan paskened that it was invalid because of “tli gitech” – the husband must hand the wife the get; she may not pick it up herself.

Reb Chaim, however, said it was not so simple. The envelope has the status of a room or courtyard, so when the husband transfers ownership to her, it is considered that he handed it to her; it makes no difference that the final act of acquisition was done by her, as in the Gemara on 77b. On the other hand, maybe here it is worse than the Gemara’s case, because she is picking up the get with her hand and can obtain it with kinyan yad (acquiring an object by virtue of hold it in one’s hand), even without the husband’s willingness to give her the envelope. This depends if kinyan yad works when there is a chatzitzah (something separating the object from the hand, in this case the envelope). Therefore, Reb Chaim concluded, the woman is sofek megureshes – she may or may not be divorced.  

Source: Rabbi Moshe Meiselman, shiur on Gittin

[Another version of this story appears in the new Chiddushei Hagrach Al Hashas, p. 246. There it does not mention that the wife was refusing the get. Also, it says that Reb Chaim’s sofek was about כליו של מוכר ברשות לוקח – whether a person can acquire an object by lifting or dragging it when it is inside a container that still belongs to the seller. This is an unresolved question in Bava Basra 85b. If she cannot acquire the get without owning the envelope, then she needs the husband to willingly give her the envelope, and it is considered as if he is handing her the get. If she can acquire the get without owning the envelope, that means she took the get herself without the husband’s giving.

The Imrei Moshe (end of Siman 21) brings this same version, and proceeds to question Reb Chaim’s logic. A get only needs to be in the wife’s hand, he says; no kinyan is necessary. So even if one cannot acquire an object while it is in the container belonging to the giver, here she is holding the get and does not need the husband’s willingness to grant her the envelope. Therefore the get should definitely be invalid.

Putting the two versions together, it emerges that there are two reasons to cast doubt on the validity of this get:

1) She picked up the get herself with kinyan yad.

2) Even if you say that kinyan yad doesn’t work due to the chatzitzah, she could be koneh the get with hagbo’oh. But that would depend (if the story took place in her house) on the question of keilav shel mocher.

According to the version that the wife was refusing the get, there is another question we could ask on Reb Chaim. What is the logic behind the possibility that the get was valid? Only because the husband had to be makneh to her the envelope, which is like a chatzer. But if she did not wish to acquire the get at all, the kinyan would not work. She picked it up and made the kinyan thinking it was a letter, but since it was actually a get, the kinyan was done on a false assumption and is therefore invalid.]  

Gittin 8b: Although it is prohibited to ask a non-Jew to do melachah on Shabbos, here for the sake of Yishuv Eretz Yisroel the Sages relaxed their decree.

Tosafos: But for any other mitzvah it is not allowed to ask a non-Jew to perform a Torah prohibition….

Certainly for the sake of Bris Milah it is allow to ask him to perform a Rabbinically prohibited act… but one cannot learn from here that it is allowed to ask a non-Jew to carry a sefer on Shabbos through a Rabbinically prohibited street, because only for Bris Milah, which itself pushes aside Shabbos, were they lenient.

Shulchan Aruch 307:5 quoting Rambam: It is permitted to ask a non-Jew to do an act of work that is Rabbinically prohibited, for the needs of a sick person, a great need (large loss) or a mitzvah. And some (Tosafos) disagree with this.

גיטין ח: אע”ג דאמירה לעובד כוכבים שבת משום ישוב ארץ ישראל לא גזרו רבנן. תוס’: אבל משום מצוה אחרת לא היינו מתירין אמירה לעובד כוכבים במלאכה דאוריית… ודאי איסורא דרבנן שרי בחצר שלא עירבו משום מצות מילה… ואין ללמוד מכאן היתר לומר לעובד כוכבים להביא ספר בשבת דרך כרמלית דלא דמי דדוקא משום מילה דהיא גופה דחיא שבת התירו.

שו”ע או”ח ש”ז ס”ה: דבר שאינו מלאכה ואינו אסור לעשותו בשבת אלא משום שבות מותר לישראל לומר לא״י לעשותו בשבת והוא שיהיה שם מקצת חולי או יהיה צריך לדבר צורך הרבה או מפני מצוה כיצד אומר ישראל לא״י בשבת לעלות באילן להביא שופר לתקוע תקיעת מצוה או להביא מים דרך חצר שלא עירבו לרחוץ בו המצטער ויש אוסרין.

One Friday night when Rabbi Yisroel Reisman was recently married and had just gotten semicha, his landlord asked him a shailah. He had the cholent fully cooked before Shabbos and his practice was to set the crockpot on a timer so that it would be off before the daytime meal when he removed the food from the pot. (Possibly he did this to avoid the prohibition of dishing food out from a pot that is currently standing on the fire – see Orach Chaim 318:18.) The problem was that just after Shabbos began, he realized that he had plugged the crockpot into the timer but forgotten to plug the timer into the wall. Could he call a goy to move the pot onto the blech?

Rabbi Reisman showed him that at the end of Siman 253, the Biur Halacha brings a dispute as to whether one may ask a non-Jew to re-heat solid food that was previously cooked. Most poskim hold it is forbidden, but the Pri Megadim says that since in general one may ask a non-Jew to do a D’rabbanan for the sake of Shabbos, here one should not rebuke one who is lenient. He also brings that the Shaarei Teshuva in 318 ruled leniently. The Biur Halacha concludes that one may rely on this for the sake of Shabbos. As soon as the landlord saw that, he said, “This is a case of great need,” and called in a non-Jew to move the pot.

Afterwards, Rabbi Reisman said, “I don’t know why that was such a desperate situation – you could have shared my cholent.” “No,” the man replied, “it was a desperate situation because this is the third time in the last few weeks that I’ve made this mistake, and those times I was strict about it and we ate cold cholent.  My wife was already mad at me, so imagine what she would have said this time!” Rabbi Reisman agreed that this was indeed a case of great need.