Author: YC

In preparation for a new volume of Read and Remember, I am collecting stories on halacha topics.
Nedarim

Nedarim 41a: Even a fly can kill

YCLeave a comment

Nedarim 41a: Said Rabbi Alexandri in the name of Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, and some say Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: When the end of a person’s life comes, anything can overpower him, as Kayin said to Hashem, “Anyone who finds me will kill me” (Bereishis 4:14). Rav derived this from a different posuk: “They stood for Your judgment today, for all are your servants” (Tehillim 119:92).

The Mefaresh explains: Anything can overpower him – even a fly or a mosquito.

The Ran explains: Once the verdict of Your judgment is that the person’s time has come to die, all things are Your servants to carry out the sentence. 

נדרים מא ע”א: וא״ר אלכסנדרי א״ר חייא בר אבא, ואמרי לה אריב״ל: כיון שהגיע קיצו של אדם הכל מושלים בו, שנאמר: (בראשית ד) והיה כל מוצאי יהרגני. רב אמר, מן הדין קרא: (תהלים קיט) למשפטיך עמדו היום כי הכל עבדיך.

One maggid shiur explained this Gemara with the Mefaresh’s comment by saying that the fly or mosquito might bite him and infect him with a deadly disease. But one of the listeners spoke up and said, “I can explain it based on my own experience. I once set out in my car and said Tefilas Haderech, and as I said the words, ‘Save us from dangerous animals on the road,’ I wondered to myself, why do we still say these words nowadays? Usually we’re traveling inside a car and the animals, if there are any, pose no risk. About a half hour later, I got my answer. A small fly entered my eye as I was speeding down the highway, and I lost control of the car and crashed. Miraculous, I emerged with only minor injuries. Then I understood that sometimes, the ‘dangerous animals’ can mean flies. Probably that is the meaning of the Gemara in Nedarim too: when there is a decree of death upon a person, even a fly or a mosquito can overpower him.”

Source: Meoros Hadaf Hayomi, Nedarim 41a (v. 3 p. 160)

[The listener’s explanation seems more correct than the maggid shiur’s. The Gemara is saying that anyone can be Hashem’s messenger to carry out a death sentence, even those creatures who aren’t usually harmful. If the meaning is as the maggid shiur said – that a mosquito infects him with malaria – that is the usual way of getting malaria. That does not illustrate how Hashem uses an unusual messenger. According to the listener, however, flies do not usually cause car accidents, so his story shows that anything can kill if that is Hashem’s decree.

Why does the Gemara bring a proof from Kayin? Because when Kayin said, “Anyone who finds me will kill me,” he was not afraid of any human avenger. Hevel had no children, and Adam and Chava would not kill their own son. Clearly, Kayin meant an animal sent by Hashem, because he thought that Hashem had decreed death upon him.]

Nedarim

Nedarim 8a: Is Daf Yomi a neder?

YCLeave a comment

Nedarim 8a: Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who says, ‘I will get up early tomorrow and learn this perek, or this masechta’ has vowed a great vow to the G-d of Israel.”

נדרים ח ע”א: ואמר רב גידל אמר רב: האומר אשכים ואשנה פרק זה, אשנה מסכתא זו ־ נדר גדול נדר לאלהי ישראל.

Rabbi Meir Shapiro proposed the Daf Yomi at the first Knessiah Gedolah of Agudath Israel, in Elul 5683 (1923). He had some trouble getting people to accept the idea. Before the opening session of the Knessiah, he presented the idea in a private meeting of the Moetzes. Some were concerned that people would not take it seriously, and would then have less respect for the Gedolei Yisroel after they proposed a revolutionary idea that was not accepted. Therefore they advised that Rabbi Meir Shapiro speak publicly and advance the idea himself.

Another one of the Moetzes members asked, “Suddenly every am haaretz is going to finish Shas and be considered a Shas Yid?” Reb Meir was caught off guard. He had not been expecting an objection like that. Luckily, Rabbi Menachem Ziemba spoke up in his defense and said, “A Yid who finishes Shas is already not called an am haaretz!”

Reb Meir still feared that as he was young and relatively unknown, people would not accept his idea. He met privately with the Chofetz Chaim and asked him to present the idea instead. The Chofetz Chaim replied, “No, you present it yourself. But I ask you to come to the session 20 minutes late.” When Reb Meir walked in, the hall was already packed. The Chofetz Chaim rose in his honor, and everyone else followed suit. After that unusual display of respect, everyone paid close attention to Reb Meir’s speech, and the Daf Yomi proposal was greeted with unexpected enthusiasm. It was decided that the Daf would begin with Berachos on Rosh Hashanah 5684 (1923).

There were many, however, who were afraid to start the Daf Yomi program because of the great responsibility of daily learning. What if they missed a day? Perhaps, they thought, starting the program would be considered a vow, as the Gemara says in Nedarim 8a, “Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who says, ‘I will get up early tomorrow and learn this perek, or this masechta’ has vowed a great vow to the G-d of Israel.” Also, the Gemara says in Sanhedrin 26b, “Thoughts can prevent a person from learning Torah,” which Rashi explains (in his second pshat) to mean that if a person plans ahead too confidently, saying that by such-and-such a date I will finish these masechtas, the plan will likely be unsuccessful. Rather, these people argued, better to simply learn with no stated quota.

These misgivings continued until the first day of Rosh Hashanah arrived, and the Gerrer Rebbe, the Imrei Emes, left his beis medrash after davening, saying, “Now I am going to learn the Daf Yomi!” Following the Rebbe’s example, thousands of Chassidim took upon themselves the Daf Yomi schedule, and thousands more Jews from all over the world followed suit, then and in the 14 cycles since then.

Source: Mayim Chaim – Biography of Rabbi Chaim Kreiswirth, pp. 90-94   

[The question of why one who misses the Daf one day is not considered to be transgressing a neder was left unanswered. Perhaps we could suggest an answer based on the rule of בנדרים הלך אחר לשון בני אדם – “When it comes to Nedarim, follow the language of people.” (Nedarim 49a and many other places). The words of a person’s vow legally mean what most people use them to mean. When most people say they are learning Daf Yomi, they mean that once in a while, they might miss a daf and make it up later.

Therefore, if someone makes his own private resolution to get up early and learn a certain daf, that is a neder as the Gemara says. But if someone joins the Daf, they are joining it with the intent of doing what the other Daf learners typically do.  

Thus in Elul 1923, everyone was afraid to be the first to accept the Daf, because there would be no precedent to base themselves on, and perhaps it would be a neder to learn every single day. But after Rosh Hashanah 1923, once the Gerrer Rebbe and his close Chassidim accepted it, others could accept it too and their words would mean whatever the Rebbe’s words meant – to learn it on most days.

Alternatively, we could say that the Gerrer Rebbe certainly said “bli neder” when accepting it, so it became the standard that anyone accepting the Daf meant bli neder, although he may not have said so explicitly.

As to the second quote, from the Rashi in Sanhedrin 26b, we could say that Rashi means that one who boasts about exactly how much he will learn is punished either because of his arrogance, or because of ayin hora. But in the case of Daf Yomi, once it was already accepted by many people, one who announces that he is joining is not displaying arrogance, neither does it cause ayin hora.]

Succah

Succah 51b: How high must a mechitzah be?

YCLeave a comment

Succah 51b: What was the “great improvement”? … Originally, during the Simchas Beis Hashoevah, the women sat inside the Ezras Nashim and the men sat outside. But the men and women began socializing (“kalus rosh”), so they reversed it: women on the outside and men on the inside. But still there was kalus rosh. Finally they built a balcony and made a rule that the women had to sit above and the men below. 

סוכה נא ע”ב: מאי תיקון גדול? ־ אמר רבי אלעזר: כאותה ששנינו, חלקה היתה בראשונה והקיפוה גזוזטרא, והתקינו שיהו נשים יושבות מלמעלה ואנשים מלמטה. תנו רבנן: בראשונה היו נשים מבפנים ואנשים מבחוץ, והיו באים לידי קלות ראש, התקינו שיהו נשים יושבות מבחוץ ואנשים מבפנים. ועדיין היו באין לידי קלות ראש. התקינו שיהו נשים יושבות מלמעלה ואנשים מלמטה.

It is well-known that the Baal Shem Tov said, “You are wherever your thoughts are.” Less known is that the Ramban says it too, and uses it to explain how an eiruv works.

In his commentary on Eiruvin 17b, the Ramban wonders: according to Rabbi Akiva who says that walking out of the 2000-amos techum is a Torah prohibition, how does an eiruv techumin work to circumvent it? If it were a Rabbinic prohibition, we would understand: Chazal created the prohibition so they have the right to make the exception. But if it’s D’oraisa, why should putting some food out on the road make that spot your starting point to measure the techum, while you sit at home, not even able to see that spot?

The Ramban proposes that either eiruv techumin is a Halacha L’moshe Misinai, or else it is a svara. The logic would be that since his mind is on that spot, he has made it his home. The Gemara says (Eiruvin 73a), “We are witnesses that if he were living there, he would be happier.” His thoughts make it his place of eating and sleeping, and therefore we measure his techum from there.

Fascinatingly, this concept came into play in the famous dispute between Rabbi Moshe Feinstein and the Satmar Rebbe over the required height of a mechitzah in shul. The source for a having a mechitzah is the Gemara in Succah about the women’s balcony constructed in the Beis Hamikdash during the Simchas Beis Hashoevah, and their dispute hinged on whether that balcony’s purpose was to prevent mingling, or to block the men’s view of the women.

Central to the debate was an apparent contradiction in the Rambam between his Commentary on the Mishnah and his Yad Hachazaka. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam says:

תיקון גדול ר”ל גדול התועלת והוא כי העם היו מתקנים מקום לאנשים ומקום לנשים ומקום הנשים למעלה ממקום האנשים כדי שלא יסתכלו האנשים בנשים.

“The place for the women was above the place of the men, in order that the men would not gaze at the women.”

But in Hilchos Lulav 8:12 he writes:

ערב יום טוב הראשון היו מתקנין במקדש מקום לנשים מלמעלה ולאנשים מלמטה כדי שלא יתערבו אלו עם אלו.

“On Erev Yom Tov, they would prepare in the Temple a place for the women above and the men below, in order that they should not mingle with each other.”

The Rambam says this again in Hilchos Beis Habechirah 5:9, and it is actually an explicit Mishnah in Midos 2:5 that the balcony was there so that the men and women should not mingle.

Based on this, Reb Moshe argues that the mechitzah is to prevent mingling, socializing and touching, not seeing, and therefore in our shuls, an upstairs gallery need not be blocked off from vision by a wall, and an ezras nashim on the same level with the men need not have a mechitzah higher than shoulder height.

In a second teshuva written to support the first one, he stresses that gazing deliberately at women, whether in shul or anywhere, is forbidden; however, the mechitzah in shul is not there to prevent people from doing aveiros. Everyone is responsible to guard his own eyes. The mechitzah is there because it’s a Torah obligation for a shul or any place of public gathering to have one. Indeed, were it not a Torah obligation, it would not have been allowed to add it to the Beis Hamikdash, every aspect of which was dictated by nevuah.

How then does Reb Moshe explain the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah where he says the balcony was built to prevent gazing? He proves that the Rambam cannot mean to prevent people from doing the aveirah of gazing, because: 1) Even after the balcony was built, the women were visible, and 2) Before they built the balcony too, Chazal had the women sit on the inside and men on the outside without any partition between them, so they were clearly not concerened about blocking visibility. They changed this setup only after they saw that it led to kalus rosh – socializing and touching. Therefore, the Rambam must mean that looking at the women was leading to mingling, and that is why a balcony was built – to prevent mingling.

The Satmar Rebbe, on the other hand, says that a mechitzah must block the women from view, and he bases himself on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah. How does the Satmar Rebbe explain the Rambam in Yad Hachazakah and the Mishnah in Midos, which say that the problem is mingling? He answers that when men gaze at women and think about them, it is considered as if they were physically there among the women. This is based on two sources: the Ramban in Eiruvin quoted above, and also the concept of בני ערבוביא – literally, “children born from a mixture” (Nedarim 20b). According to the Tur, this refers to a man who lives with his wife while his mind is on another woman. We see that they are called a mixture, even though physically they may be far apart, since his mind is on her.

Thus, the “kalus rosh” and “taaruves” mentioned in the Gemara as the impetus for building the women’s balcony really means that the men were gazing at the women. They solved this problem by making a balcony with a solid fence around it so that the women would not be visible. In our shuls too, the mechitzah must be high enough to block vision.

Sources: Igros Moshe OC 1:39-40, Teshuvos Divrei Yoel 1:10

[Rabbi Aharon Rubenstein brought a proof to Reb Moshe from the Ramban on Parshas Ki Savo, on the words ארור אשר לא יקים את דברי התורה הזאת, who quotes a Yerushalmi that explains this to refer to lifting up the Sefer Torah in shul. The Ramban adds that the writing in the Torah should be shown to every man and woman in the shul. If the mechitzah were higher than the women’s heads, how would they see the Sefer Torah?

However, even the Satmar Rebbe surely agreed that the women at the Simchas Beis Hashoeva were able to see the dancing, although the men could not see them. It must be that the fence around the balcony in the Beis Hamikdash was built with curtains or holes through which the women could look. Here too, in shul, the mechitzah could be the same way so that the women could see the Sefer Torah.

The Satmar Rebbe also quotes an opinion (the Teshuras Shai, Rabbi Shlomo Yehuda Tabak, dayan of Sighet) who said that the women should not be able to see the men. The Satmar Rebbe disagrees with this, citing the Simchas Beis Hashoeva and also the fact that there is no historical precedent for this. So the Satmar Rebbe clearly agrees that the women could see through the mechitzah, and thus see the Sefer Torah as well. (The question from the Ramban would be a problem for the Teshuras Shai. So would the poskim quoted by the Mishnah Berurah at the end of Siman 88 who say that a niddah should not look at the Sefer Torah – implying that other women do look.]

Chullin

Chullin 110a: Not Inviting Yourself Out

YCLeave a comment

Chullin 110a: Rami bar Dikuli from Pumbedisa came to Sura on Erev Yom Kippur. All the people took their udders and threw them out. He went and picked them up and ate them. They brought him before Rav Chisda, who asked him: “Why did you do that?” He said, “I am from the place of Rav Yehuda, who eats udders.”

 רמי בר תמרי, דהוא רמי בר דיקולי מפומבדיתא, איקלע לסורא במעלי יומא דכפורי, אפקינהו כולי עלמא לכחלינהו שדינהו, אזל איהו ־ נקטינהו אכלינהו, אייתוה לקמיה דרב חסדא, אמר ליה: אמאי תעביד הכי? אמר ליה: מאתרא דרב יהודה אנא, דאכיל. אמר ליה: ולית לך נותנין עליו חומרי המקום שיצא משם וחומרי המקום שהלך לשם? אמר ליה: חוץ לתחום אכלתינהו. ובמה טויתינהו? אמר ליה: בפורצניֹ. ודלמא מיין נסך הויא? אמר ליה: לאחר שנים עשר חדש הווֹ. ודלמא דגזל הוה? אמר ליה: יאוש בעלים הוה, דקדחו בהו חילפיֹ. חזייה דלא הוה מנח תפילין, אמר ליה: מאי טעמא לא מנחת תפילין? אמר ליה: חולי מעיין הוא, ואמר רב יהודה חולי מעיין ־ פטור מן התפיליןֹ.

Rabbi Chaim Shmulevitz often surprised his listeners with unusual sources for his principles of mussar.  A classic example of Rav Chaim’s mussar analyses of maamarei Chazal draws from the Gemara in Chullin 110a, which relates how Rami bar Dekuli of Pumbedisa was once visiting Sura on Erev Yom Kippur. When the townspeople threw away the udders of animals they had slaughtered for the Erev Yom Kippur feast, he collected them and ate them, in spite of the fact that there was a custom in Sura not to eat the udders of animals. Rami bar Dekuli was brought before Rav Chisda who asked him many questions about how, why and when he cooked and ate the udders. In the course of the discussion, Rav Chisda also asked why Rami bar Dekuli was not wearing tefillin, and he replied that he suffered from a stomach ailment.

Reb Chaim spent a long time explaining every single detail of the story. When he finished, the audience still could not work out the connection between the Gemara he was quoting and the rest of the shmuess. Finally, after a short pause, Reb Chaim continued:

“I am troubled by a very difficult question. Rav Chisda asked Rami bar Dekuli many questions, but one question he did not ask him: A Jew is suffering from a stomach ailment on Erev Yom Kippur. Why is he searching for discarded animal udders in garbage cans? In every Jewish home, people are sitting around the table eating the festive meal of Erev Yom Kippur. Why didn’t Rami bar Dekuli knock on somebody’s door? It seems that one does not ask such a question, for Rav Chisda understood very clearly the meaning of the words, אל תצטרך לבריות – do not take handouts from other people.”  

Source: The Rosh Yeshiva, p. 185; Sichos Mussar p. 29.

Bava Kama

Bava Kama 71a: Money Earned on Shabbos

YCLeave a comment

Bava Kama 71a: If one cooked on Shabbos, if he did so out of forgetfulness, he may eat the food, but if he did so deliberately, he may not eat the food. This is Rabbi Meir’s view, but Rabbi Yehuda says, if he did so out of forgetfulness, he may eat the food only after Shabbos, but if he did so deliberately, he may never eat the food.

Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 318:1: If one cooked on Shabbos, if he did so deliberately, it is forbidden to him forever, but others may eat it immediately after Shabbos. If he did so out of forgetfulness, then it is forbidden for everyone during Shabbos and permitted after Shabbos even to him.

בבא קמא עא ע”א: המבשל בשבת, בשוגג ־ יאכל, במזיד ־ לא יאכל, דברי ר״מֹ רבי יהודה אומר: בשוגג ־ יאכל במוצאי שבת, במזיד ־ לא יאכל עולמיתֹ רבי יוחנן הסנדלר אומר: בשוגג ־ יאכל למוצאי שבת לאחרים ולא לו, במזיד ־ לא יאכל עולמית לא לו ולא לאחרים.

שו”ע או”ח שי”ח ס”א: המבשל בשבת במזיד אסור לו לעולם ולאחרים מותר למוצאי שבת מיד ובשוגג אסור בו ביום גם לאחרים ולערב מותר גם לו מיד:

An avreich from France who learns in Kollel Chazon Ish in Bnei Brak gave up a yerushah of tens of millions of euros due to the fact that some of the money was earned through chillul Shabbos.

According to the report, the avreich’s 80-year-old father, a French millionaire who owns about 20 luxury hotels, recently closed a huge business deal, and together with his two brothers, arranged a new will for his increased fortune. The father himself is Shomer Shabbos but some of his relatives are not.

All the heirs, including the avreich, were asked to sign the will. The avreich asked Rabbanim in Eretz Yisrael and France about accepting the money tainted by Chillul Shabbos and was told that despite the huge personal loss, he can’t accept the money.

Several of his relatives tried to come up with legal or business loopholes to allow him to receive the money but he decided to simply forgo the yerusha.

The avreich sent a detailed letter to his father explaining the reasoning behind his refusal to sign the will and his father accepted his son’s decision with great admiration and pride.

Source: https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-stories/2131456/kiddush-hashem-avreich-gives-up-yerushah-of-tens-of-millions-of-euros.html

[It is not stated which rabbis he asked, but we can raise several questions on this psak.

  1. Something produced on Shabbos is permitted to everyone after Shabbos, except to the violator himself (Shulchan Aruch 318:1). 
  2. He could have used 6/7 of the money, the part that was not earned on Shabbos.
  3. It is allowed to have benefit from the value of the item produced on Shabbos (Mishnah Berurah 318:4). Since money is exchangeable, the money this avreich would receive should not be considered “the same money” earned through work on Shabbos.]

A similar story was told about a Jewish family who came to the United States in the days of the 6-day workweek. The father kept losing his job because he refused to work on Shabbos, and the family was evicted from their apartment. The superintendent of the building next door had mercy on the family and allowed them to stay in the cellar, where the coal for the furnace was kept. Soon their skin turned black from the dust of the coal. One day, the children were playing on the sidewalk when a wealthy Jewish man walked by. He beheld a strange sight: black children were speaking Yiddish! He stopped and asked where they lived, and they led him down to the basement. At that moment the mother and father were not there, but he saw the dirty floor on which they slept and the coal box that served as their tables. His heart filled with sorrow for their plight, he placed $500 on the table for them. Just then, the mother walked in and looked him up and down. “Are you shomer Shabbos?” she asked. “Well,” said the man, “I used to be shomer Shabbos back in Europe, but it was too hard to keep Shabbos in America.”

At this, the mother said, “We are living this way because we keep Shabbos. We aren’t interested in money from someone who does not keep Shabbos.” 

The man was so impressed that he began to keep Shabbos too. And eventually Hashem helped and the poor family got back on their feet. Both families had children who went on to be among the gedolei Torah in America.

When the above story was told to Rabbi Chaim Kreiswirth, he responded with the posuk at the beginning of Shir Hashirim, אל תראוני שאני שחרחורת – “Do not look at me as black, for the sun has scorched me.”

Source: Mayim Chaim, p. 438

[In this story, the second argument above – that 6/7 of the money was earned without chilul Shabbos – does not apply. The man had become wealthy only by being mechalel Shabbos, otherwise he would have been rolling from one menial job to the next.  But today, these wealthy hotel owners could have made their millions without chilul Shabbos, for example, by owning the hotels in partnership with a non-Jew.   As to the first argument, that something produced through chillul Shabbos is allowed for everyone except the violator himself, here also an argument can be made that if the wealthy man knew that his donation would be accepted, he might continue to work on Shabbos with them (or others in a similar situation) in mind.]

Bava Metzia

Bava Metzia 61b: The Return of Interest

YCLeave a comment

Bava Metzia 61b: Rabbi Elazar said: If interest was paid pursuant to an agreement ahead of time, Beis Din can force the lender to return it. But if it was Rabbinically prohibited interest, Beis Din cannot force him.  Rabbi Yochanan said: Even when interest was paid pursuant to an agreement ahead of time, Beis Din cannot force him to return it.  

Bava Metzia 65b: The halacha is like Rabbi Elazar.  

ב”מ סא ע”ב: אמר רבי אלעזר: רבית קצוצה ־ יוצאה בדיינין, אבק רבית ־ אינה יוצאה בדיינין. רבי יוחנן אמר: אפילו רבית קצוצה נמי אינה יוצאה בדיינין.

ושם בדף סה ע”ב: והלכתא כרבי אלעזר.

Alan, president of an established ladies’ wear corporation, needed a loan to operate his business. He approached his brother-in-law Sam for a $750,000 loan, and although Sam was at first reluctant, he eventually transferred the entire sum. The two agreed on a six percent annual interest rate, which was to be paid in installments over a five-year period. Alan lived up to the terms of the agreement and paid back the entire principal, including $120,000 in interest. Taking the loan proved to be a wise decision, as Alan’s business was once again stable, and the future seemed very promising. Not too long after he finished paying off the loan in full, Alan attended a Torah class in which the topic of the prohibition of collecting interest was discussed. The rabbi teaching the class noted that in many instances a borrower retains the right to recover the interest he paid via a Jewish court of law. Alan approached Sam seeking to recover the $120,000 in interest he paid. However, Sam rejected the claim. Sam explained that he had forfeited earnings from his previous investment, totaling at least the annual percentage he charged Alan, and brought to his attention that he had graciously lent him a very large sum with no guarantee.

The two went before the Bet Din of Aram Soba in Jerusalem. The Rosh Bet Din, Rabbi Max Sutton, asked Alan, “Did you accept personal liability for the loan? If your company had been unsuccessful, would you have repaid the loan from your own money?”

“No,” said Alan, “it was understood that the loan was for my business only, and payments were to be made from my business account. If the business failed, I would not be held personally responsible.”

“If so,” said Rabbi Sutton, “Sam has no obligation to return the interest. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:63) says that one may charge interest to a corporation (e.g. a Jewish owned bank that pays interest to its depositors). The rationale behind this ruling is that since the owner is not personally liable in the event of bankruptcy, the prohibition of interest is not applicable. A borrower is defined by Torah law as someone who has personal liability to repay a debt.

“Furthermore, even the halachic opinions that disagree with Reb Moshe and prohibit lending with interest to a corporation, agree that the prohibition is reduced to a Rabbinical violation. As a general rule, interest collected in violation of Rabbinical law is not subject to return after it is paid to the lender. Hence even according to the more stringent view, Sam is exempt from returning the interest he collected.”  

[Community Magazine, December 2022, p. 48]

[Those who disagree with Reb Moshe actually fall into two categories: Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank held that it is ossur mid’oraysa for a corporation to pay or receive interest (Har Tzvi 126). R’ Tzvi Pesach permits it only in the case of a government-owned bank, because that is similar to a charity fund where the principal stays invested and the poor are supported from the interest. This case is mentioned by the Maharit, brought in the Mishneh Lamelech, end of chapter 4 of Hilchos Malveh V’loveh. Since the poor people do not have rights to the principal itself, it belongs to no one, and therefore it may pay or receive interest. So too in the case of a government-owned bank, no individual person has rights to the money, and therefore it may pay or receive interest. This actually goes a step further than Reb Moshe does in the case of a corporation, where he permits it only to pay interest, not to receive.

The Minchas Yitzchok 4:16 (p. 42) brings the Rogatchover Gaon who says the same as Reb Moshe: that a corporation may pay interest (his actual words are אין זה רבית בבאנק על פי דין תורה, which may mean it is permitted for the bank to pay interest, or receive, or both). The Rogatchover proves this from Bava Kama 93 where it says that a shomer (guardian) who was negligent in guarding tzedakah money does not have to pay, unless the poor have set allowances they receive from the money. This shows that “tzedaka” is not an owner, and by the same token it is allowed for a tzedaka fund to lend or borrow with interest.

According to this opinion, the Minchas Yitzchok argues, a Jew taking out a loan from a Jewish-owned bank to purchase a house can simply create a corporation and buy the house with the loan under the corporation’s name.

However, he says, if the proof rests on the analogy to lending tzedaka money, the Radvaz (1:414) says that if the fund is for the poor of this city only, although they don’t have set allowances, then it is considered that the fund has owners and it is forbidden to lend it on interest. Here, the stockholders have the right to demand their money, so in a way they are even stronger owners than the poor are in the tzedaka fund.  Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch (YD 160:18) rules that even with money of the poor that has no owner, only Rabbinic interest can be collected, not Torah interest.

The Bet Din in this story may have understood that the reason why it is allowed to lend the tzedaka fund on Rabbinic interest is because even regular interest on this type of loan is only Rabbinic, thus if the interest is Rabbinic it is two D’rabanans. If so, then even if a corporation lent out money with Ribbis D’Oraisa, it would be downgraded to a Rabbinic prohibition and the interest would not be claimable.]

Eiruvin

Eiruvin 44b A Human Wall

YCLeave a comment

Eiruvin 44b: One may form a wall out of people to permit carrying on Shabbos, but only if the people don’t realize they are being used as a wall. Once, Rava had some bottles that were lying in the street of Mechuza. As Rava walked home from his shiur, surrounded by talmidim, his assistants picked them up and carried them inside. Next Shabbos, they wanted to carry them in again, but he forbade them, because it was as if the people knew.

עירובין מד ע”ב: כאן לדעת, כאן שלא מדעת… הנהו זיקי דהוה שדיין בריסתקא דמחוזא, בהדי דאתא רבא מפירקיה אעלינהו ניהליה. לשבתא אחריתי בעי עיילינהו. ־ ואסר להו, דהוה ליה כלדעת, ואסור.

The Gerrer Rebbe once left a rare sefer in shul, and on Shabbos he wished to bring it home. So he told his gabbaim to announce that he would be walking home at a certain time. The Chassidim came to greet him, forming two lines along the street. The Rebbe, with the sefer hidden in his pocket, walked between the lines all the way to his house.

Source: R’ Eli Stefansky

Bechoros

Bechoros 19b: Giving an incentive to declare it treif

YCLeave a comment

Bechoros 19b: If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and does not know if it has ever given birth in the past…

Bechoros 21b: If one buys an animal from a Jew, and the Jew does not tell him whether the animal has previously given birth, and now it gives birth, is the baby a bechor? Rav said: It is certainly a bechor, because if the animal had previously given birth, the seller would have boasted about it.

Taz Yoreh Deah 316:4: If a non-Jew is selling a cow and the Jew tells him that the younger it is, the more he will pay for it, and the non-Jew says it has already had four calves, he is believed, because if it had been a cow that never gave birth, he would have said so, for his own gain.

בכורות יט ע”ב: הלוקח בהמה מן העובד כוכבים, ואינו יודע אם ביכרה אם לא ביכרה וכו’

בכורות כא ע”ב: איתמר. מצינו לוקח מעובד כוכבים, לוקח מישראל מאי? אמר רב: בכור ודאי, דאם איתא דבכרה ־ אישתבוחי הוה מישתבח ליה.

Rav Yisroel Belsky once allowed a kashrus agency to rely on non-Jewish workers in checking eggs for blood spots by offering a financial reward to the workers for every egg that they found containing a blood spot.  Eventually, the innovation was discontinued. Apparently, one of the company workers was a diabetic who carried around a lancet.  The incidence of blood found in eggs was significantly higher during this period. 

Source: https://vinnews.com/2022/11/24/adrianna-the-non-jewish-nanny-and-halacha/

Yuma

Yuma 87a: Asking Mechilah for Lashon Hara

YCLeave a comment

Yuma 87a: One who angers his friend, even with words, must apologize to him.

יומא פז ע”א: אמר רבי יצחק: כל המקניט את חבירו, אפילו בדברים ־ צריך לפייסו.

When R’ Yisroel Meir Hakohein published his sefer Chofetz Chaim, he brought it to various gedolim for haskamos. R’ Yisroel Salanter told him, “Leave your sefer with me, and I will read it and decide.” When he returned, R’ Yisroel said, “You write (4:12) that if one person spoke lashon hara against another, and that person ended up being harmed by it (i.e. the listeners believed the lashon hara and acted on it), he must come to him to ask forgiveness, and if the victim doesn’t know about it, he must tell him what he said about him and ask forgiveness. I don’t understand – just because he wants to do teshuva, does that give him the right to pain his friend even more by telling him what he said about him?” The Chofetz Chaim replied, “I took this halacha from Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuva 207.”

They discussed the Rabbeinu Yonah, but still could not agree.

The Chofetz Chaim then asked R’ Yisroel to write him a haskamah and specify that his approval is on everything except this halacha. R’ Yisroel replied, “I’m afraid not, because there are some people who don’t read the full haskamah, and would just see my approval, and I would be guilty of causing others to sin (lifnei iver).” So the Chofetz Chaim left without a haskamah.

Rav Moshe Sternbuch shlita heard from Rav Dessler in the name of Reb Yisroel Salanter that in such a case, one should ask mechilah in general for anything he did, not telling the person exactly what it was.

Sources: Az Nidberu 7:66 and Moadim Uzmanim 1:54, Dirshu notes on Sefer Chofetz Chaim, quoting the sefer Meir Einei Yisroel v. 6 p. 353.

[We are left wondering: What did Reb Yisroel Salanter do with the proof from Rabbeinu Yonah? Let’s look at Rabbeinu Yonah inside:

אם ישוב בעל הלשון בתשובה צריך לבקש מחילה לאשר מוצק לו מזעם לשונו, והוא לא יזכור מספר כלם, כי רבים מכאובים הכאיב וכמה נפשות הדאיב, גם רבים מאשר זכר, כי אותם עכר, והם לא ידעו כי הדיח עליהם את הרעה, יתבייש להודיעם ולגלות אזנם על אשר גמלם רעה, כי הוא מכה ואין מכתו ידועה, כענין שנאמר (תהלים קכ): ״מה יתן לך ומה יוסיף לך לשון רמיה חצי גבור שנונים״, על כן נמשל לשון הרע לחץ, כי המושך בקשת פעמים רבות ישלח חציו באדם ולא נודע מי הכהו.

“If the speaker of lashon hara wishes to repent, he must ask forgiveness from whomever he has harmed with his angry tongue, and he will not remember all his victims, for he has caused many wounds and pained many souls. Also, in many cases, even where he does remember harming others, they may not know that he brought misfortune upon them, and he will be embarrassed to tell them that he did harm to them. For lashon hara is a wound that is not recognizable, as it states in Tehillim (120:3-4), ‘What further safeguard could one give or add to a cunning tongue? It is like the sharp arrows of a warrior.’ This is why lashon hara is compared to an arrow: for when one draws his bow, he will often shoot arrows at a person without the person knowing who shot him.”

It’s clear from the analogy to the arrow that Rabbeinu Yonah is talking about a case where the victim already knows that someone has spread lashon hara about him, only he doesn’t know who spread it.  In that case, Reb Yisroel would agree that the speaker stepping forward and confessing won’t cause the victim any additional pain.

However, what about a case where the victim suffered a loss (e.g. his shidduch was broken off, or he was denied a job) but never knew the real reason why? He might have assumed until now that it was because the girl simply didn’t like him, or the boss found a more capable candidate. But when the speaker confesses, he will find out that negative information was spread about him. That’s where Reb Yisroel held he shouldn’t tell him.

But the Chofetz Chaim says that even in this case one must tell him, as is clear from his words:

ואפילו אם חבירו אינו יודע עדיין כלל מזה צריך לגלות לו מה שעשה נגדו שלא כדין ולבקש ממנו מחילה על זה, כיון שהוא יודע שעל ידו נסבב לו דבר זה.

“And even if the other person does not yet know anything about this, he must reveal to him what he did against him in violation of halacha, and ask him forgiveness for it, since he knows that he was the cause of harm to the other person.”

So the Chofetz Chaim actually went a step beyond Rabbeinu Yonah, and it was in this step beyond that Reb Yisroel did not agree with him and therefore refused to grant him a haskamah.

So what does their disagreement hinge upon? Let’s remember: Reb Yisroel made two arguments: 1) Why should your doing teshuva give you the right to hurt him? Better suffer without a mechilah rather than hurt him. 2) It really is possible to get mechilah without hurting him, by asking in general without specifying the sin.

The Chofetz Chaim disagreed with both of those arguments. On 1), he held that although it would cause the victim pain, he would still rather know what was said about him. A person does not want to be ignorant, even when knowledge is painful. Not only that, but sometimes it could be useful to know; he might take steps to correct the fault that people found in him. Reb Yisroel, on the other hand, may have held that a person would rather remain ignorant of painful information. Alternatively, he held that even if the victim himself would rather know, from the speaker’s standpoint, it would be wrong to disturb his ignorance and cause him pain.  

On 2), the Chofetz Chaim held that mechilah without knowing the extent of the offense is like a mekach taus – a transaction on false pretenses. Let’s say A owes B a million dollars and B forgot about it, and A goes to B and says, “If I owe you some money, are you mochel?” and B says yes, that mechilah is invalid. Reb Yisroel, on the other hand, looked at mechilah as a tenai, a condition. The sinner doesn’t owe anything to his victim. It’s Hashem who punishes, not the victim. You have to do teshuva to Hashem. Except that Hashem makes a condition and says, “For sins against your fellow man, I will take off the punishment only if you obtain mechilah from the victim.” For this purpose, a mechilah without knowledge of the crime is also a mechilah.

Another approach to the second dispute is that the Chofetz Chaim held that the purpose of asking mechilah is to humble oneself and feel embarrassed for one’s sin. Asking mechilah without specifying the sin does not fulfill that purpose, because the small amount of embarrassment it takes to do that is not commensurate with the gravity of the sin. Reb Yisroel held that a little embarrassment is also enough; it need not be commensurate with the sin.

One cannot say that Reb Yisroel also agreed that a general mechilah does not work, and still he held that the speaker of the lashon hara must forego his mechilah in order not to cause the other person pain. For if then, what would be the purpose in asking for a general mechilah if it doesn’t accomplish anything?

However, we could learn that Reb Yisroel was uncertain of whether a general mechilah works, so he said one should ask for a general mechilah just in case it works. If it doesn’t work, then too bad – the sinner must forego his mechilah. Alternatively, he held there are two dinim – two reasons for asking forgiveness: the embarrassment, and the tenai, as outlined above. Both are true. In this case, where the sinner cannot achieve one, he might as well get the other.]

Yevamos

Yevamos 40a: An Incentive for Chalitzah

YCLeave a comment

Yevamos 40a: One who performs chalitzah has no special status in inheriting the deceased brother’s property; he is like any other brother.

יבמות מ ע”א: החולץ ליבמתו הרי הוא כאחד מן האחין לנחלה.

Rabbi Avrohom Yehoshua Heshel, the Ohev Yisroel, was known as the Apter Rav. Actually, he only served as rav of Apta for 8 years. The rest of his rabbinic career was spent in other cities: before Apta he was rav of Kalbisov, and after Apta he went to Yasi and Mezhbizh. When he announced to the town of Apta that he was leaving, the townspeople were upset and asked him, “Why? Is the rav not satisfied with his salary? When you came to our town, you asked for an unusually high salary, and we have been paying it with no complaints. And the salary you will receive in your new position will be lower.”   

The Apter Rav replied: I will explain with a story. Once there were two brothers who were orphaned at a young age. They went to live in different towns with different families, and had little contact with each other. They each grew up and married, but neither was blessed with children. One brother became wealthy, while the other struggled in poverty. The wealthy brother, who lived in Apta, became ill and felt his end was near. He called over his wife and told her, “You must know that I have a brother and his name is Shmuel, but I don’t know where he lives. When I die, you will need to get chalitzah from him. When he comes here and gives you chalitzah, give him a sizable portion of the money I am leaving you.”

After he passed away, the widow went to the rav of Apta and told him what her husband had said. The rav sent letters to all the surrounding towns asking if there was someone by that name, and the brother was eventually located. The rav of his town said to him, “Go to Apta and give chalitzah to your brother’s widow. And know that there is a large sum of money waiting for you there.” Reb Shmuel went home and told his wife, Bassheva, the news. “Now we will no longer be poor!” he said.  But Bassheva said to him, “Look at the amazing, rare mitzvah that Hashem has sent our way! Go and give the chalitzah, but I have one request: Do not accept any money for this mitzvah. I want you to do the mitzvah completely l’shem shamayim!” Her husband agreed. Just to be sure, she made him swear to her that he would not take a penny.

Reb Shmuel came to Apta and gave chalitzah. The widow then offered him a sack of money containing half of her husband’s wealth. But he steadfastly refused to accept it. She asked the rav what to do – how could she fulfill her late husband’s request, when the brother would not take the money? The rav advised, “Give the money to the Kehillah treasury instead.” 

In heaven the angels could not contain their excitement and danced for joy. Such a powerful love for a mitzvah this couple had, that they gave up their only chance to be wealthy! The Heavenly Court decided that they would be blessed with a son in their old age.

“I am that son,” the Apter Rav concluded. “And the reason I asked for a high rabbinical salary was because I wanted to collect my inheritance from the Apta kehillah treasury. Now that I have finished collecting it, I am moving to a different town.”

Source: Kindline Yiddish Magazine, Parshas Ki Savo 5782, based on a story told by Rabbi Leibish Langer

[The obvious question here is that this was not payment for the mitzvah; the brother of the deceased inherits all the money in any case, since there was no father or any other brothers. The answer may be that the widow’s kesubah takes precedence over inheritance, and in this case her kesubah was more than half of the husband’s fortune. Thus, some or all of the sack of money was not rightfully the brother’s inheritance, and he would only have been accepting it as payment for the mitzvah.

In fact, the idea of paying him for the chalitzah was not the dying husband’s own; it is a takanah, brought by the Rema in Even Ho’ezer 163:2.

וכל זה מדינא אבל הקהילות תקנו תקנה אם יתרצו היבם והיבמה בחליצה יחלוקו כל הנכסים שהניח ואפילו אינה מגיע החצי לכדי כתובה וכו’ ואותו החצי שמגיע לחלק יורשי הבעל נוטל החולץ ואין לאב ולא לשאר אחין חלק בו אפילו תפסו מוציאין מידן דעיקר התקנה היתה כדי שיתרצו בחליצה ולכן החולץ עיקר בזה.

“The above (that the brother giving chalitzah is like any other brother) is the original law. But the Kehillos enacted that if the widow and her husband’s brother agree to chalitzah, they split up all the property left by the dead husband equally, even if her kesubah amount was more than half of it. The brother giving chalitzah takes the entire half; his father and brothers have no share in it. Even if they seize it, we take it away from them, because this takanah was made as an incentive for the brother to agree to do chalitzah, and therefore the brother giving chalitzah takes all.”

Thus, since the money was rightfully the widow’s and was being given to Reb Shmuel only to motivate him to agree to do chalitzah, as per the above Rema, Reb Shmuel and his wife declared, “We don’t need any incentive to do a mitzvah; we love to do mitzvos.”]