Author: YC

In preparation for a new volume of Read and Remember, I am collecting stories on halacha topics.
Bava Kama

Bava Kama 27a: Drinking contact lenses

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Bava Kama 27a: If you place a vessel in the street, and someone comes and trips over it and breaks it, he is exempt from paying. Shmuel said: This rule was stated when he tripped at night.

בבא קמא כז ע”א: המניח את הכד ברה״ר, ובא אחר ונתקל בה ושברה ־ פטור… שמואל אמר: באפילה שנו.

A yeshiva bochur came to his dorm room later at night, very thirsty. Seeing a glass on the table, he filled it with water and drank it. He noticed a bitter taste, but didn’t think much of it at the time. In the morning, one of his roommates remarked with annoyance, “Where are my contact lenses?” Apparently they had been in the glass, soaking in lens solution. “I drank them,” said the bochur sheepishly. The roommate was very upset. “They cost me $200! You have to pay me for the damage,” he said.  

They presented the shailah to Rav Chaim Kanievsky, who said, “You need to pay. Although it was an accident, the Gemara says אדם מועד לעולם בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצוןִ – a man is liable for any damage he causes, even if done unknowingly or accidentally (Sanhedrin 72a). Furthermore, in this case you noticed the bitter taste of the lens solution, and this should have alerted you to stop drinking before he swallowed the actual lenses.” But he advised them to ask his father-in-law, Rav Elyashiv to see if he agreed with the psak.

Rav Elyashiv did not agree, for three reasons: 1) It was not done as an act of damage, but as an act of drinking. 2) It didn’t even occur to the bochur that the cup contained contact lenses. 3) The owner of the contact lenses was at fault for placing such a valuable item in a regular glass, on a table which was meant for their common use.

Source: Divrei Siach, Bemishnasam shel Rabboseinu Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and Rav Chaim Kanievsky, published on Rav Elyashiv’s first yahrtzeit, p. 34

[Rav Elyashiv considered this case similar to tripping over a pot in the street at night. Pots are not usually in the street, and he could not see it well. Here too, contacts are not usually placed in a regular glass on a table, and he could not see them.

Furthermore, Rav Elyashiv may have meant the Gemara in Bava Kama 62a, in which a man kicked someone’s chest into the river, and it turned out to have contained a pearl. If people don’t usually keep pearls in a chest, only money, then the damaging party was not expected to think of the possibility that there might be a pearl there. Similarly, even if we were to blame the bochur for drinking someone else’s water, or whatever bitter drink he had reason to think might be in the cup, we can’t blame him for the contacts, since it would not occur to him that there were contacts there.]

Chullin

Chullin 95b: A bad omen

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Chullin 95b: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: The first business deal one makes after building a house, having a baby or getting married is an omen of his future success, even though one may not act on this completely as a fortune teller would. Rabbi Elazar said: This is only true of he did three good or three bad deals in a row, thus creating a chazakah.

Rashi: One may not rely on this fortune telling, but still, if he failed in three deals, he should not go out for business too much, because this is an omen that he will be unsuccessful.

חולין צה ע”ב: תניא, רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר: בית תינוק ואשה, אף על פי שאין נחש יש סימן. אמר ר׳ אלעזר: והוא דאיתחזק תלתא זימני.

A young man named Yitzchak Ohevzion was interested in buying a certain apartment, but one of the other people living in the building came to him and said, “I would advise you not to buy it, because three deaths have taken place in that apartment. A young baby died, a man was murdered, and a woman died of an illness.”

Yitzchak went to Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky and asked him if he should worry about this. Reb Chaim thought for a moment, and then said, “Go and ask my father-in-law, Rav Elyashiv.” Rav Elyashiv said, “The house is not the cause of those deaths. You can buy the apartment and live in it.” The young man returned to Reb Chaim and told him the answer he had received.

Reb Chaim then said, “The Gemara in Chullin 95b says that we should worry about such things. ‘A house, a child and a wife, although one may not practice fortune telling, there is a sign. Rabbi Elazar said: This is only when there is a chazakah of three times.’ And see Rashi.”  But he added, “Now that my father-in-law said you don’t need to worry, you don’t need to worry. “

Source: Divrei Siach, Bemishnasam shel Rabboseinu Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and Rav Chaim Kanievsky, published on Rav Elyashiv’s first yahrtzeit, p. 33.

[Based on this, we can understand the Gemara in Taanis 29b: “A Jew who has a dispute with a non-Jew should avoid going to court in Av, because it has bad mazal; he should try to have it in Adar, which has good mazal.” Seemingly this is “nichush” – fortune telling. But the answer is that if you are not totally rigid about it – you are merely trying to schedule it for Adar, but if necessary you will agree to go to court any time – there is no problem.]

Taanis

Taanis 25a: The mysterious chicken

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Taanis 25a: A man once passed by Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa’s house and left some chickens. His wife found them, and he said to her, “Do not eat their eggs.”

תענית כה ע”א: מעשה ועבר אדם אחד על פתח ביתו והניח שם תרנגולין, ומצאתן אשתו של רבי חנינא בן דוסא, ואמר לה: אל תאכלי מביציהן.

Rabbi Moshe Soloveitchik related that when he was a young boy, it once happened that a chicken started marching into his family’s yard every day, laying an egg and then leaving. His father, Reb Chaim, decided to find out where the chicken was coming from, so that he could return the eggs to their rightful owner. Reb Chaim followed the chicken and suddenly it vanished into thin air! “Maybe there is someone who owed me money and died before he could pay me back. This chicken could be his gilgul,” Reb Chaim suggested. He went and checked his notebook, and indeed there was such a person who had died recently.

The next day, when the chicken came, Reb Chaim came up to it and said, “If you are so-and-so who owed me money, then I forgive you!” And the chicken never came back again.

Source: Chashukei Chemed on Beitzah, p. 8

[In Bava Metzia 28b we learn that one who finds a lost animal, and is holding it while waiting for its owner to claim it, should use the animal’s products (e.g. the work value of a horse) to pay for its food supply. Thus Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa was allowed to use the eggs of the chickens he found, because he was feeding them; he was being strict beyond the letter of the law. In Reb Chaim’s case, if the chicken had not been a gilgul, he would have had to return the eggs, since he was not feeding it.]

Yevamos

Yevamos 39b: Yibum nowadays

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Yevamos 39b: Abba Shaul says: One who marries his brother’s wife for the sake of her beauty, for the sake of marital relations, or for some other ulterior motive, is considered as if he is having an immoral relationship.

Rema, Even Hoezer 165:1: Even if both of them wish to do yibum, we do not allow them, unless it is obvious that they intend to do it for the sake of the mitzvah.

יבמות לט ע”ב: אבא שאול אומר: הכונס את יבמתו לשם נוי, ולשום אישות, ולשום דבר אחר ־ כאילו פוגע בערוה, וקרוב אני בעיני להיות הולד ממזרֹ וחכמים אומרים: (דברים כ״ה) יבמה יבא עליה ־ מכל מקום.

אה”ע קס”ה ס”א רמ”א: ואם שניהם רוצים ביבום אין מניחים אותם לייבם אא״כ ניכר וידוע שמכוונים לשם מצוה (טור בשם ר״ת).

רמב”ם יבום וחליצה ד,יז: יבם שרגלו הימנית חתוכה אינו חולץ בשמאל ואם חלצה מעל שמאלו חליצתה פסולה , היתה רגלו עקומה לאחור או הפוכה על צידה או שהיה מהלך על ראשי אצבעות רגליו הרי זה אינו חולץ שהחולץ צריך לנעוץ עקיבו בארץ וזה אינו יכול ואם חלצה למי שרגלו כך חליצתה פסולה.

אה”ע קסט,לד: היתה רגלו עקומה לאחור או הפוכה על צדה או שמהלך על אצבעות רגליו אינו חולץ:

Yisroel Chaim and his wife Chaya lived in Jerusalem, and had no children. When Yisroel Chaim passed away in 1925 at the age of 35, the Beis Din asked Chaya, “Did your husband have any brothers?” “Yes,” she said, “he had one brother living in New York.” The Beis Din in Jerusalem wrote to a rav in New York, asking if he could locate the brother and help arrange a chalitzah.

The rav in New York managed to locate the brother. As the brother came into the rav’s house, the rav noticed that he was limping on his right foot. “Can you please take off your shoes and socks?” said the rav. The man did as he was told; the rav saw that his whole foot was bent backward, and he was walking on two of his toes. In such a case, the Rambam (Yibum Vachalitzah 4:17) and the Shulchan Aruch (Even Hoezer 169:34) rule that one cannot do chalitzah. And Ashkenazim, following the position of Abba Shaul, do not practice yibum nowadays. But then what was the solution for the poor widow? Was she to remain single for life?

The rav sent the question to Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzensky in Vilna, who replied, “The poskim such as the Shvus Yaakov, Knesses Yechezkel and the Beis Meir permit yibum even today in such situations. Even if the brother is already married, he may marry the widow; Rabbeinu Gershom’s ban on polygamy does not apply in this case. Furthermore, after marrying her, he may divorce her immediately, even without her consent. This is all cited as practical halacha by the Pischei Teshuva, Even Hoezer 165:3.”

Although the Shav Yaakov disagreed, invoking the rule that “anyone who cannot do chalitzah, cannot do yibum,” the other poskim argued that this rule does not apply when the chalitzah can’t be done for purely physical reasons. Reb Chaim Ozer adds that the Ritva in Chullin 92 says this explicitly. Therefore, the best solution for this case was that the brother in New York should marry his deceased brother’s wife.

However, if that was impossible, Reb Chaim Ozer said that if the man was able to push his right heel into the ground, even painfully, they could rely on a combination of two lenient opinions and do chalitzah with the right foot, and then again with the left foot (because perhaps in a case like this, the man learns to favor his left foot and he has the status of a lefty, who can do chalitzah according to some Rishonim).

Source: Achiezer 3:20

Berachos

Berachos 30b: Why a child cries during Shmoneh Esrei

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Berachos 30b: Even if the king greets him, he may not interrupt Shmoneh Esrei to answer him.

Mishnah Berurah 104:1: Even gesturing during Shmoneh Esrei is forbidden, except to tell a crying child to keep quiet.

ברכות ל: אפילו המלך שואל בשלומו לא ישיבנו. כתב המ”ב בסימן ק”ד סק”א בשם השערי תשובה דאפילו רמיזא בעלמא אסור אם לא לתינוק הבוכה מותר לו לרמז לו בידיו כדי שישתוק.

It was the Friday night meal in the Mirrer Yeshiva in Jerusalem. That Friday had been Purim, so everyone was still in the Purim mood. Eliezer Papelow was asked to get up and say a few words of Torah. He said, “The Mishnah Berurah brings from the Shaarei Teshuvah that if a child is crying in the middle of the silent Shmoneh Esreh, one may make hand signals to him to be quiet. But if you look in the Shaarei Teshuvah itself, you will see that he does not say that the child was crying; he says the child was laughing. Why did the Mishnah Berurah change the case? The answer is that it has to do with the names of the sefarim. The Shaarei Teshuvah gives a case of a child laughing, because when it comes to teshuvah, a child has nothing to worry about – he has no sins – so he laughs. But the Mishnah Berurah says he was crying, because when it comes to mishnah, learning, a child has very little, so he cries!”

Pesachim

Pesachim 116a: Rabban Gamliel Haya Omer

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Pesachim 116a: Rabban Gamliel used to say, “Whoever did not say these three things on Pesach did not fulfill his obligation.”

פסחים קטז ע”א: רבן גמליאל היה אומר כל שלא אמר שלשה דברים אלו בפסח לא יצא ידי חובתו.

Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik was once in Berlin on Shabbos Hagadol, and he heard a German rabbi speak. “The Gemara says,” said the rabbi, “that if Persians forced a man to eat matzah, he fulfilled his obligation (Rosh Hashanah 28a), although he surely did not recite the Hagadah. How is this consistent with Rabban Gamliel’s famous statement: Anyone who did not say these three things on Pesach did not fulfill his obligation: pesach matzah and maror?” The rabbi spoke for a long time about this question. After the speech, Rav Soloveitchik said to him, “You have erred. Rabban Gamliel means he did not fulfill his obligation of telling about the Exodus, but certainly he has fulfilled the mitzvah of matzah.”

The rabbi did not have a ready reply, but the next morning in shul he showed Rav Soloveitchik the comment of the Maharsha on Rabban Gamliel’s statement:

לא מצינו בשאר מצות דבעיא שיאמר בהן על שם מה, דסגי להו בברכה על המצוה, אבל טעם הענין הוא מפורש ברפ”ק דזבחים דכל הזבחים שנזבחו שלא לשמן כשרין חוץ מן הפסח וחטאת דפסולין שלא לשמן וטעם הענין מפורש שם דלפי פגמם ורחקם מן הקדושה בעי טפי קירוב לקדושה דהיינו זביחה לשמה וע”כ אר”ג דגם אכילת הבעלים יהיה מפורש לשמה לקרב אל הקדושה.

“We don’t find regarding other mitzvos that one must say out loud why he is doing them. It’s usually enough just to make a bracha on the mitzvah. But the reason for this is explained in the first chapter of Zevachim. All offerings that were slaughtered with the wrong type of offering in mind are kosher, except for the Pesach and the Chatas. Because they are far from holiness, they require one to slaughter them with the right purpose in mind to bring them closer to holiness. And that is why Rabban Gamliel said that even the eating of the offering must be done with the right purpose in mind.

“An Acharon,” replied Rav Soloveitchik, “cannot say something unless there is a source for it in the Rishonim. In this case, the source for the Maharsha is a Ramban in Milchamos, at the beginning of Berachos, who says:

וזו היא ששנו בברייתא במס’ יומא הקורא עם אנשי משמר לא יצא ידי חובתו לפי שמקדימין וקורין קודם לזמן הזה… והיאך אפשר שהיו אנשי משמר ואנשי מעמד מבטלין מצות ק”ש ואמת ויציב דאורייתא לגמרי…אלא ודאי מאי לא יצא ידי חובתו שלא קיים מצוה כהלכה שאלו מקדימין וקורין קודם שיכיר בין תכלת ללבן… ושנינו כיוצא בה כל שלא אמר ג’ דברים אלו בפסח לא יצא ידי חובתו ולא שיהא צריך לחזור ולאכול פסח מצה ומרור.

The Gemara (Yuma 37b) says that one who says Shema with the kohanim of the mishmar does not fulfill his obligation, because they say it too early. Now, how is it possible that the kohanim did not keep the mitzvah of saying Shema, and Emes Veyatziv which is D’oraisa? Rather, it means that he fulfills his obligation, but not in the best way. As another example of this, Rabban Gamliel says that anyone who did not say these three things on Pesach did not fulfill his obligation, but he does not have to eat the pesach, matza and maror over again.

“So,” Rav Soloveitchik concluded, “that explains why if the Persians forced a Jew to eat matza, he fulfilled his obligation.”

Source: Mr. Stern from the Mirrer Minyan of Borough Park

[It’s interesting that the Ramban is essentially understanding Rabban Gamliel the way the rabbi in Berlin understood him: that the recital of the three things is part of the mitzvos of eating pesach, matza and maror. The only difference is that the Ramban says that you do fulfill your obligation, albeit not in the best way.

Rav Soloveitchik’s original response, that Rabban Gamliel is talking about the mitzvah of telling about the Exodus, is based on the Rambam (Hilchos Chometz Umatzah 7:5), who brings Rabban Gamliel in the middle of his chapter on telling the story of the Exodus, and concludes, “And all these things are what are called Hagadah.”]

Gittin

Gittin 45b: Giving an aliyah to someone who violates Shabbos

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Gittin 45b: A sefer Torah written by a heretic must be burnt. Rashi: Because he certainly wrote it with idolatry in mind.

Rambam Yesodei Hatorah 6:8: One may not burn or erase a sefer Torah, but if it was written by a Jewish heretic, we burn it, including the names of Hashem, because he doesn’t believe in the holiness of Hashem and he did not write the name with Hashem in mind; he thinks the name is no different from any other word, so the name is not considered holy. And it is a mitzvah to burn it in order not to leave any reminder of the heretics or their actions.

אמר רב נחמן, נקטינן: ספר תורה שכתבו מין ־ ישרף. פירש”י ישרף־ דודאי לשם עבודת כוכבים כתבו.

רמב”ם הלכות יסודי התורה ו,ח: כתבי הקדש כולן ופירושיהן וביאוריהן אסור לשורפם או לאבדם ביד והמאבדן ביד מכין אותו מכת מרדות, במה דברים אמורים בכתבי הקדש שכתבם ישראל בקדושה אבל אפיקורוס ישראל שכתב ספר תורה שורפין אותו עם האזכרות שבו, מפני שאינו מאמין בקדושת השם ולא כתבו לשמו אלא שהוא מעלה בדעתו שזה כשאר הדברים והואיל ודעתו כן לא נתקדש השם, ומצוה לשורפו כדי שלא להניח שם לאפיקורוסים ולא למעשיהם.

It was early Shabbos afternoon in the basement of Shomrei Shabbos in Borough Park, where minyanim are held one after the other, every 20 minutes. In one particular minyan, the only kohein present was a man wearing a black hat who, the people said, was a mechalel Shabbos. The baal korei argued that this kohein should nevertheless be called up for the first aliyah because of the mitzvah of “v’kidashto” (sanctify the kohein by giving him the most honorable place), but the rest of the people there were against it. They pushed the baal korei and the mechalel Shabbos away from the sefer Torah by force, although he had already made the bracha, and called up a Yisrael.

Then someone said, “Wait a minute. This shul has a rav, Rabbi Yidel Tirnauer, who is upstairs right now giving a shiur. Why don’t we ask him what the shul’s policy is?” Two representatives went up to Rabbi Tirnauer and interrupted the shiur with this urgent question. The rav’s reply was, “They don’t have to call him up.”

[Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 3:12 and 22) rules that an atheist Jew may not get an aliyah, because to him saying the name of Hashem is just like saying any word, as the Rambam says regarding writing the name, and therefore his bracha is considered a bracha without Hashem’s name, which is not a bracha. If he does make a bracha, one may not answer amein. However, a Jew who believes in Hashem, but due to his desires or other pressures violates Shabbos, is allowed to get an aliyah. Still, Reb Moshe says that the aliyahs in the shul should be arranged such that he does not get an aliyah too often.

In OC 4:91:8 Reb Moshe adds that even if the mechalel Shabbos is a kohein, he should not be called. It seems he meant that even in the case when he believes in Hashem and can theoretically get an aliyah, one need not call him for kohein. Rabbi Tirnauer clearly followed this psak, saying that one need not call him (implying that occasionally, it is allowed to give him an aliyah if necessary, e.g. out of respect or appreciation).

In OC 2:50, Reb Moshe raises the question of whether Rashi disagrees with this ruling. Rashi says that the reason for burning the sefer Torah is because the heretic wrote it with idolatry in mind. If so, an atheist’s sefer Torah would not require burning, and perhaps his bracha is a bracha. (The logic would be that a name of Hashem recited without any intent – for Hashem or for an idol – is סתמן לשמה: it is automatically taken to mean Hashem.) However, Reb Moshe argues that in order to minimize the extent of the dispute between Rashi and the Rambam, we should say that Rashi only disagrees on the obligation to burn an atheist’s Torah. The Rambam gives the reason, “In order not to leave any reminder of the heretics or their actions,” and Rashi disagrees with this. But Rashi could still agree to the first half of the Rambam: that a name of Hashem written by a non-believer would have no holiness and one would be permitted (not obligated) to burn it. In Orach Chaim 215:10, the Mishnah Berurah cites a dispute between the Mechaber and the Gra as to whether one may answer amein after the bracha of an apikoros. In the Biur Halacha, he concludes that one should follow the Gra and answer amein, provided that he heard the entire bracha. Seemingly, this is against the ruling of Reb Moshe. But it may be that the apikoros in question there is someone who believes in Hashem but denies other principles of Judaism, whereas Reb Moshe is referring to an atheist.]

Pesachim

Pesachim 4a: Informing someone that her relative died

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Pesachim 4a: Rav’s father was Rabbi Chiya’s brother, and his mother was Rabbi Chiya’s sister. When Rav came to visit Eretz Yisroel, Rabbi Chiya asked him, “Is Ayvo alive?” Rav said, “What about Ima?” So Rabbi Chiya asked, “Is Ima alive?” Rav said, “What about Ayvo?” Rabbi Chiya then said to his servant, “Take off my shoes…”

Yoreh Deah 402:12: If someone’s relative died and he does not know about it, there is no obligation to tell him, even if the deceased is his father or mother. And regarding this it says, “One who brings bad news is a fool.” And it is permitted to invite him to an engagement party, a wedding or any simcha, since he does not know. However, if he asks explicitly, one must not lie and say, “He is alive,” as the Torah says, “Keep far from falsehood.” Rema: Still, when the deceased left a son, it is customary to tell him so that he should say Kaddish. But for daughters, there is no custom to tell them at all.

פסחים ד ע”א רב בר אחוה דרבי חייא ובר אחתיה. כי סליק להתם אמר ליה: אייבו קיים? אמר ליה: אימא קיימת, אמר ליה: אימא קיימת? אמר ליה: אייבו קיים. אמר ליה לשמעיה: חלוץ לי מנעלי וכו’

יו”ד ת”ב,יב: מי שמת לו מת ולא נודע לו אינו חובה שיאמרו לו ואפילו באביו ואמו ועל זה נאמר מוציא דבה הוא כסיל ומותר להזמינו לסעודת אירוסין ונישואין וכל שמחה כיון שאינו יודע מיהו אם שואל עליו אין לו לשקר ולומר חי הוא שנאמר מדבר שקר תרחק: הגה ומ״מ בבנים זכרים נהגו להודיע כדי שיאמר קדיש אבל בבנות אין מנהג כלל להודיעם (מהרי״ו סי׳ י״ג).

It was June 15, 1987, Dovid Kaufman’s wedding day, and preparations were in full swing. The Kaufmans together with the kallah’s family, the Steinbergs, had rented out the biggest hall in town, Brightstone Manor, and the cooks were busy preparing the reception and wedding meal for 500 guests. The women of the family were at the hall from the middle of the day, getting their makeup and hair done. Of course, Dovid’s mother Chana knew that her mother could not attend. The last time Chana had visited her at the nursing home, she had been unable to get out of bed. Chana promised to visit her the day after the wedding and tell her all about it.

At 4 PM, the phone rang in the Kaufman home. Dovid’s brother Nachman picked it up. It was a staff member at the nursing home. “We’ve been trying to reach Chana Kaufman,” they said. “She must come right away – her mother passed away!” Absorbing the shock of the news, Nachman thought quickly. “My mother is out now. Don’t worry, I will tell her.”

After hanging up, he thought: what if my mother becomes a mourner right now? Will she be able to take part in Dovid’s wedding? Can she walk him down? How will she be feeling? Is it even right to tell her at a time like this? He decided to ask his rosh yeshiva, who was an experienced posek. He would surely know what to do.

“Don’t tell her,” said the rosh yeshiva. “There is no obligation to tell her and ruin her simcha. She will find out on her own tomorrow. And make sure that if any of the other wedding guests are aware, they do not tell her either.”

Source: Rabbi Yisroel Reisman, tape R-14 (All names are fictitious because the story was told without names)

Bava Metzia

Bava Metzia 50b: Never Steal a Lottery Ticket

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Bava Metzia 50b: If someone buys an item for the wrong price, if the difference was less than one sixth, the sale is valid. If it was more than one sixth, the sale is invalid. If it was exactly one sixth, the sale is valid but he must pay the difference.

בבא מציעא נ ע”ב: אמר רבא, הלכתא: פחות משתות ־ נקנה מקח, יותר על שתות ־ ביטול מקח. שתות ־ קנה ומחזיר אונאה.

There was once a poor orphan girl who didn’t have money to get married. She had a low paying job and she resigned herself to renting a room in a wealthy family’s house, using her salary to pay the rent and living out her life as an old maid. One day, her landlady came to her and said, “I am buying a lottery ticket. Would you like to buy one too? This may be your chance to have a better life.”

So they both bought one-dollar lottery tickets. A week later, there was a knock at the door. It was the lottery officials and they said, “Someone living in this house bought the winning ticket. The prize is $10,000!”

The landlady showed her ticket to the official, but he said, “No, this doesn’t match.” The landlady thought to herself, it must be the poor orphan woman’s ticket. She went to the orphan woman’s room, but no one was there. The ticket lay on top of her dresser. Suddenly, her yetzer hara got the better of her. She switched her ticket with the poor woman’s ticket and brought it to the lottery officials. It indeed matched, and she collected the $10,000 prize.

A few days went by and there was another knock at the door. It was the lottery officials again. They said, “Last week was the regular weekly drawing, but this week was the Mega Millions jackpot. And someone in this house has won $25 million. It’s not the same ticket that you won with last week. Didn’t you have two tickets?”

The landlady began to wish she had not exchanged the tickets. She went down to the orphan woman and confessed to her crime. “My ticket was the original ticket that would have won $25 million, but I gave it to you and took the other one. That’s how I got the $10,000 prize. Let’s switch back now.”

The orphan woman believed her, but wasn’t sure if she should give up on the $25 million. The two of them agreed to go and ask a rabbi, and abide by his decision.

The rabbi ruled that both prizes belonged to the orphan woman. The first prize belonged to her because the ticket had originally been hers. And the second prize also belonged to her because the landlady had willingly given up that ticket to her.

[The rabbi’s ruling seems incorrect because when the landlady switched the tickets, she was paying for a $10,000 item using an item worth one dollar (at the time). The transaction was invalid and the poor woman did not acquire the other ticket. Actually, we don’t need the Gemara in Bava Metzia to prove this point. The ticket exchange was done without the other woman’s presence or consent and therefore it had no legal validity. Therefore, it would seem, the correct psak is that the poor woman gets $10,000 and the landlady gets $25 million.

However, one could argue that the poor woman has the option of saying she doesn’t believe the landlady’s story, and she has the right to claim that the ticket in her possession was hers all along. The problem is only that she admitted to believing the landlady’s confession. Was this הודאת בעל דין – admission in a monetary case, by which she forfeits her claim? Perhaps not. Admission means stating a fact one knows to be true, such as saying, “Yes, I agree that I owe you money.” But here, she does not know that the landlady is telling the truth. Her trusting the landlady is just that – trust of a not-so-trustworthy person, out of a desire to avoid a fight over the facts. This is not an admission. According to this argument, the poor woman should get the $25 million and the landlady should get the $10,000.

Either way, it is incorrect to give her both prizes, since there is no version of the facts that would support that result.]

Shabbos

Two women lighting candles in the same house

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Shabbos 23b: One who always has candles lit will be zocheh to have sons who become Torah scholars.

Orach Chaim 263:1 Rema: A woman who usually lights two candles and forgot to light one week, must light three candles for the rest of her life.

שבת כג ע”ב אמר רב הונא: הרגיל בנר ־ הויין ליה בנים תלמידי חכמים

או”ח סימן רס”ג ס”א ברמ”א: האשה ששכחה פעם אחת להדליק מדלקת כל ימיה ג׳ נרות (מהרי״ל)

Once a married couple was staying at the wife’s parents for Yom Tov, and the young woman forgot to light. Her husband went to ask Rabbi Eisenstein in Lakewood whether she now had to light an extra candle for the rest of her life. The rav responded with a story: someone asked R’ Moshe Feinstein if a mother and daughter in the same house should both light in the dining room or in two different parts of the house. Reb Moshe responded, “Before you ask me that, ask whether both of them should light at all. Maybe once there are candles lit in a house, there is no mitzvah to light more!” Rabbi Eisenstein concluded, “Since it’s not so obvious that your wife was required to light, now that she forgot, she is not subject to the punishment of adding a candle.”