Sotah

Sotah 21a: Selling the Reward for a Mitzvah

Sotah 21a: What is the meaning of the verse (Shir Hashirim 8:7), “If a man gives all the wealth of his house for love, they would despise him”? Ulla said: Not like Shimon, brother of Azariah (Shimon was supported by his brother Azariah so that he could learn Torah) and not like Rabbi Yochanan and house of the Nasi, but rather like Hillel and Shevna. As Rav Dimi related: Hillel and Shevna were brothers. Hillel learned Torah while Shevna went into business. Afterwards Shevna said, “Come, let us divide our earnings.” A Heavenly voice came out and said, “If a man gives all the wealth of his house for love, they would despise him.”

Rema in Shulchan Aruch 246:1: One may make an agreement with his friend that he will learn Torah and his friend will support him, and receive a portion of his reward. But if he already learned Torah, he cannot sell his reward for money.

מאי (שיר השירים ח) בוז יבוזו לו? אמר עולא: לא כשמעון אחי עזריה, ולא כר׳ יוחנן דבי נשיאה, אלא כהלל ושבנאֹ דכי אתא רב דימי אמר: הלל ושבנא אחי הוו, הלל עסק בתורה, שבנא עבד עיסקא, לסוף א״ל: תא נערוב וליפלוג, יצתה בת קול ואמרה: (שיר השירים ח) אם יתן איש את כל הון ביתו וגו׳.

שו”ע יו”ד רמ”ו ס”א: ומי שא״א לו ללמוד מפני שאינו יודע כלל ללמוד או מפני הטרדות שיש לו יספיק לאחרים הלומדים: הגה ותחשב לו כאילו לומד בעצמו (טור) ויכול אדם להתנות עם חבירו שהוא יעסוק בתורה והוא ימציא לו פרנסה ויחלוק עמו בשכר אבל אם כבר עסק בתורה אינו יכול למכור לו חלקו בשביל ממון שיתן לו (תולדות אדם וחוה נתיב ב׳ מש״ס דסוטה).

Rabbi Shmuel Berenbaum, the Mirrer Rosh Yeshiva, told the following story to give his talmidim a sense of how European Jews once lived. The story took place in his home town of Kaneshen, Poland when he was 4 years old (1924). It became the talk of the town, and so he remembered it well despite his young age at the time.

In Kaneshen there lived a peddler who would travel around the nearby villages to sell his wares. He was driving his wagon back toward the town when he met a poor Jew by the roadside, looking for a ride to Kaneshen. The peddler invited him to ride in his wagon. As they rode into town, they passed several unemployed men standing by the entrance to the town, hoping to get hired for day jobs. One of them, who we’ll call R’ Reuven, called out to the peddler, “I didn’t know you were such a rodef mitzvos that you give people rides!” The peddler, not wishing to boast about his chesed, said, “I didn’t do it for the mitzvah, I just had extra room in my wagon, so why shouldn’t I give him a ride?” R’ Reuven, thinking that the peddler did not value his mitzvah so much, said, “Can I buy from you the zechus of your mitzvah of chesed for 5 zlotys?” The peddler didn’t think R’ Reuven was serious, and he nodded in agreement.

The conversation turned to other matters for about 10 minutes, and then R’ Reuven took out 5 zlotys and offered them to the peddler. Realizing for the first time that Reuven was serious, the peddler said, “No, I will not sell you my mitzvah! When I nodded my head I was joking, but I never agreed to the sale.” Reuven argued, “That’s devarim shebalev – thoughts don’t count when they contradict one’s actions. From my point of view, you agreed to the sale and you can’t go back on it now.” “I never sell my mitzvos!” said the peddler in a louder voice. The argument became heated and a group of bystanders gathered around them, some taking the peddler’s side and others backing R’ Reuven. Neither was willing to back down. Finally, they agreed to present the question to the rav of the town and follow his psak.

The rav listened to both sides, studied the subject and gave his decision: the mitzvah belonged to R’ Reuven, since the peddler did initially agree to sell it to him. However, since the peddler argued that he did not really want to sell it, he had the right to buy it back for 50 zlotys. (Reb Shmuel added that he did not understand the logic behind this decision.) Once the rav paskened, no one in town dared question him. And indeed, the peddler bought his mitzvah back for 50 zlotys, an amount far above his means.

[The obvious question is that based on the Gemara in Sotah and the Rema, the Rav should have ruled that the entire sale was invalid and no one has to pay anyone anything. One cannot sell a mitzvah after it was done already!

R’ Yosef Simcha Klein, grandson-in-law of Reb Shmuel, proposed the following explanation: Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Shulchan Aruch cites two responsa that deal with this subject, Rav Hai Gaon and the Eish Das. Rav Hai Gaon speaks of a person who fasted every Monday and Thursday for a year, and then gave the reward as a gift to someone, or sold it. He says the sale is ineffective, and then adds, “This fool who sold his fasts is like one whose meal was eaten by a dog (he gets no reward, like someone who simply had nothing to eat – Rashi Taanis 11b). What reward could he receive from Hashem, when he has already taken money? He did not fast for Hashem’s sake; he just afflicted himself to get the money. He is more likely to get punished than rewarded, for he made the name of Heaven worthless, like a shovel with which to earn his bread.”

The Eish Das deals with someone who bought his friend’s share of the Livyasan for 100 gold coins. Like Rav Hai Gaon, he says the seller will be punished for making light of the World to Come, and then adds, “Still it would seem that the buyer gets reward for his desire and love of Olam Haba, since he spent a lot of money on it.”

Accordingly, the Rav of Kaneshen may have decided that by agreeing to sell his mitzvah, the peddler sinned and now needed to do teshuva by showing Hashem how beloved the mitzvah was to him. R’ Reuven, who gained reward for trying to buy the mitzvah, would not lose by selling it back, since it was not his choice; he was ordered to do so by the Rav.]

Source: Kisrah Shel Torah, p. 91

Bava Metzia

Bava Metzia 10b: A Kosher Heter Mechirah?

Bava Metzia 10b: There is no agency for sin.

בבא מציעא י ע”ב: אין שליח לדבר עבירה

During the Shmitah of 5761, one religious kibbutz decided to invent a heter mechirah that would work even according to the Chazon Ish. The Chazon Ish objected to the regular heter mechirah done by the chief rabbinate for four reasons: 1) Since it is forbidden to sell land to a non-Jew in Eretz Yisroel, the representative carrying out the sale on behalf of all the land owners is a שליח לדבר עבירה – a representative to commit a sin – and his representation is invalid. 2) The sale is not serious since it is not accompanied by a professional survey and appraisal. 3) The sale is not legally binding since it is not registered with the government. 4) They make a condition that the non-Jew must sell it back after Shmitah, which renders it a temporary sale, and a temporary sale is like a קנין פירות which does not remove the restrictions of Shmitah.

(It would seem that these objections are mutually exclusive and asked as a ממה נפשך type reasoning: if anyone finds a way to disagree with arguments 2, 3 and 4 and believes that the sale is 100% valid, then it is a sin and one cannot appoint a representative to commit a sin.)

This hechsher had the land owners carry out the sale themselves, they used professional appraisals, they registered it with the government and they made no conditions. They drew up a separate contract to sell the land back, which would go into effect after a year. A reliable hechsher endorsed their products.

Some customers in America, surprised to see Shmittah produce on their supermarket shelves, approached Rabbi Yisroel Belsky and asked him whether to buy it.

Upon investigation, Rav Belsky discovered that the land was owned as a general partnership by all members of the kibbutz, but only the officers of the community directly participated in the sale. One partner acting on behalf of the others is still shlichus (agency) and so the first objection of the Chazon Ish was never really eliminated.

Furthermore, many poskim object to the heter mechirah on different grounds than the Chazon Ish. They argue that the sale is not real since the Jewish owner continues to control all decisions regarding the land’s usage, sells the produce and keeps the profits earned. This is similar to one who sells his property on paper to prevent his creditors from seizing it, but continues to act as the owner (Choshen Mishpat 99:7). (Contrast this with the sale of chometz, where the Jew has nothing to do with the chometz until after Pesach.) The heter mechirah done by this kibbutz was subject to this same objection.

And of course, the sale of land only solved the problem according to the practice of Yerushalayim that fruit grown on non-Jewish owned land does not have holiness of Shmittah. People in Bnei Brak, on the other hand, are stringent about this.

Yevamos

Yevamos 90b: The Miraculous Power of Learning Torah

Yevamos 90b: One may listen to a Navi even if he tells you to transgress a mitzvah in the Torah, like Eliyahu on Mount Carmel. This proves that the Sages have the power to permit a sin! – There is it different because the Torah says, “To him you shall listen.” But why not generalize from there? – There it was different because Eliyahu needed to stand up against the sin [of idolatry].

Tosafos: How could we have learned it out from a Navi? Maybe a Navi is different because Hashem told him to do it. The Ri answers: to permit the sin, prophecy would not help. He is only using his prophecy to know that the plan will be effective – in Eliyahu’s case, that fire would come down from the sky on the mizbeach.  

יבמות צ ע”ב: ת״ש: (דברים י״ח) אליו תשמעון ־ אפילו אומר לך עבור על אחת מכל מצות שבתורה, כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל, הכל לפי שעה שמע לוִ שאני התם, דכתיב: אליו תשמעון. וליגמר מיניהִ! – מיגדר מילתא שאני.

תוס’ ד”ה וליגמר מיניה. וא״ת שאני התם דעל פי הדבור היה מתנבא לעבור והיכי נגמר מיניה לעבור משום תקנתא דרבנן שלא על פי הדבור ונראה דכיון דעל פי הדבור שרי משום צורך שעה הוא הדין שלא על פי הדבור שהרי אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה וכו’ ואר״י משום דאיתחזק בנביאות היו סומכים עליו במה שהיה מבטיח בירידת אש ושוחטים על הבטחתו קדשים בחוץ שבזכותו ותפלתו תרד אש מן השמים ויהיה מיגדר מילתא שיתקדש שמו של הקב״ה ברבים וע״י כך יחזרו ישראל למוטב.

When Rabbi Shmuel Berenbaum, the Mirrer rosh yeshiva, was sitting shiva for his son R’ Leibel, people told him stories about miraculous recoveries and yeshuos people had experienced through R’ Leibel’s brachos and tefillos. Reb Shmuel listened the entire time quietly. Someone pressed him to express his opinion on such things, and he said, “Nu, he learned so much Torah – it could be true.”

R’ Yosef Simcha Klein, his grandson-in-law, noted that the same was true of Reb Shmuel himself: When he was niftar, many people came during shiva and told stories about how every blessing and promise he gave had come true.

The source for the idea that learning Torah enables one to perform miracles is the Tzidkas Hatzadik (72), who says that Moshe Rabbeinu performed his miracles through learning Torah. (This could be based on the Pesikta brought in the Yalkut on Parshas Chukas, which says that when Hashem told Moshe to speak to the rock, He meant that Moshe should teach Torah in front of the rock, and it would give water – see Emek Hanetziv, Matos 5.) The Tzidkas Hatzadik also says that Eliyahu performed the miracle of bringing down fire from heaven through the power of the chiddush in halacha that he was mechadesh to permit offering a korban outside the Beis Hamikdash.

R’ Yosef Simcha adds that there were two other reasons why Reb Shmuel’s words came true. The first was he felt the pain of others exactly like his own. The Shem Mishmuel relates (Beshalach p. 206) that his father, the Avnei Nezer, once told him, “Anyone can save his friend through his prayer, but only if his friend’s pain touches him to the depths of his heart. This is not easy and only someone on a high spiritual level can fulfill this condition.”

The second was that he was careful with his speech. As R’ Elchonon writes (Kovetz Shiurim Kesubos 208, on daf 62b), we find stories in the Gemara where someone died because a tzaddik suggested that they might be dead, כשגגה שיוצא מלפני השליט. Normally, Hashem fulfills the blessings or curses of a tzaddik because “He does the will of those who fear Him” but in these cases it was not the tzaddik’s will at all. Rather, it is because the speech of someone who guards his tongue is like a sharp axe, which can cut even accidentally. By the same token, his blessings are fulfilled. But when someone does not guard his speech, it is like a dirty and rusty blade that cannot cut.

Bava Kama

Bava Kama 94a: Making a bracha on stolen food

Bava Kama 94a:  Abaye said: From where do we see that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is of the opinion that a physical change in the stolen object does not cause the thief to acquire it? From this Baraisa: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If someone stole a measure of wheat, ground it, kneaded it, baked it and separated challah, how can he make the blessing? He would not be blessing but rather insulting, and regarding this Scripture says, “If one steals and blesses, he has insulted Hashem” (Tehillim 10:3).

Rava replied: How do you know? Maybe Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov only said that regarding the blessing, because it is a mitzvah that came through a sin.

 ר’ אליעזר בן יעקב מאי היא? דתניא, ר׳ אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: הרי שגזל סאה של חטין, טחנה, לשה ואפאה והפריש ממנה חלה, כיצד מברך? אין זה מברך אלא מנאץ, ועל זה נאמר: (תהלים י׳) בוצע ברך נאץ ה׳. … אמר רבא: ממאי? דלמא … עד כאן לא קאמר ר׳ אליעזר בן יעקב התם ־ אלא לענין ברכה, משום דהוה ליה מצוה הבאה בעבירהֹ.

Rabbi Yisroel Salanter, when he lived in Vilna, made his living by saying shiurim. When he moved to Kovna, the kehillah appointed him to an administrative position. After he left Kovna, he had no source of income, so one of his talmidim began to support him. Reb Yisroel hated to have to take from others, firstly because he followed the Rambam’s opinion that a talmid chochom should never take support for his learning, and secondly because he was afraid that he was not as great as people thought he was, so they were giving him under a false assumption, and thus he was stealing their money.

Once, a rav came to visit him during a meal, and Reb Yisroel said to him, “Would you like something to eat? It’s kosher food.” The rav was puzzled, so Reb Yisroel explained with a smile, “For me it could be that the food is not kosher, since it’s stolen, but I have already acquired it by making a שינוי מעשה, a physical change, so for you the food is kosher.”

[It would seem that since we hold שינוי מעשה קונה – a physical change causes the thief to acquire the item – the thief himself is allowed to eat it too, and the only problem is making a bracha on the food. This is brought down by the Mishnah Berurah 196:4, and his conclusion is that one should not make the bracha, except for Birkas Hamazon which is a Torah obligation.

משנה ברורה קצ”ו סק”ד: אם גנב או גזל חטים וטחנן ואפאן י״א שאע״פ שקנאן בשינוי והרי הם שלו אלא שחייב לשלם לו דמים עבורם מ״מ אסור לברך ע״ז בין ברכה ראשונה ובין בהמ״ז דלענין ברכה דאית בה הזכרת השם חמיר טפי ותמיד הוא בכלל נאוץ וי״א דהואיל וקנה יכול לברך ודעת המ״א דלענין בהמ״ז אם אכל כדי שביעה יש להורות בזה שיברך בהמ״ז דהוא דאורייתא ויש להחמיר ולברך.

Accordingly, it would seem that Reb Yisroel meant that perhaps he himself should not make a bracha on the food, but the guest could certainly make a bracha. Besides this chiddush – that the prohibition on making a bracha on stolen, changed food does not apply to the thief’s guest – we also see here that Reb Yisroel considered buying food with stolen money no better than a physical change. The counterargument would be that since this is not the same item at all, but something else exchanged for it, the rule that the bracha is an insult does not apply.]

Source: Kisvei Hasaba Vetalmidav Mikelm, v. 2 p. 787

Bava Basra

Bava Basra 21a: Good jealousy and bad jealousy

Bava Basra 21a: Jealousy of scholars leads to more scholarship.

בבא בתרא כא ע”א: קנאת סופרים תרבה חכמה

A couple once came to Rabbi Shmuel Berenbaum with a question: the wife wanted to buy an expensive luxury car, but the husband was worried that this might give rise to jealousy and ayin hara. Reb Shmuel lifted his eyes from the sefer he was learning and asked the man a seemingly unrelated question, “Do you already know Nashim and Nezikin?” “The rosh yeshiva sees that I don’t sit and learn all day,” the man replied. “Do you know at least one masechta well?” asked Reb Shmuel. “No,” said the man softly. “Do you know at least one daf Gemara by heart?” The man lowered his eyes and admitted, “Unfortunately, although I try to be kovea itim for Torah, I don’t learn it well enough to know the Gemara by heart.” “If so,” Reb Shmuel said, “you have nothing to worry about. You can buy the car – no one has anything to be jealous of you for.”

[We know that there are two types of jealousy: jealousy of physical possessions, which is wrong and may cause ayin hara, and jealousy of someone else’s Torah accomplishments, which is good and admirable, as our Gemara says, and will not lead to ayin hara. In this story, it seems that Reb Shmuel was not afraid of jealousy of the first kind – he assumed people are above that level. But what if the man had replied that he was a talmid chacham who knew Shas? Why then would Reb Shmuel have told him not to buy the car? If people are above jealousy of a car, why would they suddenly be jealous of it if he knew Shas? And if people would be jealous of him for knowing Shas, then good – קנאת סופרים תרבה חכמה!

The answer, explained Rabbi Elya Boruch Finkel (Mishulchan R’ Eliyahu Boruch, Parshas Vayikra) is that there is a third type of jealousy: jealousy of another person’s Torah accomplishments or mitzvos that he was able to do because Hashem granted him more money or a better mind. This, says the Ibn Ezra, is why the Torah says that the middle level of a קרבן עולה ויורד is to bring both a chatas and an olah – unlike the wealthy man, who brings only a chatas. The olah is to atone for the sinner’s thoughts of envy toward the wealthy sinner, who has the means to bring a nicer korban. But why wasn’t he envious of his possessions until now? The answer is that we don’t assume he is on such a low level. It doesn’t bother him that someone else has a nicer house or car. But it does bother him that he has a nicer korban.

Reb Shmuel’s point was that it’s good to be jealous of someone for knowing Shas, because that will motivate you to learn better. But if you see a man driving a luxury car who knows Shas, you might think, “The only reason he has time to sit and learn so much is because he has money. If I had money I would also become a talmid chacham.” That is the wrong kind of jealousy, the kind that might cause ayin hara.]

Erechin

Erechin 16b: Staying at the Same Inn

Erechin 16b: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: From where in the Torah do we learn that a person should not change his place of lodging? From the verse (Bereishis 13:3), “[Avraham traveled] until the place where his tent was earlier.” Rabbi Yossi bar Chanina said: From the words, “He traveled on his [earlier] journeys.” What is the practical difference between these two opinions? For a traveler who happens to sleep there. (Rashi: He stopped there just because it happened to get dark in that place.) 

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: מנין שלא ישנה אדם באכסניא שלו מן התורה? שנאמר: (בראשית י״ג) עד המקום אשר היה שם אהלו בתחלה. רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר, מהכא: (בראשית י״ג) וילך למסעיו. מאי בינייהו? איכא בינייהו אכסנאי דאקראי.

Once, Rabbi Yisroel Salanter came to Dvinsk, and no one in town knew of his visit. He rented a run-down room in a basement. A short time later, he came to Dvinsk again, this time with public fanfare. The gedolim and important people of the town gave him tremendous honor. But incredibly, he lodged in the same basement again, and all his great visitors had to come to speak to him there. All their pleas to him to let them find him a more appropriate accommodation were in vain; he would not violate Chazal’s dictum that a person should not change his place of lodging.

[It could be argued that the rule of not changing one’s place of lodging applies only when the old host and the new host are both inviting you to their houses; in that case you should not offend your old host by staying with a different host. But in a case when a person pays money for his room, it may happen that the first time he was only able to afford a low-quality room, and now he can afford something better, or perhaps now he needs something better and is willing to pay for it. In this case the laws of the free market take over: if the old hotel owner is not providing the product he needs, he can search elsewhere.

From this story, however, we see that Reb Yisroel held that even when one is paying money, the rule applies because there is still some personal honor involved: the first inn owner would feel slighted if he saw Reb Yisroel coming to town and staying somewhere else.

The Gemara brings a dispute as to whether this law applies when a person just happened to lodge somewhere. The question is which opinion the halacha follows, and, if it follows the lenient opinion, whether this leniency applies to our case, where Reb Yisroel just happened to lodge in the basement the first time because he couldn’t afford more. From the story, in which Reb Yisroel was strict, we can conclude that either he paskened like the stricter opinion, or else he held that even the lenient opinion only said it in a case when he didn’t mean to stay in the town at all, just stopped there because it got dark, but in this case, where he meant to stay in Dvinsk, everyone would agree that he must stay at the same place of lodging.]

Kiddushin

Kiddushin 40b: Courtesy and Manners

Kiddushin 40b: Learning is great, for it leads to keeping mitzvos.

Ri Hazakein: Even good midos must come from the Torah, and if someone has not learned Torah but has naturally good midos, even his midos are incorrect. Rabbi Ovadia of Bartenura on Avos 1:1: The midos in Masechta Avos were not made up by Chazal, as the non-Jewish sages did in their books about how a person should behave with others, but rather all of it is Torah from Sinai, and that is why Avos begins with the words, “Moshe received the Torah from Sinai.”

קידושין מ ע”ב: תלמוד גדול, שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה.

ובתוס’ ר”י הזקן: בא לרמוז שהחכם מצד חכמתו יגיע אל המעשה השלם והטוב והוא קנין המדות הטובות והממוצעות, ומי שהוא בעל תכונות טובות לבד לא יגיע אל החכמה מצד התכונות הטובות, וגם מעשיו שהוא עושה אינם על דרך נכונה ולא על דרך אמת כמו שאז”ל אין בור ירא חטא ולא ע”ה חסיד, שאין לו מדע שידע המעשים שיהיו טובים מצד עצמם.

רע”ב אבות א,א: משה קבל תורה מסיני – אומר אני לפי שמסכת זו אינה מיוסדת על פירוש מצוה ממצות התורה כשאר מסכתות שבמשנה, אלא כולה מוסרים ומדות, וחכמי אומות העולם ג”כ חברו ספרים כמו שבדו מלבם בדרכי המוסר כיצד יתנהג האדם עם חבירו, לפיכך התחיל התנא במסכת זו משה קבל תורה מסיני, לומר לך שהמדות והמוסרים שבזו המסכתא לא בדו אותם חכמי המשנה מלבם אלא אף אלו נאמרו בסיני.

Two bochurim from Yeshivas Eitz Chaim came to speak in learning with the Alter of Slobodka in Hebron. One of them was an amazing iluy. The Alter spoke with him for half an hour, and for the whole time he spoke about the statement of Chazal (Midrash Rabbah Vayikra 1:15) that if a talmid chochom has no deiah (courtesy, common sense), a dead cat is better than him. The Alter described the disgusting appearance of a dead cat in great detail, and commented that as bad as it was, a talmid chochom with no manners was worse. The bochur went out puzzled. Only later did he realize that as he had been speaking with the Alter, he had had a glass of tea, and after the glass was empty, he had stuck his finger into the sugar left at the bottom of the glass and then licked his finger.

Rabbi Meir Chodosh related that Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer disputed the Alter’s assessment of this bochur, saying that he was very bright, not a “talmid chochom who has no deiah” and was destined for greatness. But the Alter remained firm in his opinion. Reb Meir followed the bochur’s progress over the years and in the end, nothing became of him.

[The above Ri Hazakein and Bartenura, who hold that good midos come from the Torah, seem to disagree with Rav Nissim Gaon in his introduction to Shas:

כל המצות שהן תלויין בסברא ובאובנתא דליבא, כבר הכל מתחייבים בהן מן היום אשר ברא אלקים אדם על הארץ, עליו ועל זרעו לדור דורים.

All those mitzvos that can be derived from logic and understanding, all of mankind was obligated to keep from the day of man’s creation, for all generations.

Accordingly, there are two ways to understand this story: 1) According to the Ri Hazakein, the Alter held that this bochur could not have been such a talmid chochom because he was not deriving manners and midos from the Torah. 2) According to Rav Nissim Gaon, the Alter held that although the bochur indeed had Torah, he was missing something more basic that is supposed to precede Torah, which is deiah – awareness and midos that can be derived from one’s own mind.]

Yevamos

Yevamos 63a: Babe Ruth and the Jewish Question

Yevamos 63a: What is the meaning of the verse, “All the families of the earth will be blessed in you”? Even the families that live in the earth are only blessed for the sake of Israel. “All the nations of the earth [will be blessed for his sake]” – even the ships traveling from Gaul to Spain are only blessed for the sake of Israel.

ואמר ר׳ אלעזר, מאי דכתיב: (בראשית י״ב) ונברכו בך כל משפחות האדמה וכו’ אפילו משפחות הדרות באדמה, אין מתברכות אלא בשביל ישראלֹ (בראשית י״ח) כל גויי הארץ ־ אפילו ספינות הבאות מגליא לאספמיא, אינן מתברכות אלא בשביל ישראל.

A little Jewish boy on the East Side of New York came home from school and with great excitement told his grandfather, “Grandpa! Imagine! Babe Ruth hit three homers today!”

“Tell me,” asked the old man, “what this Babe Ruth did – is it good for the Jews?”

The above joke appeared in “A Treasury of Jewish Folklore,” published in 1948 by Nathan Ausubel, p. 426. Little did whoever cracked the joke know how much truth lay in it.

On March 16, 2013, speaking at a melaveh malka for K’hal Shaarei Shalom of Nostrand and Avenue P, Rabbi Avrohom Daniel Ginsberg, rosh kollel of Bais Medrash of Flatbush, told the following story. R’ Chatzkel Levenstein and the Mirrer Yeshiva arrived in Brooklyn shortly after WWII. In the summer of 1948, the great baseball star Babe Ruth died, and approximately 80,000 people participated in his funeral. R’ Chatzkel came into the beis medrash then, gave a klop, and remarked about the sadness, the atzvus, that had descended upon the populace with the death of the baseball hero, which puzzled him. He was bewildered by the veneration for a mere ball player. Rav Ginsburg humorously described how people tried to explain to the great European baal mussar, R’ Chatzkel, in Yiddish, the American national pastime of baseball, and the greatness of Babe Ruth. Their efforts were in vain, however, as R’ Chatzkel remained baffled as to how Ruth’s athletic feats, great as they were, had earned him such veneration. According to R’ Shlomo Brevda, who was one of the Americans present then along with R’ Refoel Green, that experience, along with its accompanying feeling of dissonance, was an impetus for R’ Chatzkel ultimately deciding to leave America and move to Eretz Yisroel, where he subsequently served as mashgiach of the Mirrer Yeshiva and Ponevezh in Bnei Brak until his passing, approximately 25 years later.

Perhaps, then, the home runs hit by Babe Ruth helped build two of the greatest yeshivas in the world!

Eiruvin

Eiruvin 44b: Chillul Shabbos after the life has been saved

Eiruvin 44b: All those who go out to save lives may return to their places.

עירובין מד ע”ב: כל היוצאים להציל חוזרין למקומן.

וכתבו התוס’ שם הא דלא חשיב ליה בפ״ק דביצה (דף יא:) גבי הנך ג׳ דהתירו סופן משום תחילתן דזה אינו חידוש וכל הנהו צריכי כדאמרינן התם. ומזה למד הגר”מ פיינשטיין (או”ח ח”ד סימן פ’) דכל היוצאין להציל לא מיירי דוקא במלחמה שיש סכנה גם לאחר שנצחו, אלא אפילו בחכמה הבאה לילד וכדומה שלא יהיה עוד סכנה ובכל זאת התירו סופן משום תחילתן.

There is a doctor in Beilinson Hospital in Petach Tikvah who became observant 30 years ago. This is his story. A religious Jew called him on Shabbos to come and take care of his sick wife. When the doctor arrived at his door and saw that the man was religious, he said, “I’m afraid if treat her, you won’t pay me after Shabbos. Either pay me on Shabbos, or find another doctor.” The man said, “Yes, I’ll pay you on Shabbos.” So he treated the man’s wife, and then said, “You own me 250 shekel.” The man took out his checkbook and wrote a check for 1000 shekel. The doctor was puzzled, so the man explained: “The word אלף (1000) is only 3 letters while מאתים וחמשים (250) is 11 letters. I wanted to minimize my chillul Shabbos.” The doctor took the check and left.

On Thursday he called the man back and said, “I must tell you that I couldn’t sleep for the last few nights, I was in awe of your dedication for Shabbos. My wife and I have decided that we want to learn more about Shabbos. Can you teach us?” [This is based on the Tosafos in Eiruvin quoted above, which says that chillul Shabbos after the life has been saved is permitted because of the rule that “they permitted the end to facilitate the beginning”: if the people going out to save lives knew that they would not be allowed to return home, they might not go to save lives in the first place. This is the basis of R’ Moshe’s heter for Hatzolah members to drive home after a call – Igros Moshe O.C. 4:80. Here too, if this man had not paid the doctor, he would not go to help the next religious Jew who called him on Shabbos. Here the heter is more clear, since the doctor made that condition explicitly.]

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 73a: Speaking lashon hara to warn someone about a shidduch

Sanhedrin 73a: If someone sees his friend drowning in the river, or being dragged by an animal, or attacked by robbers, he must save him, as the Torah says, “Do not stand idle while your neighbor bleeds.”

 סנהדרין עג ע”א: מניין לרואה את חבירו שהוא טובע בנהר, או חיה גוררתו, או לסטין באין עליו, שהוא חייב להצילו ־ תלמוד לומר לא תעמד על דם רעך.

Rabbi Yechiel Perr, rosh yeshiva of Derech Ayson of Far Rockaway, once asked his father R’ Menachem his opinion about the following story: a young lady was about to become engaged when someone divulged to her parents that her intended chosson had once been institutionalized in an asylum. A fierce dispute ensued within the community as to whether the tattler was a tzaddik or a rasha. R’ Menachem replied, “From this episode, you cannot tell. If his other actions are kindly, he did this out of tzidkus, and if his other actions are vicious, he did this out of rishus.”

Rabbi Nosson Kamenetsky compared this question to the Gemara’s analysis (Yuma 23b) of a story in which one kohein stabbed another to death in a dispute over who should have the right to do the avodah. The father of the murdered youth, finding his son in the throes of death, remarked, “My son is yet gasping, so the knife remains undefiled.” Asks the Gemara: Does this comment reflect a laxity in that generation’s concern with murder while its concern with purity was normal, or was it an expression of how meticulous that generation was with the purity of Temple utensils while its concern with bloodshed was at the normative level? Rabbi Chaim Shmulevitz (Sichos Mussar 5733, pp. 152-153) points out that we have an example here of how a single act or statement can reveal two diametrically opposed characteristics. That father might have personified the epitome of evil, callous even with regard to the life of his own child, or he might have been so saintly that in his moment of extreme anguish he still had the sanctity of the Beis Hamikdash in mind.

ועיין ספר חפץ חיים, ציורים, ציור שלישי: אם הוא רואה שאחד רוצה להשתדך עם אחד, וידוע לרואה הזה כי החתן יש לו חסרונות עצומים, כפי המבואר לקמן בסעיף ו מה נקרא חסרונות לענין זה, והמחותן אינו יודע מזה דבר, ואילו היה יודע לא היה מתרצה לזה, יש לגלות לו.

ובסעיף ו שם: אם החסרון הוא מצד חולי גופו, והמחותן אינו מכיר אותו מצד שהוא דבר פנימי אשר לא נגלה לכל, פשוט דאין על המגלה ענין זה חשש אסור רכילות. ושם בבאר מים חיים: שיכוין לתועלת המחותן ולא מצד שנאת החתן.

ואח”כ כתב ועוד יש אופן שני דצריך לגלות לו. היינו, אם נשמע על החתן שיש בו אפיקורסות, ח”ו, צריך לגלות לו, ועל זה נאמרו סמוכין “לא תלך רכיל בעמך” אבל “לא תעמד על דם רעך.” ודייק הגרש”ז אוירבאך (נשמת אברהם אהע”ז סימן ב ס”ק א) דלעיל גבי מחלה לא כתב הח”ח שחייב לגלות, משמע דאינו חייב לגלות, רק שאין בו משום איסור רכילות.