Author: YC

In preparation for a new volume of Read and Remember, I am collecting stories on halacha topics.
Megillah

Megillah 5a: The Baal Korei Who Died

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Megillah 5a: Rav said: “When Purim is observed in its regular time, an individual alone may read the Megillah, but when it is observed outside of its regular time, such as when it falls on Shabbos and is pushed back to Friday, one must read the Megillah with a minyan.”

But does this not contradict the following statement of Rav: “When Purim falls on Shabbos, Friday is the regular time.” Actually, Shabbos is the regular time. (Rashi: Because the Anshei Knesses Hagedolah ordained Purim on Shabbos, and it was only a later generation of sages who made the decree not to read the Megillah on Shabbos.) So when it says Friday is the regular time, doesn’t it mean that one does not need a minyan on Friday? – No. it just means that Purim is not pushed back to Thursday.

This Gemara is discussing the case when the 14th of Adar fell on Shabbos, but the Mishnah Berurah (690:61) extends the rule (that when it is not the regular time, we need a minyan) to the case when the 15th of Adar falls on Shabbos and the Megillah is read in a walled city on Friday. 

מגילה ה ע”א. אמר רב: מגילה, בזמנה ־ קורין אותה אפילו ביחיד, שלא בזמנה ־ בעשרה… ומי אמר רב הכי? והאמר רב יהודה בריה דרב שמואל בר שילת משמיה דרב: פורים שחל להיות בשבת ־ ערב שבת זמנם. ־ ערב שבת זמנם? והא שבת זמנם הואִ! אלא לאו הכי קאמר: שלא בזמנם ־ כזמנם, מה זמנם אפילו ביחיד, אף שלא בזמנם ־ אפילו ביחידִ ־ לא… לאפוקי מדרבי וכו’.

שו”ע או”ח תר”צ. מגילה בי”ד ובט”ו צריך לחזור אחר עשרה ואם אי אפשר בעשרה קורים אותה ביחיד. וכתב המ”ב: דהיכא דמתרמי יום ט”ו בשבת דצריכין המוקפין להקדים ולקרותו בע”ש בודאי צריך לקבץ עשרה לקריאתו, ובזה עוד חמיר יותר דאי ליכא עשרה לא יברכו המוקפין עליה.

Once, in Yerushalayim in a year when the 15th of Adar fell on Shabbos, and the Megillah was read on Friday, the baal korei in one particular shul fell suddenly ill after the reading, and died on Friday afternoon. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach paskened that all those who had heard the Megillah from him would have to hear it again. The reason is that the real time for Krias Hamegillah is Shabbos, and Friday is just a replacement for Shabbos. This baal korei, since he did not live to see Shabbos, was not obligated in the mitzvah, and thus was incapable of being “motzi” the listeners in their obligation.

 [The Chazon Ish disagreed with the Mishnah Berurah’s contention that when a walled city pushes back the reading to Friday, they must have a minyan. He argues that since Friday is the day everyone in the world is reading the Megillah, there is enough pirsumei nisa and one doesn’t need a minyan.

But it would seem that in R’ Shlomo Zalman’s case, even the Chazon Ish would agree that the listeners did not fulfill their obligation with the now-deceased baal korei. For even the Chazon Ish agrees that Shabbos is the real time originally ordained for the reading, and Friday is just a replacement for Shabbos. The fact that this replacement time happens to be the time when the rest of the world is laining does not change the fact that it is, after all, just a replacement. And someone who is not obligated in the original day is not obligated in the replacement either.]

Source: Rabbi Aryeh Golovenzitz

Chullin

Chullin 110b: Liver Under Hot Water

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Chullin 110b. Abaye said to Rav Safra, “When you go up to Eretz Yisroel, ask them about liver.” He went up and asked Rabbi Zerika, who replied, “I cooked it for Rabbi Ami and he ate it.” He reported back to Abaye, but Abaye said, “I already knew that liver cooked alone is permitted. What I meant to ask was if it is permitted to cook liver with other meat.”

Tosafos quoting Rabbeinu Tam: This Gemara is talking about unsalted liver, but salted liver is like any other meat that was kashered through salting, and one may cook it with other meat.

חולין קי ע”ב: אמר ליה אביי לרב ספרא: כי סלקת להתם בעי מינייהו, כבדא מה אתון ביה? כי סליק, אשכחיה לרב זריקא, אמר ליה: אנא שלקי ליה לרבי אמי ואכלֹ. כי אתא לגביה, אמר ליה: למיסר נפשה לא קא מיבעיא לי, כי קמבעיא לי ־ למיסר חבירתה.

אומר ר״ת דכולה הך שמעתא איירי בכבד שלא נמלח דאי בתר מליחה ושהייה במלח פשיטא דשרי לבשלה בהדי בשר שעל ידי מליחה יצא כל הדם.

שו”ע יו”ד ע”ג ס”א: הכבד יש בו ריבוי דם לפיכך לכתחלה אין לו תקנה לבשלו ע״י מליחה אלא קורעו שתי וערב ומניח חיתוכו למטה וצולהו (שיהא ראוי לאכילה) (או״ה נתיב ט״ו) ואחר כך יכול לבשלו… ובדיעבד מותר אם נתתבשל לבדו בקדירה (בלא צלייה) אבל הקדירה אסורה שפולטת ואינה בולעת ויש מי שאוסר. רמ”א: וכן נוהגין לאסור הכל.

Rabbi Avrohom Pam and his rebbetzin spent a week in Toronto. When they returned, Rabbi Yisroel Reisman came over to visit, and Rav Pam recounted the halachic questions that had been presented to him over the week.

“A lady bought a whole chicken, with the not-yet-kashered liver in a plastic bag inside the cavity of the chicken. She knew she needed to roast the liver, but since it was frozen, she decided to thaw it out by running hot water on it in the kitchen sink, while still in the plastic bag. Then she realized this might be considered cooking…”

“In whose house did this shailah happen?” the Rebbetzin broke in.

“In the house where we were staying,” said Rav Pam.

“So why didn’t they ask me?!” joked the Rebbetzin.

Rav Pam continued, “I was matir it for a combination of two reasons. First of all, pouring (עירוי) only cooks the outermost layer of an item, and here the outermost layer was the plastic bag, so the liver did not get cooked. This reason alone was not sufficient to permit it, because they ran it under the sink for a long time, and some say that with many pourings, the cooking goes deeper than a layer. The second reason is the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, brought by the Mechaber in 73:1. The Mechaber that although lechatchilah we follow the opinion of the Rambam and Rif that one must roast the liver, if one followed Rabbeinu Tam and cooked it, even without salting, it is kosher. The Rema says that we are strict even after the fact. But in this case, where we have the first reason too, I was matir it.” 

“If they had asked me, I would have said that too!” exclaimed the Rebbetzin.

Source: Rabbi Yisroel Reisman, tape on YD 73:3-6.

Kiddushin

Kiddushin 80b: The Night Watchman for Yichud

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Kiddushin 80b: One woman may be alone with two men. This was only said in the city, but on the road there must be three men, because if there were only two, one of them might need to go off and relieve himself, leaving the other man alone with the woman.

Even Hoezer 22:5: The same applies to night time: there must be three men.

קידושין פ ע”ב: לא יתייחד אדם עם שתי נשים, אבל אשה אחת מתייחדת עם שני אנשיםֹ. ושם בדף פא ע”א: אמר רב יהודה אמר רב: ל״ש אלא בעיר, אבל בדרך ־ עד שיהיו שלשה, שמא יצטרך אחד מהם להשתין, ונמצא אחד מתייחד עם הערוה.

שו”ע אה”ע כ”ב ס”ה ברמ”א: וכ״ז בעיר אבל בשדה או בלילה אפילו בעיר בעינן ג׳ (ב״י בשם הראב״ד).

Rabbi Meir Brandsdorfer was once asked to serve as the sole shomer for yichud for a chosson and kallah (following a chupas nidah). He sat learning at a shtender all night long.

Usually, at night we require two shomrim, because one might fall asleep. Here, R’ Meir Brandsdorfer either was not afraid of falling asleep, or else he held that a nap on a shtender would not be considered sleeping for this purpose.

[This depends on how we learn the Raavad, who is the source of the halacha that you need two shomrim at night. The Beis Yosef brings the Raavad as follows:

וכתב הראב”ד בספר בעלי הנפש שי”א דכי אמרינן דאשה מתיחסת עם שני אנשים כשרים ה”מ ביום אבל בלילה לא ישן עמה בבית אחד עד שיהיו שם ג’ אנשים מפני שהוא דומה לדרך דאמרינן לא שנו אלא בעיר אבל בדרך עד שיהיו ג’ שמא יצטרך א’ מהם לנקביו ונמצא זה מתיחד עם הערוה וה”נ חיישינן דילמא אדנאים חד מינייהו אזיל חד ועביד איסורא.

According to this version of the Raavad, he is talking about people who are awake at night, and the fear is that if there is only one shomer, the shomer might fall asleep and the other man might go and commit a sin. Therefore we need two shomrim (three men total), so that the likelihood of them both falling asleep is low.

But in the Sefer Baalei Hanefesh that we have, the girsa is אדנאים חד מינייהו איתער חד ועביד איסורא: “While one is asleep, the other will wake up and commit a sin.” This implies that the case is that they are all sleeping, and the fear is that if there are only two men, one man might wake up and sin. Therefore we require three, so that if one is tempted, he will be afraid to sin lest one of the two shomrim wake up. But if the shomer is trying to stay awake, there is no problem, either because we are not afraid he will fall asleep, or because the temporary dozing of someone trying to stay up all night is not a deep enough sleep to make the other man unafraid of being caught.]

Source: Chukei Chaim, Parshas Bo 5780 (#165)

Pesachim

Pesachim 46b: Making Knaidlach for the Last Day of Pesach

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Pesachim 46b: Rabbah said that one who cooks on Yom Tov for the next day does not violate a Torah prohibition because theoretically, guests may come today and eat the food. Although Rabbinically it is prohibited, Chazal made an exception when Yom Tov falls on Friday and one makes an eiruv tavshilin.  

Rema 527:20: One who is fasting on Yom Tov is forbidden to cook for others. R’ Akiva Eiger: This is only when one is abstaining from all food, but if one abstains from a particular food because of a chumra (e.g. kitnios), he is allowed to cook it for others, or even for himself to eat on the following day, since others could eat it today. Maharsham and Chazon Ish disagree with this in the case of kitnios but agree in the case of gebrokts.

פסחים מו ע”ב איתמר, האופה מיום טוב לחול, רב חסדא אמר: לוקה, רבה אמר: אינו לוקה. רב חסדא אמר: לוקה, לא אמרינן הואיל ומיקלעי ליה אורחים חזי ליה. רבה אמר: אינו לוקה, אמרינן הואיל. אמר ליה רבה לרב חסדא: לדידך, דאמרת לא אמרינן הואיל ־ היאך אופין מיום טוב לשבת? אמר ליה: משום עירובי תבשילין. ־ ומשום עירובי תבשילין שרינן איסורא דאורייתא? ־ אמר ליה: מדאורייתא צורכי שבת נעשין ביום טוב, ורבנן הוא דגזרו ביה, גזירה שמא יאמרו אופין מיום טוב אף לחול. וכיון דאצרכוה רבנן עירובי תבשילין ־ אית ליה היכירא.

שו”ע או”ח תקכ”ז ס”כ ברמ”א:  ומי שמתענה ביום טוב אסור לבשל לאחרים אפילו לצורך בו ביום דהוי כמי שלא הניח עירוב שאינו מבשל לאחרים (מהרי״ו).

וכתב המ”ב דהאחרונים חולקים על הרמ”א, וכתב ר’ עקיבא איגר (שו”ת א,ה) דאפילו להרמ”א היינו דוקא במי שמתענה אבל מי שנוהג איסור בדבר מסוים מותר לבשל לאחרים האוכלים אותו, או לעצמו על שבת אם אוכל אותו בשבת (כגון אשכנזי בן א”י המבשל קטניות לאחרון של פסח, הואיל וחולים או ספרדים יכולים לאכלו בו ביום(. והמהרש”ם בדעת תורה (תקכז,א) אסר דלא אמרינן הואיל ואי מיקלעי ליה אורחים כיון שמחזיק אותו כאיסור, וגם החזון איש (מט,טז) אסר מטעם אחר משום מוקצה, אבל שניהם כתבו דמותר לבשל מצה שרויה לאחרון של פסח, דאף המחמירים סוברים דמעיקר הדין מותר שהרי באחרון של פסח אוכלים, ולכך מותר לבשל ביו”ט הואיל ואם בא אורח הנוהג היתר היה יכול לאכלו בו ביום.

R’ Yaakov Kamenetsky told the following story about his great-great-great uncle, R’ Eliyahu Schick.

(R’ Eliyahu Schick’s sister was the grandmother of Chaya Shereshevsky, who married R’ Shmuel Hirsch Kamenetsky, R’ Yaakov’s grandfather.)

Once, while R’ Eliyahu was the rav of Derechin, there was a devasting fire, and he went to collect donations to help families rebuild. He came to the town of Smargon, where his cousin by marriage, R’ Leibele Shapiro (also known as R’ Leibele Kovner), who was the rav of the town, accompanied him. When they came before the home of a wealthy Chabad chassid, R’ Leibele told him there was no use going into that house because the owner would not contribute to anything in Derechin, a shtetl known to be a center of misnagdim. R’ Eliyahu himself was also personally considered to be a fervent misnaged, to the extent that Chassidim accused him of deliberately giving a psak to cause them suffering. In the year 1873, when Pesach fell on Shabbos, R’ Eliyahu prohibited the preparation of knaidlach on Friday for the last day of Pesach because he held that one may cook on Yom Tov for use on Shabbos only such food as one may eat on Yom Tov itself. When R’ Eliyahu passed away a year and a half later, the Chassidim contended that he was punished from Heaven because his ruling had prevented them from enjoying knaidlach on the single day out of Pesach when they were allowed to eat them.

R’ Eliyahu said, “I will bet you a ruble for the Volozhin Yeshiva that I can get a donation from him.” He went in and came out with three rubles. “How did you do it?” asked R’ Leibele. “I told him a story about the Alter Rebbe,” said R’ Eliyahu.

R’ Leibele then said, “You gained three rubles, and here is my ruble for Volozhin, but I cannot accompany you any longer because the Torah commands מדבר שקר תרחק.” 

R’ Leibele was a talmid of R’ Chaim Volozhiner, and his son, R’ Refoel Shapiro, was the Netziv’s son-in-law and successor as rosh yeshiva of Volozhin when it reopened in 1899. R’ Refoel’s son-in-law was R’ Chaim Brisker.

When R’ Leibele was on his deathbed, R’ Yisroel Salanter wanted to visit him, but R’ Leibel refused because he was opposed to the Mussar movement. People said to him, “Is this the time for machlokes?” R’ Leibele replied, “If not now, when? Will I not be going off in a short time to the World of Truth?”

R’ Yisroel Salanter said in his hesped on him, “The posuk in Daniel (8:12) says, ‘Truth will be cast down to the ground.’ What we are doing now is burying truth underground.” The ability to perceive one’s adversary as being truthful – while wrong – because he is consistent in his outlook indicates that R’ Yisroel himself was so unequivocally committed to truth that he had greater esteem for one who was truthful than for one who was in agreement with his Mussar approach.

[R’ Eliyahu evidently held that those who don’t eat gebrokts consider it a real prohibition and therefore cannot take into account the possibility that those who do eat it might show up for a meal – similar to the halacha of kitnios according to the Maharsham.]

Source: Making of a Godol, pages 111-114

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 12a: The Skull Under the Mizbeyach

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Sanhedrin 12a: The Sages say that Beis Din should not add an extra month to the year to allow time for tamei people to become clean before Pesach, but rather they should make Pesach with tumah. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and holds it is better to add the month. And this was the story with Chizkiyah, king of Yehuda: he added a month due to tumah.

Tosafos: What was the tumah in the case of Chizkiyah? The Yerushalmi says that they found the skull of Aravna the Yevusi under the mizbeyach.

סנהדרין יב ע”א: תנו רבנן: אין מעברין את השנה מפני הטומאה, רבי יהודה אומר: מעברין. אמר רבי יהודה: מעשה בחזקיה מלך יהודה שעיבר את השנה מפני הטומאה. תוס’: ובירושלמי אמר דגולגלתו של ארונה היבוסי מצאו תחת המזבח.

After the shaitel controversy in 2004, Rabbi Ahron Dovid Dunner went to Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky and asked, “Sometimes it happens that there is a ‘tummel’ and we find out that everyone has been doing something wrong for a long time. Is there a precedent in Chazal for such a thing?” R’ Chaim replied, “The Yerushalmi says that they found a skull buried under the mizbeyach.” That meant all the avodah in the Beis Hamikdash for the last 300 or so years had been invalid and forbidden. You can’t imagine more of an upset than that.

[The Tzion Yerushalayim (on the page of the Yerushalmi Pesachim 64a and Sanhedrin 5b) seems to be bothered by the fact that Har Habayis was built on top of underground domes to prevent any tumah from coming up. This is stated by the Rambam in Hilchos Parah Adumah 2:7:

שכל הר הבית והעזרות תחתיהן היה חלול מפני קבר התהום.

And his source for this is the Mishnah in Parah 3:3.

The Tzion Yerushalayim says that the answer is given by the Mishneh Lamelech on Beis Habechirah 1:13. There the Rambam writes:

המזבח אין עושין אותו אלא בנין אבנים גזית וזה שנאמר בתורה מזבח אדמה תעשה לי שיהיה מחובר באדמה שלא יבנוהו לא על גבי כיפין ולא על גבי מחילות.

“The mizbeyach must be built of hewn stones. And although the Torah says, ‘You shall make Me an altar of earth,’ that does not mean that the actual mizbeyach should be made of earth, only that it must be connected to the earth, not built atop domes or tunnels.”

The source for this Rambam is the Gemara in Zevachim 58a. The Mishneh Lamelech points out that we see here that the mizbeyach was different from all other areas of Har Habayis, and that explains why it was such a problem when they found the skull of Aravna the Yevusi – there was no dome over his skull to block the tumah from rising up.

There are several more difficulties with this story.

  1. The Tzion Yerushalayim ends by asking that Aravna was a non-Jew and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai holds that the graves of non-Jews are not metamei. At the very least, this story should have been brought as a proof against Rabbi Shimon. He leaves this question unanswered.
  2. Why was only the skull of Aravna found? What happened to the rest of his skeleton?
  3. Based on Pesachim 81b, the tzitz atones for tumah of the tehom – tumah that no one knows about. If so, why was most of Klal Yisroel tamei? Before they found the skull, it was tumah of the tehom. After they found it, they removed it!
  4. Why wasn’t the hollow space of the Shisin itself sufficient to block the tumah?
  5. Dovid bought the field from Aravna when he, Aravna, was still alive, so how could he have been buried there? And even if we say that David let Aravna continue to live there until the Beis Hamikdash was built, why would he have been allowed to be buried there, given that they were planning to build the Beis Hamikdash?

In Makos 11a we read the story of how Dovid Hamelech dug the Shisin (the tank under the mizbeyach into which the wine of the nesachim ran). Water from underground began spraying upward in a geyser, and he asked Achisofel whether it was allowed to write the name of Hashem and block the hole. Rashi asks: Achisofel died during the rebellion of Avshalom, three years before Dovid bought the Temple Mount. He answers that many years earlier Dovid had already figured out with Shmuel where the Beis Hamikdash would be, and he dug the Shisin with permission from Aravna.

Accordingly, it may be that Aravna fell into the Shisin, which was already dug in his time, and died. The kohanim in Chizkiyahu’s time perhaps discovered it when they went down to clean the Shisin. The Gemara says (Meilah 11b) that once in 70 years, the young kohanim would go down into the Shisin and clean it out. Maybe this was not yet done regularly during the First Beis Hamikdash era.

The skull had rolled from the main chamber into a drain pipe, where there was no space to block the tumah. But the rest of the skeleton was in the hollow space of the Shisin.

When first discovered, the skull was thought to be Jewish, so the people considered themselves tamei and postponed Pesach. But then someone came forward and told them that it was Aravna.

And regarding the question of tumas ha-tehom, maybe since the skeleton had already been found in the Shisin years before, but was not considered a problem since the hollow space blocked the tumah, the skull found later in the pipe was not considered tehom, since after all someone did know about its body.

Another interesting question: If there is a rule that the mizbeyach must not be built over empty space, then why was it allowed to have the Shisin? The answer may be that only man-made domes are forbidden, but the Shisin was a natural cave, created in the six days of creation (Succah 49a) and all Dovid Hamelech did was clear out the loose dirt and pebbles from it (Rashi Succah 53b).

Today there is a cave under the rock in the Dome of the Rock. Rabbi Leibel Reznick has proposed that the rock, as the original peak of the mountain and the only place there not built on domes, is the place of the mizbeyach. The cave under it would then be the Shisin. There is a large, round marble slab on the floor of the cave, and it is said that this slab covers the entrance to another cave below. The Radbaz writes (Teshuva 691) that he heard from Arabs that the earlier kings wanted to see what was in the cave, so they lowered people down, and they died. (Presumably the people who died were pulled back up, so we won’t have to worry about skulls down there when moshiach comes.)  Therefore they closed off the cave and filled it with dirt, and to this day no one knows what is there.

In 1865 Captain Charles Wilson was sent with the sanction of the British War Department to survey the water supply of Jerusalem. The director of his survey writes that the hole in the bottom of the cave leads to a drain flowing down to Nachal Kidron. The Mishnah (Midos 3:2 and Yuma 5:6) indeed says that the blood flowed down from the base of the mizbeyach into a drain leading to Nachal Kidron.]

Source: Tape by Rabbi Ahron Dovid Dunner; The Holy Temple Revisited by Leibel Reznick p. 113

Bava Kama

Bava Kama 110b: Annulling a Marriage Retroactively

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Bava Kama 110b: If so [if a person’s korban reverts to his heirs when he dies without getting kaparah from it, since he consecrated it in error], shall we then say when a woman’s husband dies and his brother is afflicted with ugly boils, she should be free without chalitzah, for she married him in error? – There it is different, because we are witness that she is happy with any marriage, and thus it was worth it to her to be married to her husband, even if that would result in her being stuck at the mercy of his ugly brother.

בבא קמא קי ע”ב: אלא מעתה, יבמה שנפלה לפני מוכה שחין תיפוק בלא חליצה, דאדעתא דהכי לא קדשה עצמהִ התם אנן סהדי דמינח ניחא לה בכל דהו, כריש לקיש, דאמר ר״ל: טב למיתב טן דו מלמיתב ארמלו.

In 1981, a woman in her 60s entered the office of Tel Aviv’s beis din, chaired by Rabbi Yitzchak Yedidya Frankel. The woman had recently arrived from Bukhara, and when she told her story, tears welled in the eyes of all those present.

She had married in 1941 while living in Bukhara, but just before the wedding the Germans swept into the Soviet Union in a surprise attack. Her fiancé was drafted into the Soviet army, they married, and shortly afterward he was sent to the battlefield and killed. His death was verified beyond a doubt, but this left the young widow in need of chalitzah from her late husband’s brother in order to be free to remarry. The brother, however, was an official in the Communist Party and he absolutely refused to participant in anything that smacked of religion. He left her as an agunah for 40 years – though he knew of the suffering he was imposing on her, he would not soften his position.

Despite this woman’s lack of any formal Jewish education, she stood fast to her principles and withstood this incredible nisayon. Now in her later years, she approached the beis din and asked if there was any way to permit her to marry, so that she would not be forced to spend the rest of her life all alone.

The beis din, which consisted of Rabbi Frankel, Rabbi Shmuel Baruch Werner and Rabbi Shlomo Tenne, searchd high and low to find a glimmer of hope for this courageous woman. Finally, they found grounds for leniency, based on the fact that her brother-in-law had discarded his Jewish identity entirely.  The Mordechai brings the Maharam, who says that although the Gemara says it is worth it to a woman to get married even at the risk of falling to the mercy of an ugly brother, it is not worth it to her when the brother is a mumar, someone who has discarded his Jewish identity. The only reason she married him, says the Maharam, was because she did not know about the existence or lifestyle of the brother, or else she did not know about the laws of chalitzah. Since this was a highly unusual case with little precedent, they were hesitant to rely on their own findings, so they sent them to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein for his approval.

Several weeks passed and they heard no word from Reb Moshe. Finally Rabbi Frankel called Reb Moshe’s home one day at 4:00 in the afternoon (9:00 in the morning in New York). He related the story of the poor woman’s plight and emphasized that we must not prolong her suffering any longer than necessary. It was obviously by the tone of Rabbi Frankel’s voice that he was upset by the fact that he had not received a reply all this time.

Reb Moshe apologized profusely, explaining that he had never seen the letter from the beis din. Apparently, his family members had withheld it from him due to his frail health (he was almost 90 years old). He promised to demand that he be shown the letter immediately and that he would respond promptly. Just four hours later, the doorbell rang. It was a messenger from the Israeli Postal Service with a telegram in hand. The message, in Hebrew words and in Latin characters, was: “She may get married. My responsum will follow. Moshe Feinstein.”

Reb Moshe’s handwritten responsum arrived via airmail some two weeks later. His decision was based not on the fact that the brother was anti-religious – we don’t pasken like the Maharam – but rather on the fact that this case is different from the Gemara’s in that there must have been information the wife did not know at the time of marriage. In the Gemara’s case, where the husband was healthy and his life was not in danger in any way, she made an informed decision to marry him and accept the risk of falling to yibum. In the Bukharian case, where there was a war raging and her husband had been drafted, why would she marry him knowing that he was likely to die? It could only be that she was misinformed: either she did not know about chalitzah at all, or she knew but assumed that this brother did not count as a Jew. Therefore her marriage was in error and she is permitted to remarry without chalitzah. 

[There is a question here in pshat in the Gemara. The Gemara distinguishes between the case of a person who was makdish a korban and then died, and the woman who got married and then her husband died. In the case of the korban, we say that had he known he was going to die, he would not have been makdish it, so retroactively the korban was never a korban and it falls to his heirs. In the case of the husband dying, we say that the woman got married knowing the risks and the marriage is not invalidated retroactively. What is the difference?

We could answer this by positing a difference in the case, or a difference in the logic. The “difference in the case” approach would be to say that in the korban case, he died quickly, within the short time it takes to bring the korban to the Beis Hamikdash. Thus we can assume that he must have had some hidden sickness before, of which he was not aware, and therefore this is not נולד. The consecration of the korban was בטעות because he was not fully aware of the risk he was taking. In the husband dying case, the husband may have died several years after the marriage. Quite probably he was not sick at the time of the marriage, so the risk of him dying was not any greater than anyone else. The woman’s decision was fully informed, so the marriage is not invalidated.

The “difference in logic” approach would be to say that in both cases the man probably had some condition that raised his risk of dying, but a wife has a higher risk tolerance, since the benefit of being married now tips the scales of her mind. So although she was unaware of the husband’s condition, still she would have married him even had she known the true risk. But in the korban case, had the man known about his own medical condition, he would not have been makdish the korban.

In our story, the woman was aware of the risks, since the German invasion had already happened and her husband had already been drafted before the marriage. These risks are much higher than the usual risk of a person dying, even a person with a medical condition. Also, there is a smaller benefit to tip the scale, since she would only be with the husband for the short time prior to his deployment. Reb Moshe therefore reasoned that there is no way she would have married him, unless she were misinformed about something else: she did not know about chalitzah at all, or she knew but assumed that this brother did not count as a Jew.]

Source: Hamodia, Vayeitzei 5780

Menachos

Menachos 21a: I Forgot Whether I Salted the Meat

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Menachos 21a: One who eats cooked blood does not transgress [the Torah prohibition].

מנחות כא ע”א: אמר זעירי א״ר חנינא: דם שבישלו אינו עובר עליו.

A woman came to the Taz and asked, “I cooked meat, but forgot whether I salted it beforehand.” The Taz permitted it because of ספק דרבנן לקולא – in a doubtful situation on an enactment of the Sages, we rule leniently. We salt meat to remove its blood, but even if we did not remove the blood, once the meat is cooked, cooked blood is forbidden only Rabbinically. Therefore, salting is only a Rabbinic question. Although the rule is that even a doubtful situation of a Rabbinic law, where there is a חזקה – a status quo situation where it is forbidden – we rule strictly, in this case the fact that the meat originally had blood is not considered a חזקה.

The Taz proves this from a case in Shulchan Aruch: meat was known to be soaked and salted, and then a non-Jewish employee cooked it, saying that he soaked it a second time. We rely on his words if he is מסיח לפי תומו – he is speaking casually, not aware that we are relying on him. Now, “speaking casually” is only relied upon when the prohibition is Rabbinic and there is no חזקה. So it must be the fact that the meat originally had blood is not considered a חזקה.

Why not? The Chavos Daas explains that the meat is one thing and its blood is another. The meat itself was never forbidden, only it had blood mixed into it. By salting, we are separating the two, but we are not permitting anything that was previously forbidden.  

The Shach (Nekudos Hakesef) disagrees and argues that in the case of the non-Jew, if there were no חזקה we would permit the meat even without the non-Jew’s casual testimony because every Rabbinic doubt is permitted (ספק דרבנן לקולא). From the fact that we do require his מסיח לפי תומו, we see that blood in the meat is called איתחזק איסורא. And why then is he believed? The Shach (Sifsei Kohein) already explains that non-Jews care about cleanliness and it is likely that he washed the meat anyway. Therefore, here in the case of the woman who is unsure whether she salted the meat, we follow the חזקה  and the meat is forbidden.

The Taz adds that she probably followed habit and salted the meat. To this, the Shach responds that since salting is a big job, the fact that she doesn’t remember it probably means she didn’t do it

[Seemingly there is a big question on this Taz. If blood in meat is not איתחזק איסורא, then treife taste absorbed in a pot is also not איזחזק איסורא for the same reason: the pot is one thing and the treife taste is another, and we are only separating the two. But the whole source for the rule that מסיח לפי תומו is not relied upon by an איסורא דרבנן דאיתחזק איסורא is the end of Siman 137, which says that aנכרי מסיח לפי תומו  is not believed to say that a pot was kashered!

This same question can be asked in Siman 102 in the laws of דבר שיש לו מתירין. The Rema (s’if 4) states that meat with blood in it is not דבר שיש לו מתירין because the meat itself doesn’t need to become permitted; the blood merely has to be extracted. But in s’if 3 all agree that treif utensils would be דבר שיש לו מתירין, if not for the fact that it would be expensive to kasher them.]

Source: Taz, Yoreh Deah 69:24

Avodah Zarah

Avodah Zarah 51b: Shaitels from the Temples of India

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Avodah Zarah 51b: If one found on the idol’s head money, garments or vessels, they are permitted. Clusters of grapes, crowns made of sheaves, wines, oils and flours, or anything similar to what is brought on the mizbeyach – they are forbidden.

Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 139:3: An offering to an idol becomes forbidden if either: 1) It is a item that is brought on the mizbeyach, like meat, oil, water or salt. 2) An action was done to it that is similar to slaughtering or splattering (זריקה), provided it is done with the object that is normally used in the worship of this idol, even if the slaughtering or splattering is not the normal manner.

For example, if the idol is usually worshipped by waving a stick in front of it, and one broke a stick in front of it, the stick becomes forbidden, because breaking the stick is similar to slaughtering. But if the idol is not worshipped with a stick at all and one broke a stick in front of it, he is not liable to punishment, nor does the stick become forbidden.  

עבודה זרה נא ע”ב: מצא בראשו מעות, כסות או כלים ־ הרי אלו מותרין.ֹ פרכילי ענבים, ועטרות של שבלים, ויינות ושמנים וסלתות, וכל דבר שכיוצא בו קרב ע״ג המזבח ־ אסור.

יורה דעה קלט ס”ג: איזהו נוי ואיזהו תקרובת? נוי כגון שמדליק לפניה נרות או שטח לפניה בגדים וכלים נאים לנוי. ותקרובת כל שכיוצא בו קרב על גבי מזבח כמו כל מיני מאכל כגון בשר שמנים וסלתות מים ומלח אם הניחו לפניה לשם תקרובת נאסר מיד אבל דבר שאין מקריבין ממנו בפנים אינו נאסר אלא א״כ עשה ממנו כעין זביחה או כעין זריקה המשתברת והוא דרך לעובדה באותו דבר אע״פ שאין דרך לעובדה בזה הענין. כיצד אליל שעובדים אותה שמקשקשים לפניה במקל ושיבר מקל לפניה נאסר מפני ששבירת המקל דומה לזביחה, אבל אם אין עובדים אותה במקל כלל ושיבר מקל לפניה אינו חייב ולא נאסר.

In 2004 the Jewish community became aware that some of the hair for shaitels comes from Indian temples, and they feared it might have the status of an offering to an idol, from which it is forbidden to derive benefit. Women were told not to wear human hair shaitels until the matter was investigated and a conclusion reached.

The problem had actually been raised many years earlier in 1990 by Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos Vehanhagos v. 2 siman 414). Rav Sternbuch wrote that Hindus believe that hair is holy and forbidden to cut outside of a religious context. If there is some danger in their family and they are saved, they give thanks to the idol by shaving off their hair and bringing it to the priest, who would burn it for the idol. But recently, with the rising demand for hair to make wigs, the priests stopped burning it and instead they sell it to companies and generate income for the temple. This is the source of the Indian hair on the market. The Shulchan Aruch requires an action similar to slaughtering, and the cutting of the hair is exactly that. The masses of villagers in India still believe that the priests burn their hair as an offering, otherwise they would not agree to shave it. That is why the merchants in the hair business or the government of India sometimes deny that the hair comes from the temples. But it is true and clear that it is so. Merchants who went to India to buy hair testified before Rav Sternbuch that they got it from the temples.

In a second teshuva on the subject (v. 3 siman 265), the asker argued that he heard from the priests that the hair cutting is not a service to the idol but simply a removal of the impure hair, so that they can go into the temple without it.

[At this point it will be helpful to split the various issues up and give them numbers, so that we can more easily follow the arguments of the poskim in this story.]

Issue (1): What defines דרך עבודתה, the standard method of worship? The Gemara defines two types of offerings that become forbidden: a) anything that is brought on the mizbeyach b) taking any object that is normal used in the service of that particular idol (e.g. an idol that is served using a stick) and performing an act of shechitah or zerikah on it. Rav Sternbuch wrote that all theory aside, we have to look what the women who actually get their hair cut off are thinking. Even if officially Hinduism says what the priests say, the women see the shaving as showing their dedication to their idol by giving up their beauty, and that is why they do it right near the temple – so that the idol should see their self-sacrifice for him and help them. They want to give the idol pleasure, even if their religion doesn’t require it.

Issue (2) The intent of the barbers. The asker also raised the question that perhaps the barber, who is doing the action of cutting, is not doing it for avodah zarah, just to earn a living. To this Rav Sternbuch responded that perhaps that is true, but there is another problem:

Issue (3): Are the women helping the barbers? Just as it says in Makos 20b that if someone turns his head to make it easier for the barber to cut his peyos, he is considered a participant in the sin of cutting peyos, here too, since the woman having her hair shaven helps the barber by sitting in the right place and moving her head, she is taking part in the action. Since her intention is to serve the avodah zarah, the hair is considered an offering.  

~~~

However, Rav Elyashiv in Kovetz Teshuvos v. 1 siman 77 ruled that the hair was mutar, and responded to the three issues mentioned above:

Issue (1): As mentioned, something not brought on the mizbeyach is only ossur if it is an object that is normally used in service of this idol. In this case, however, the Hindu idol is not served with hair, since official Hinduism does not consider hair a sacrifice. Therefore even if an individual worshipper did offer up her hair to the idol, and perfomed shechitah (cutting) on it, it would not become forbidden.

Issue (2): Secondly, even if someone were not to accept the above reasoning, the barber is the one doing the cutting. The barber certainly knows that the hair is sold, not offered to the idol.

Issue (3): Rav Sternbuch’s logic of מסייע, based on the Gemara in Makos 20b – that the woman is helping the barber by tilting her head and she intends to offer the hair – is not halachically valid, because the Shach (Nekudos Hakesef on Yoreh Deah 198:20) says that this principle only applies to shaving the peyos, where the Torah says לא תקיפו in the plural. The Taz disagrees and applies the principle of מסייע to a woman having her nails cut by a non-Jew on Shabbos before going to the mikveh. But even the Taz might agree that the “helping” doesn’t work to create the status of an offering to idolatry. In any case, the Sidrei Taharah rules like the Shach.

Issue (4): The cutting of the hair is not done in the temple itself, in front of the idol. The Gemara’s language, “If he broke a stick in front of it” implies that the stick only becomes forbidden when the service is done in front of the idol. The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch also copy this language.

Rav Elyashiv concludes with a word of caution: his psak was based only on the facts as presented to him, and it would be worthwhile to investigate and find out more.

~~~

In 2004 the issue was raised again when a British Jew at the airport on his way home from Canada met some Indians, who were talking about going to the temple to offer up their hair. The Eidah Chareidis and Rav Elyashiv asked Rabbi Ahron Dovid Dunner to investigate. He interviewed a professor of Hinduism, who explained all about their religion. Dayan Dunner asked him how a statue that was just built could help him. He said, “We serve the Creator of the world; these statues are just reminders. And the tonsuring (cutting the hair) is just a way of giving up our ego before going to the temple.” But when he interviewed Hindu laymen, he got varying answers. Some did really believe in the statues. Some said that the hair was a sacrifice to them. They bring their hair either as a request for something from the idol, or as thanks for saving them from danger. He reported back to the poskim in Eretz Yisroel, who encouraged him to go to India, visit the temples themselves and find out the true facts.

Dayan Dunner traveled with his wife and one other rav from the London beis din to visit the temple at Tirupati. They were assisted by a Jew living in India as well as a local translator. (Translation was difficult because there are over a hundred languages spoken in India. The people at the temple spoke Tamil, so the local translator had to translate from Tamil to Hindi, and then the Jew from Bombay translated from Hindi to a mixture of English and Hebrew.)

Issue (1): All the people cutting having their hair cut said that they were giving it to the idol because the idol likes it; it makes him happy. Also, they observed that the women put their hands on their hearts and said prayers during the tonsure. Also, they saw some girls who were not willing to sacrifice all their hair, so they just had a few strands cut off. This seemed to prove that the purpose is not to remove something impure or to break one’s ego and walk out with a bald head. When Dayan Dunner’s group asked some of the women if they minded that their hair was being sold, they said no, why not let the idol make a profit from it?

Issue (4): As to the argument that a sacrifice is only forbidden if done right in front of the idol, Dayan Dunner’s group saw thousands upon thousands of people walking up a 20 kilometer mountain barefoot to see this idol, and waiting in line for 24 hours to get in. The only service they do when passing in front of the idol is to recite a few of the idol’s names and put some money or jewelry in the collection box. The rest of the services, including hair tonsuring, are done in separate buildings. The entire mountain is considered holy by them and thus might be considered “in front of the idol.”

Issue (5): What percentage of Indian hair on the market comes from the temples? After this, Dayan Dunner and his group followed the hair out of the temple to Madras, a major city nearby where the human hair trade is a big business. The merchants there explained to them the high quality of temple hair. All over India, they said, women collect and sell their brush hair (hair that falls out during brushing) because they are afraid someone might find it and make witchcraft against them. This brush hair is not high quality, first of all because it is weak hair (the weakest hairs are generally the ones that fall out) and secondly because the roots and tails are not aligned, and when roots are placed next to tails they get caught and tangled like Velcro. Temple hair, which is cut off all at once, is the best.

From there he traveled to Eretz Yisroel and reported to Rav Elyashiv. Rav Elyashiv paskened: “Temple hair is an offering to avodah zarah and is therefore ossur. One may not use any shaitel made of Indian hair. According to current knowledge, most of the shaitels sold in Eretz Yisroel come from India. Therefore one may not buy a shaitel here unless one knows its source. In other places, it depends where the majority come from. If the majority is from other countries, it is permitted based on the rule of כל דפריש. But one is obligated to investigate the source of the hair.” Rabbi Tovia Weiss and the beis din of the Eidah Chareidis heard the facts too and gave the same psak.

[It seems that the new information changed Rav Elyashiv’s mind on issues (1) and (4). On (1), he saw that a significant number of worshippers look at the hair as a gift to the idol, and that was enough to be considered דרך עבודתה. On (4), the whole mountaintop was considered “in front of the idol.” The question is why he changed on issue (2) and (3). This will become clear below in his letter to Rabbi Belsky.]

News of the psak spread around the world in a matter of minutes. Women walked out of weddings and took off their sheitels. Teachers came to school in tichels.

~~~

Rabbi Dunner then traveled to America and gave his testimony in front of 60 rabbis. Rabbi Yisroel Belsky consulted with Hindu priests and scholars, including many converts and baalei teshuva, all of whom confirmed the facts established earlier, namely, that official Hinduism teaches that no holiness or sacrificial status is accorded to the hair. On the contrary, hair is a symbol of the ego, is impure, and thus held to be displeasing to their gods.

Issue (1): Rav Belsky took the position that דרך עבודתה is determined by the priests and the official books, no matter how many simple pilgrims believe differently. Besides, perhaps the words Dayan Dunner heard from the worshippers were garbled in the chain of translations. He pointed out that the translator from Tamil to Hindi spoken only broken Hindi, and the translator from Hindi to English was really a native Marathi speaker for whom Hindi was also a second language.

Issue (2): Dayan Dunner testified to Rav Belsky that the barbers told him that they were working because they were paid by the temple. A worker, however ignorant he may be, does his work in accordance with the intentions of the one who hired him and paid him. Therefore, the barbers are cutting the hair based on the priests’ version of Hinduism, not that of the worshippers. And it is only the barbers’ intent that counts since they are the ones doing the act.

Rav Belsky also heard from a baal teshuva who had once been a Hindu, and knew the language well, that the barbers constantly chat and joke with each other while they work, about politics or about their union. When he mentioned this to Dayan Dunner, he agreed, but argued that it’s no different from Jews who talk in shul. Rav Belsky said, “True, and who says they are having kavanah while they talk?”

Issue (5): Rav Belsky heard from experts that most hair exported from India is not from the temples. For example, in 2004 the amount of temple hair processed in India was about 300 tons, while the amount of brush hair was about 4000 tons.

Issue (6): Even if we were to consider it kavua, which makes it like a 50-50 question, the hair from India then gets taken to other countries where it is mixed with other hair. This is a case of two mixtures, which the Rambam permits in the case of avodah zarah (Shach Yoreh Deah 110:52).

Rav Belsky put all of the above arguments in a letter to Rav Elyashiv. 

~~~

Rav Elyashiv responded:

Issue (1): According to the testimony of Dayan Dunner, the tonsuring is עבודתה בכך – the normal manner of worshipper this idol. This is similar to the idol Kemosh mentioned in the Torah, of which the Rambam says in Sefer Hamitzvos (negative commandment #6)

שהעובד לאיזה דבר שהוא ממיני עבודה זרה באיזה מין שיהיה ממיני העבודה – הרי זה חייב כרת, בתנאי שיעבד כדרכה, כלומר: בדבר שדרכה להעבד בו, כגון פוער לפעור וזורק אבן למרקוליס, ומעביר שערו לכמוש.

“One who worships avodah zarah is liable to the punishment of kareis, as long as he did it in the normal manner for that idol, for example… if one shaves his hair off to Kemosh.”

Here, during the haircut the women say the name of the idol.

Issue (2): And the barbers said to him [Dayan Dunner] that even though they are working for money, still – they said – they are also Hindus who see this as service to the avodah zarah. In such a case we clearly apply the rule that “we can assume an idol worshipper does things for idolatry” (Chullin 13a), since that is the goal of the women getting their hair cut.

Issue (5): Rav Elyashiv says he was shown a document from the Indian government stating that 75% of the hair exported from India is from the temples. And even if most were not from the temples, it would be considered kavua. The Divrei Chaim (2:57) says that when a Jew orders something from a non-Jewish store and the non-Jew ships it to him, it is as if the Jew himself took from the store, so the rule of כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה applies and it is a 50-50 question. 

Issue (6): As to Rav Belsky’s argument that there are two mixtures, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 110:8) requires three mixtures and doesn’t mention the Rambam’s leniency about two mixtures to permit avodah zarah. Furthermore, how can one use the mixture of hair from different countries to nullify Indian hair, when there are different qualities and prices for hair from different sources, and they are sold separately?

~~~

Subsequently, Rav Belsky met with Rav Elyashiv, did more research and wrote a letter back to him.

Issue (1): Rav Elyashiv quoted the Rambam about shaving one’s hair for the idol Kemosh. The fact that donating one’s hair is the normal manner of service to Kemosh does not prove it is normal for the Hindu idols. The Hindu priests themselves all say that it is not. The only indication that it is normal comes from a few statements that Dayan Dunner heard, through a chain of unreliable translators. Even if the translation was correct, the understanding of simple people does not determine the normal manner of service for halachic purposes.

Besides, even if the Hindu religion were exactly like the worship of Kemosh, the Rambam is only saying that the act of shaving one’s hair for Kemosh is the normal manner of service, and therefore one who does so would be punished. He is not saying that the worshippers actually dedicate their hair to Kemosh, rendering the hair forbidden. Lehavdil, we Jews also have a mitzvah to shave hair for Hashem in certain cases (e.g. a Nazir) but we don’t dedicate the hair itself to hekdesh in any way. Rather, the act of service is performed on the person.

We can prove that the Rambam did not mean that the worshippers dedicate their hair to Kemosh, because if he did, the hair would be like a korban that is slaughtered, and the Rambam would have listed it in his next sentence where he says that one is punishable for worshipping avodah zarah through any of the four standard avodos, of which shechitah is one.

Issue (2): Rav Elyashiv seemed to have heard from Dayan Dunner that the barbers said they saw the haircuts as service to the avodah zarah, but when Rav Belsky and the other American rabbis pressed him to tell them what exactly he had heard from the barbers, it appears that he only heard them say they were working for their pay, and perhaps that they saw their work as holy, but nothing more. In any case, the baal teshuva who knew their language well testified that the barbers chat about politics and other mundane matters as they work, like all barbers. If they have any religious intent, it is that of the priests who pay their salaries.

Issue (5): The “Indian government statement” that 75% of Indian hair is temple hair was made by a low-ranking office worker who took it from a webpage. When the rabbis investigated the webpage, they saw that he had read it backwards and most of the hair was not from the temples. Furthermore, the rabbis spent 8 hours with the owner of a large hair processing firm in India and determined that none of his hair was from the temples. A statement quoted from a rav in Antwerp that supposedly claimed that most of the shaitels come from temple hair was likewise proven to be a misquotation.  

The reason why there is so much non-temple hair is that in India, hair is collected in a different manner from most other countries. In Romania, Hungary, Spain and Russia, women interested in selling their hair grow their hair for up to several years and then cut it all off at one time. The hair must be grown to at least eight inches long in order to be used for a wig. Women in India generally do not cut their hair all at once. Rather, they grow their hair extremely long, not cutting it for years, and whenever they brush their hair they collect the strands that fall out. Every few weeks representatives from hair collection firms visit these women and buy the brush hair in exchange for cash. Indeed, selling brush hair is an important source of income for many poverty-stricken families. It is one of the reasons they do not cut their hair all at once. Were they to do that, the women would only make money once every few years. This way, they can put food on the table each week.

The brush hair is sorted by quality, shade and length in large facilities in India. Then it is shipped to Romania or Ukraine for bleaching and dyeing. From there it is shipped to the wig-weaving factories in China and Korea.

The only time Indian women cut their hair off all at once is in the temples. This is called “Indian Remy hair” in the industry. With Remy hair, there is no need for sorting. Before the hair is cut, the hair is gathered together with two ribbons, one at the end near the tip and another close to the scalp. This keeps all the hair strands root to root and tip to tip. Brush hairs are much longer than the Remy hair, but Remy is by far the better of the two types. There is also European Remy hair, tied and cut in the same way. Whether from India or elsewhere, Remy hair is generally used without processing and in its natural color. It is known for its silky texture and natural luster.  Almost all Indian Remy hair is solid black and comes in four natural shades.

The bleaching and dyeing process is used only for brush hair, but Remy hair is used in its natural color. Wig manufacturers would never subject Remy hair to bleaching and dyeing because it is worth much more in its natural state. Thus only a woman buying a black shaitel need worry about temple hair. Any other color is certainly either Indian brush hair, or European Remy hair.

In any case, even if we were to doubt the above facts, gathered from people in the industry, the hair being exported from India is at worst a mixture of temple and brush hair, with brush hair as the majority. The rule of kavua would not apply because the hair already became mixed beyond recognition while in the hands of the goy, before the Jewish company ordered. Therefore it is not comparable to the case of the Divrei Chaim, where a Jew orders something from a store that sells separate recognizable items.

Issue (6): As to the rule that avodah zarah is never nullified in a mixture, and according to the Shulchan Aruch even two mixtures, that halacha was only stated in Zevachim 74b regarding rings or silver cups which are expensive and valuable. But hair is nullified. In any case, here we have two mixtures and the Rambam permits that, as mentioned. 

Regarding Rav Elyashiv’s argument that hair is recognizable as Indian and therefore is not considered mixed, Rav Belsky replied that of course if it is labeled Indian that is true. Rav Belsky’s two mixtures argument applies in a case where it is labeled Ukrainian or Hungarian, yet we fear that some Indian hair is mixed into it.

[It would seem that the dispute on Issue (1) hinges on how to apply the rule of “normal manner of service.” Everyone would agree that if someone went to the Hindu idol and threw stones, because he believed that was the normal manner of worship, it would not make him liable to the punishment for idolatry, nor would the stones become forbidden, since the official religion does not prescribe that. But here, everyone agrees that Hinduism does encourage having one’s hair cut. The act is certainly “the normal manner of service” and someone doing so would be liable to punishment. The question is only in how to interpret the act. The official religion interprets it as an act of surrendering one’s pride. The simple people see it as giving the hair to the idol. Do we say that these simple people are still within the bounds of “the normal manner” since, after all, their action is the normal action and it is only their thoughts that are deviant?

Furthermore, the Gemara does say, and the Shulchan Aruch does rule, that if an idol is normally served with a stick and one breaks a stick in front of it, even though breaking is not the normal manner of service, the stick becomes forbidden. Thus only the object has to be normal, but the action done with it can be abnormal. Perhaps here as well, Rav Elyashiv would argue that since the object, hair, is normally used for service, only the dedication of the hair is abnormal, that is enough to forbid the hair. Rav Belsky would argue that the hair is not used for service at all; it is just an irrelevant by-product of the service done on the body of the one getting her hair cut.]

Sources: Shulchan Halevi pp. 437-446; Shulchan Halevi – Halachic Responsa from the Desk of Harav Yisroel Belsky, v. 1 p. 155; Rabbi Ahron Dovid Dunner – Lecture available on Kol Halashon

Sanhedrin

Sanhedrin 19a: Keeping an Eye on your Children

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Sanhedrin 19a: Rabbi Yosi in Tzipori made a law that a woman may not walk in the street with her son behind her, because of a story that happened. Rashi: A boy was kidnapped and taken into a house, and when the mother began to cry, one of the kidnappers offered to help and show her where her son went. When she entered the house, they raped her.

סנהדרין יט ע”א: ואמר רמי בר אבא: התקין רבי יוסי בציפורי שלא תהא אשה מהלכת בשוק ובנה אחריה, משום מעשה שהיה. פירש רש”י:  שגנבוהו פריצים מאחריה ונתנוהו בבית, וכשחזרה ולא ראתהו, התחילה צועקת ובוכה, בא אחד מהם ואמר: בואי ואראנו ליך, ונכנסה אחריו ועינו אותה. והובא להלכה באה”ע כב,יד.

A tichel-clad young woman walked into a Judaica shop in Yerushalayim with her 1-year-old baby in a stroller. “Please, I’d like to see your finest gold menorah,” she said. The saleslady pulled over a ladder and took down the $5,000 gold menorah – the most expensive item in the shop. The young lady’s eyes lit up. “Wow, this is really something,” she gushed. “Do you mind watching my baby while I run out and show it to my husband in the car? This is his idea, but it is a lot of money so I’d like to just double-check with him before finalizing.” As the recipient of commissions on high-end items, the saleslady’s eyes also lit up. “Sure, no problem.”

Five minutes passed, and then ten, but the saleslady wasn’t worried. After all, spending $5,000 is not a snap decision, and the young woman had left her baby there, so she would certainly be back soon.

Fifteen minutes later, a woman burst into the shop, screaming hysterically, “My baby! My baby!” This woman had left her baby unattended on the sidewalk while she entered a store, and the first lady – a professional con artist – took advantage by taking the baby, entering the Judaica shop with a tichel on her head and a baby in tow, and then absconding with the menorah.

The owner of the shop took the saleslady to a din Torah before Rabbi Yitzchok Zilberstein, claiming that she had acted irresponsibly by allowing the menorah out of the shop unsupervised. The saleslady responded that she had done exactly as the owner would have wanted her to do, and in fact what he himself would have done had he been there. After all, who would suspect that the baby had been nabbed off the street?

Harav Zilberstein paskened that the saleslady indeed had acted as the owner would have wanted, and therefore was not liable to pay. But the real guilty party in this story was the woman who had left her baby unattended. She violated the takanah of Chazal that a woman may not walk in the street with her child trailing behind her, out of her sight.

Source: Hamodia November 27, 2019

Bava Metzia

Bava Metzia 66b: Selling the Reward for One’s Mitzvos

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Bava Metzia 66b: If someone sells the future fruits of a date palm to his friend, Rav Huna said: Until they grow, he can back out, but once they grow he cannot back out. Rav Nachman said: Even after they grow he can back out.

בבא מציעא סו ע”ב: המוכר פירות דקל לחבירו, אמר רב הונא: עד שלא באו לעולם ־ יכול לחזור בו. משבאו לעולם ־ אין יכול לחזור בו, ורב נחמן אמר: אף משבאו לעולם ־ יכול לחזור בו.

A Jew in Tiberias who was known as a tzaddik sold half of his mitzvos to a wealthy man for 22,000 rubles. The buyer paid half the amount, but before paying the other half he went to see a rav, who asked Hashem to send him an answer through a dream as to whether this was a worthwhile purchase. He received the answer that this “tzaddik” was not any better than anyone else. The buyer went back to the “tzaddik” and demanded a refund. But the seller refused, and instead demanded the other half of the sale price. The dispute was presented to the Netziv (Meishiv Davar v. 3, siman 14)

The Netziv commented that this seller showed, by the very fact that he sold his mitzvos, that he was not a tzaddik. He brings several proofs:

  1. Selling one’s mitzvos is what Esav did. The Torah’s criticism of Esav is not that he sold the birthright for a bowl of soup. The Rashbam says that Esav sold it for its full value, and the soup was only to close the deal. Still, the Torah says that he despised the birthright, because a right-thinking person realizes that spiritual reward is priceless and should not be sold for any money in the world.
  2. We see in the Gemara in Taanis (25a) that Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa received a golden leg from his table in Olam Haba and he returned it to Heaven. In Shemos Rabbah (52) we see that his wife was the one who demanded that he return it. So how much more wrong it is to deliberately sell the honor of Hashem, to take pleasure in Hashem in Olam Haba, in order to receive physical pleasure in this world. It is like one whom the king honored with a medal and he sold it to something else. Such a person has despised the honor of the king and deserves a punishment.  
  3. The Torah says, “You have cried in the ears of Hashem, saying, ‘We wish we could eat meat! It was better for us Egypt.’ Hashem will give you meat and you will eat.” (Bamidbar 11:18) The complainers remembered the physical pleasures of Egypt, and paid no attention to the spiritual pleasures in the desert, where they enjoyed the revelation of the Shechinah on a constant basis. Therefore Hashem said, I will give you meat until it comes out of your noses, because you rejected Hashem who is in your midst. The same could be said of this man who despised the pleasure of Olam Haba and sold it for physical pleasure, for money. He is deserving of punishment and does not fit the description of a man on a high spiritual level.

Then the Netziv asks on himself from the story (Sotah 21a) of Shimon the brother of Azariah and Rabbi Yochanan of the Nasi’s house, who sold half their reward for learning Torah to those who supported them. He answers that there it is different because they did it in order to be able to learn Torah. The Mishnah in Avos (4:17) says, “One hour of teshuva and good deeds in this world is better than all the life of Olam Haba.” They loved the Torah so much that they didn’t demand full reward for it in Olam Haba, only to take pleasure in Hashem through the battle of Torah. The Gemara also brings the story of Hillel and his brother Shevna, where Shevna offered Hillel money in return for partnership in the reward for his Torah, but a Heavenly voice proclaimed, “If a man gives all the wealth of his house for love, they would despise him.” [Most understand this to be because Hillel had already learned Torah, so the money would not help him learn more; it was merely an attempt to buy off his reward. But the Netziv disagreed with this – perhaps Hillel would continue learning thanks to Shevna’s money.] The money would have helped Hillel learn with a clear mind and no worries. But Hillel was so engrossed in his learning that his poverty did not bother him in the least, as the Gemara tells about him (Yuma 35b) that he used to earn a small coin and give half to the guard at the Beis Medrash door and sit and learn. Therefore he refused to take the money. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Shimon the brother of Azariah knew that if they would have to worry about making a living, it would disturb their learning, as we find in Eiruvin 65a that Abaye said that even a small interruption, like his mother asking him to bring the cereal to the table, would decrease his ability to learn. Therefore they agreed to give up spiritual pleasure in Olam Haba in order to learn diligently. But to simply exchange spiritual pleasure for physical pleasure – that is like the attitude of the complainers in the desert.

The Netziv then takes the position that the sale was not valid, and offers six arguments:

  1. The man sold half of his reward, presumably including Torah. But one cannot sell reward for Torah, because that means sitting in the yeshiva in Olam Haba, and only real scholars can do this. As an analogy, there is difference between selling an honor bestowed by a king, which can be done, although it is insulting to the king to do so, and selling a position conferred by the king on a skilled person. One cannot sell the position because the buyer doesn’t have the requisite skills. So once the part of the sale that covers reward for Torah is invalid, the entire sale is invalid.
  2. Reward for mitzvos is a דבר שלא בא לעולם which we hold one cannot sell. And even according to the opinion that one can sell דבר שלא בא לעולם, the sale only takes effect when it comes into existence (Bava Metzia 66b), which in this case would be after the seller’s death, at which time no sale can take place.
  3. There is no act of kinyan.
  4. The Rosh and the Shiltei Hagiborim (in the 8th chapter of Bava Kama) disagree on whether one can sell the rights to a mitzvah. For example, the mitzvah of bris milah falls upon the father: can the father sell the right to do the mitzvah to someone else? Their disagreement stems from two different interpretations of the story of Yaakov and Esav. The Shiltei Hagiborim holds that Esav really sold the right to offer korbanos to Yaakov, only that he could go back on the sale since there was no kinyan; therefore Yaakov made him swear not to go back. The Rosh holds that the sale was not effective at all. But both agree that if one has already done a mitzvah, one cannot sell the reward to another person.
  5. The Gemara in Kiddushin says that a person who regrets doing a mitzvah loses his reward. If it were possible to sell the reward, we could have the absurd situation where the seller could regret his mitzvah and buyer would lose the reward he paid for.
  6. The reason why you cannot sell the reward of a mitzvah, says the Netziv, is because the reward comes as a natural consequence of the mitzvah, just as healing is a consequence of taking medicine (Midrash Rabbah beginning of Re’eh, Midrash Tehillim 132). The reason why teshuva helps is that teshuva is a type of medicine too.

Therefore, the sale of the mitzvos was invalid and the buyer can demand back his 11,000 rubles.

Source: Meishiv Davar Chelek 3, Siman 14